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USE OF THESIS

The Use of Thesis statement is not included in this version of the thesis.

ABSTRACT
A Bell in the Storm - Persistent unexplained pain and the language of
the uncanny in the creative neurophenomenal reference is a doctoral
work comprised of three parts. Part 1 is an exegesis Persistent
unexplained pain and the language of the uncanny in the creative
neurophenomenal reference; Part 2 is The Plays, A Bell in the Storm
(produced by deckchair theatre in May, 2005) and the radio play To
Fall Without Landing (produced by the Australian Broadcasting
Commission for Radio National in October 2005); and, Part 3 the
book of monochord poems, Secrets of the Driftwood.
The exegesis begins with specific anecdotes of my experience of a
serious car accident in May 2000 and a subsequent persistent
unexplained pain state that nonetheless pose deeply theoretical
questions about the human experience of pain. The body-mind dualism
of Renes Descartes’ L’Homme and its inculcation into the classical
specificity theory of pain in medical discourse is examined. The bodymind classical pain theory is then critiqued initially in light of the mid
1960s’ literary theories of Jacques Derrida and then Melzack and
Wall’s medical Gate Control Theory (1965), through to more recent
neurobiological evidence from Szentagothai, Erdi, Maturana and
Varela (and others). These recent neurobiological theories challenge
the classical theory’s supportability through the brain’s ability to selforganise, in complex and unpredictable ways that defy the
commonsense of medical discourse. Pain and other phenomenal
states may emerge in uncanny ways that amounts to a self-referential
neurophenomenology that is inseparable from our ontology. Pain and
the problem of reference in both language and neurophenomenology
are considered in light of the writings of Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man,
Cathy Caruth and others in what de Man and Caruth describe as the
fall. This cooperation between the self-referentiality of language and
the brain is theoretically explored, particularly through the creative
reference of Lacan, Kristeva, and Scarry. This creative reference is
then referenced through both the aleatory photographic creations of
Nick Djordjevic and their presence in the stage play A Bell in the Storm
and Caruth’s fall into the radio play To Fall Without Landing.
In part 2, both plays attempted the practical creative relation of the
difficulties and joys, the lack and the gain, the uncanny and the bathos,
the fall from and to ‘the other’ (and how these binaries are never in
opposition) that the exegesis theoretically uncovered, within the
different mediums of the multi-media stage and radio. The monochords
of Part 3 relate to the inexpressibility of pain and its self-referentiality
(in particularly the English language) and the uncanny moments
glimpsed in single line or chordal expressions.
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Introduction
The world becomes its language and its language becomes the world. But it
is a world out of control, in flight from ideology, seeking verbal security and
finding none beyond that promised by a poetic text, but always a selfunsealing poetic text.
– Murray Kreiger. A Re-opening of Closure: Organisation Against Itself.

The thesis of this study enabled me to bring two aspects of my
professional life together. The first, as a professional clinical and
research nurse of twenty years in psychiatric health care and, the
second, as a playwright, poet and musician. When my own body
became so painfully volatile after a car serious car accident in May
2000, I was catapulted into a world I was used to professionally
observing. Not only that but the very profession I was involved in
was the profession that so disbelieved my pain state. I also found
there was very little language available to express my pain to my
doctors, colleagues, friends, my wife and my children. What was so
obvious to me seemed to engender doubt in the others of my life
because there seemed no empirical evidence of tissue or bony
damage or lesion to explain my persistent pain.

The dominant medical discourse’s explanations of pain rely on a
drawing in L’Homme by Renes Descartes in 1644. In this modest
drawing, a boy has his toe too close to a fire. The fire burns the toe
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causing pain to ring in the brain through the nerves being pulled like
a rope ringing a bell at the other end. Pain, in this discourse, is
specifically caused by a lineal and upward process of bodily
damage or lesion. My question, then, is how one can have
persistent and severe pain without any verifiable bodily lesion – that
is to say – obvious damage to the body? Furthermore, if this
question has been impossible to prove beyond the sufferer’s own
experience, then how could the sufferer communicate and
functionally live in a world that defies the common sense of the
above explanation?

I examine and critique the discourse of medicine’s specificity theory
of pain, which I argue, is based upon the body-mind dualism of
Rene Descartes. That is, either the pain is caused by verifiable
damage or lesion to the body or in the absence of this damage or
lesion, the pain must be all in the mind. This interpretation also
attempts to sweep pain’s unexplained and persistent presence
under the carpet of the mind. I examine the mind’s inability to
escape the play of language and affirm its presence outside of
metaphysics. I deliberately employ Jacques Derrida’s mid-1960s
linguistic theories of play, noncentredness and supplementarity to
examine current linguistic and epistemological attributions and
definitions of ‘the mind’. Since ‘the mind’, despite Descartes’ res
cogitans, is not comprised of atoms and cells, it lacks a corporeal
centre and becomes subject to Derrida’s sense of play, as any
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structurality of the mind escapes its own structurality. The centre of
the mind is always ‘elsewhere’ because it is trapped in an
epistemological and linguistic circle: ‘for mind see mind’, which is in
a never-ending circular search for its noncentred and playful identity
and presence. Play, in this sense, is the disruption of the mind’s
presence.

Co-operating with Derrida’s linguistic and metaphysical play, I
further critique the body-mind problem of pain in light of the Gate
Control Theory developed by the medical pain theorists Melzack
and Wall, also in mid-1960s. The specificity theory’s body-mind
explanation of pain relies on the brain being a passive and
hardwired mechanism much like a computer. The mind then
mysteriously reads the printout. The corporeal pain signal is
therefore always travelling up predictably to the brain from some
lesion in the body. If no lesion is detectable then it is axiomatic that
any pain must be all in the mind and therefore other than a
[corpo]real pain. Melzack and Wall however, explored what they
termed the variable link of pain, wherein they examined the
presence of severe pain without obvious lesion, as well as the
absence or delay of pain in the presence of severe injury. They
postulated there was some corporeal interference or greater
nervous system complexity that behaved like a gate at the dorsal
horn (of the spine) along Descartes’ rope. Pain signals from a
lesion below the dorsal horn could be inhibited or allowed to pass
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up to the brain. These signals however, to open or close the gate,
had to involve some activating downwards causation from the
central nervous system or the brain itself. Furthermore they
theorised that pain signals themselves could originate from the
central nervous system and descend through the dorsal horn to the
body. This meant that the brain did not predictably reflect the
painful severity of a lesion but radically modified and in some cases
engendered the human experience of pain.

The Gate Control Theory caused much vituperation and division in
medical discourse in the 1960s and 1970s but by 1983, this
reaction had to acknowledge the growing evidence of dorsal horn
modulation and the deep involvement of, to borrow from Freud, the
dark continent of the neuroplastic brain. In 1984, Janos
Szentagothai published his paper Downwards Causation in the
Journal of Theoretical Medicine. By 1993, Szentagothai, along with
his colleagues Michael Arbib and Peter Erdi, had found the brain to
be autopoietic, or self-organising in ways that were neither monist
nor dualist in nature. They also found that this self-organisation
occurred in non-centred ways that required the help of professional
philosophers to interpret, especially considering they also
signposted negentropy as an extra phenomenon of the selforganising brain. Negentropy is negative entropy where the output
from the brain could exceed the input of the stimulus to it. In terms
of pain this may mean pain states can and do emerge from the
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brain that exceeds the predictions of input-equals-output reflexive
models. Such emergent phenomena though, are in no way, limited
to pain but, given the self-referentiality of the brain, defiant of any
universal theories of prediction. Erdi argued that no structural
theory – no matter how dynamic - could cope with the brain’s global
self-referentiality and he concluded that the brain ought to be
considered as post-structural.

The exegesis then investigates a cooperation between the theories
of poststructuralist or self-referential linguistics and the selfreferential brain. Both engender rather than reflect the phenomenal
world in uncanny ways through three essentially cooperative
properties: 1. self-organisation or play; 2. this self organisation or
play takes place in the context of a noncentred heterogeneous
complexity that Derrida termed the presence of the noncentre; and,
3. both linguistic and neural phenomena emerge in uncanny or
unpredictable negentropic ways that for linguistics, Derrida termed
supplementarity and, for neural phenomena, the discourse of
neuroscience terms emergent properties.

I pursue an inquiry into the cooperative processes between the selfreferentiality of language and neurophenomenology through the
work of Humberto Maturana’s Biology of Cognition that argues our
neurophenomenology goes the core of our epistemology and
humanness as languaging beings. Our neurophenomenology
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engenders our ontology and our ontology engenders our
neurophenomenology and they are both inseparable from the other.
A problem of reference ensues however, because if both our
language systems and neurophenomenology are self-referential
and, by definition, they are doing more than we know, then how can
we gain meaningful access to the world and even consciousness
itself? I engage the work of Cathy Caruth and Paul de Man to
vantage what Caruth terms the problem of reference through a
literal and figurative understanding of falling. I consider the
important differences between a constative and performative text
within the creative reference, which is always engaged in doing
more than it knows. Reference to world, de Man tells us, is gained
not through access to an objectively stable universal truth but
through a literal and theoretical falling. What self-referential theory
does is fall, and in falling, it refers.

I examine the creative reference within the aporia of unexplained
persistent pain through Elaine Scarry’s creative frame and pain’s
inexpressibility and, the Lacanian and post Lacanian ideas of Julia
Kristeva. I engage the creative acts of Nick Djordjevic’s storm
photography in both their theoretical and practical involvement in
the play A Bell in the Storm, the radio play To Fall Without Landing
and the writing of the monochords for Secrets of the Driftwood.
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This exegesis is a contribution to a co-operation between literary
theories of self-referentiality and creativity and interpretations of
unexplained and persistent pain, in light of the neuroplastic brain’s
self-referential involvement in such a pain and creativity’s mystery.
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Chapter 1
The Big Bang

On the evening of Friday the nineteenth of May, 2000, I was driving
my wife’s Saab home from a poetry reading. At a red light only a
minute from our home, I wondered which Friday night film I would
watch with our children, then aged ten and seven, and if I would be
back in time for its start at eight-thirty. I noticed the car clock
displayed 8.28 pm. David Sylvian’s Secrets of the Bullfight was
playing on the car stereo. I put my left hand on the volume knob to
turn the music down and ring my wife just as ‘Simon’ did in the
opening scene of the play A Bell in the Storm:
Simon

(To himself) Come the Sabbath??? (Long
Pause… then into the mobile) Steph? It’s me…
(Pause) Yes I’m driving, but it’s Ok… I’m stationary
at a red light… (Pause) Yes… (Pause) About a
minute and half away… Tell her I’m sorry I’m
late…I’ll watch the movie with her just as soon as I
get home… (Pause) How was the reading? (Truck
headlights are incoming like munitions. Music
up to effect this) The poetry was Ok but she’s got
this big name now and…

The lights explode into Simon… Stage effects to effect The
thinning… (Buchanan, 2005, p 185).

I am still unsure about the bang, the impact, the concussion of
sound and energy caused by a four wheel drive hitting my car
without braking, doing what one witness described as at least
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‘90ks’. I say ‘unsure about the bang’, because I cannot, even now,
distinguish between the external event of the impact, in what I have
come to call the big bang and my deeply perturbed, confused and
synaesthetic apprehension of what happened to me in the driver’s
seat of that car. The explosion of metallic sound emanated from
deep inside me, as the sheer violence of the accident seemed to
have been always already in my every blood cell, something that I
could at once taste, see, smell as well as hear: colourful, pungent,
bitter. I could neither inhale nor exhale an air that seemed so
instantly charged with this energy of a storm raging in a space that
was neither internal nor external but, whatever it was, I was
somehow strewn across both as if the external and internal had
never been in opposition. I knew that if I were to be strewn too
much, too far, too widely that I would probably die. I do not recall
feeling anxious, or sad, or fearful, or even curious because what
was happening to me seemed so obvious and inevitable that it was
simply the way of the big bang. What I do recall though is the
profound presence of something that I would come to know
intimately over the coming years that would though elude any
language I used to describe it and conjure doubt in everyone else I
loved, knew, or was clinically treated by: pain.

Pain was with me when I woke in the ambulance and again in
hospital. As I was stabilised (as one nurse in the Emergency unit
put it), I recognized that this pain wasn’t something external, that is
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something that was with me but, something that was me. I
complained of this pain to the nurse and then again to the
physicians treating me. They were highly concerned and attentive. I
was given morphine and taken to be X-rayed and CT scanned. As
the orderly pushed me through the hospital corridors, I thought I
was flying through the air looking down at the ceiling which I
thought to be a map of this dynamic new world I had entered. I
smiled, undoubtedly stoned, and the orderly in noticing gave me a
look that was to become the most familiar non-verbal expression I
would notice in others relating to my pain over the next five years:
the eyes narrowing, the gaze straying slightly in Elaine Scarry’s
edict on pain:
To have pain is to have certainty. To hear about pain is to have
doubt. (Scarry, 1984, p 13).

Scarry’s edict of doubt concerning the validation of pain in others
became institutionalized in my case when all the X-rays, CT scans,
MRI scans revealed No Abnormalities Detected (NAD). This
institutional doubt would become a concentrated and aggressive
ideological disparagement (Merskey and Teassel, 2000, p 259).
Such disparagement is redolent of Louis Althusser’s notion of
interpellation: “Hey you – why are you in pain?” or even worse,
“Hey you – you can not be in pain” (Althusser, 1962, p 152). An
ideology concerning whether or not the suffering of pain is bona
fide, seems to exist and pervade a discourse that operates within
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insurance agencies, medico-legal practice, the workplace, and
even within the ‘institution’ of my marriage.

I was sent home from the Emergency Department the following
morning, with no medications for pain or anything else. I was told
there was nothing wrong with me, and if I did need follow-up to see
my GP. By then the morphine had well and truly worn off. I could
barely walk. As I left the unit a nurse approached me and said “I’d
buy a lottery ticket if I were you… You were lucky… Hardly
scratched.” This was a sentiment echoed by the investigating police
officer over the phone on the Sunday evening: “You’re lucky mate –
I can’t usually talk to people who have been hit as hard as you
were… Ya car’s completely written off. We’ve charged the joker
who hit you – he left the scene of the accident and fronted up at the
station with his father, who’s a lawyer, at one-in-the-morning,
drinking from a bottle of Scotch. I can’t tell you what he’s been
charged with – that’d be a breach of privacy – but here’s his full
name and address, date of birth and place of work…” Still
concussed, I scribbled down the driver’s details through the fog of
an obtunded consciousness, unable to keep up with the officer’s
ever-growing impatience. When I hung up the phone I scrawled in
large letters: HIT AND RUN… DRUNK DRIVER… PRIVACY!
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Either/Or

From the horrors of World War 1 and its high explosive detonations
pounding a concentration of men in their trenches, and in the open
carnage of no-mans-land (Le terraine vagues, as the French called
it), came three groups of those who were afflicted by something
that was named War Neuroses and Shell Shock (Mott, 1919, p 1 –
47). The first group was killed instantly “yet no visible injury has
been found to account for it.” (Mott, 1919, p 1). The second group
had external and visible injuries that were however, incongruent
with the symptoms suffered, which “… leads one to consider that in
a large proportion of cases of shell shock… there are factors at
work in the production of the nervous symptoms besides the actual
aerial forces generated by the explosive.” (Mott, 1919, p 1). “The
third group includes affections of the central nervous system
without visible external injury.” (Mott, 1919, p 1). In the play A Bell
in the Storm, Andrew’s expert medical testimony addresses the
court on these mysterious afflictions:
Andrew

In World War 1 soldiers were subject to high
explosive blasts that caused no obvious injuries yet
they fell either unconscious or were killed instantly.

Sally

I still can’t work out why some were killed and some
weren’t!

Andrew

It was a mystery. It was termed commotio cerebri:
meaning a commoted brain or shell shock. But the
many soldiers who survived these blasts, woke up
in pain, sometimes not being able to talk – they
even lost the use of limbs. Many of them, including
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the ones who were killed, had any obvious injuries.
So, their symptoms were diagnosed as being “all in
the mind”, when it was a brain and nervous system
disturbance all along. (Buchanan, 2005, p 230).

Mott then divided up the causation of shell shock into two
categories: Physical trauma, which he described as commotio
cerebri and Psychic trauma, which he described as emmotio
cerebri. Mott actually considered the psychogenic factors to be:
…by far the most frequent and important cause of shell shock
followed by a psychoneurosis, particularly hysteria… being
dependent in a great measure upon the personality of the individual
soldier, his mental attitude, and bodily condition at the time of the
shock (whether of emotional or commotional origin) which led to his
collapse.” (Mott,1919, p 2).

Mott was to later describe these men as “naturally of a timorous
dispossession.” (Mott, 1919, p 16). I still recall my grandfather
sitting at his kitchen table in the 1960s. He had his head in his
hands, unable to cope anymore with his pain that was ‘all through
him’ and had plagued him since those same battles had seen him
‘blown to hell and back’:
“What’s wrong with Grandpa?”
“Nothing… He has one of his headaches again.” My Grandma
would reply.

These headaches were never discussed openly. In contrast his
dramatic episodes when newly married were recounted around the
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dining table like myths. My grandmother would recall with pride how
he would wake to the roars of the lions in the South Perth Zoo
across Matilda Bay, and, would throw her on the floor, with him on
top to protect her from the dawn shells raining in from the Somme,
Passchendaele or Pozieres. Such actions were considered not only
heroic but readily understandable. His pain however was neither
heroic nor understandable. No obvious physical injury was
detectable. Even less obvious, that is to say, kept hidden and
secret was his suffering the shame and indignation in being denied
a Veteran’s pension in the 1960s, on the grounds he suffered from
no discernable injury even though he had been twice decorated for
valour and bravery with the Military Medal and Military Medal with
Bar from the battles of Passchendaele and Pozieres (one of only
437 soldiers from the AIF to be so decorated throughout the entire
war). The suffering of persistent pain is often kept hidden and
secret because as Patrick Wall put it:
They move like draught horses, uncomplaining, heads down in
continuous driving snow. Not only have their multiple treatments
failed, but they have suffered the indignity of being told that their
pain will go away and/or that it is all in their heads. (Wall, 1999, p 8
– 9).

Implicit in this suffering is a sense of shame as for Scarry’s edict:
“To hear about pain is to have doubt” (Scarry, 1984, p 13), that is it
is all in their heads and this leads to an explicit personal shame.
Even so he was determined to fight the decision that denied him
not only his pain and a heart attack he suffered in his fifties, but, his
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actual experience of a war he had never really recovered from
since 1919. Indeed, 1919 was the same year Dr Frederick Mott
M.D., LL.D., F.R.S., F.R.C.P., ; BREVET LT.-COL. R.A.M.C. (T)
concluded about such afflictions:
…from a far greater experience I have come to recognize the fact
that the psychogenic factor is the predominant causal agent in “War
Psychoneuroses,” and that a large proportion of cases which were
regarded as shell shock did not owe their condition to any
pathological changes which would have been recognizable in the
central nervous system by any known methods of microscopic
investigation; in fact, they were functional psychoneuroses. (My

italics, Mott, 1919, p 5).

For Mott, like so many others that followed him, such afflictions
were a case of “either-or”. That is, either the pain my grandfather
suffered was evidenced by bodily damage or it was not. If it was
not, then it was axiomatic: it was psychogenic, that is, all in his
mind.

In this sense there is a body-mind dualism at work here that
predicates Mott’s conclusion of more than eighty years ago. This
dualism was at work to deny my grandfather’s pension in the
1960s, and was still at work in my own case, in all but one of the
specialist physicians I saw in the first months after my accident in
the year 2000. This one doctor was Dr John Quintner; a
Rheumatologist and Pain Medicine Physician who had joined
forces with a colleague in Pain Medicine from the University of New
South Wales, Associate Professor Milton Cohen to, “make our
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colleagues in medical practice see beyond the dualism which limits
their practice and prejudices their patients” (Personal
correspondence, Quinter, 2000).

Prove it…

My introductory session with Dr Quintner however, did not start
well. It was some six weeks since the accident. I was in increasing
difficulty and tremendous pain. I felt my life had changed so much
that the person I was before the accident was almost
unrecognizable to me let alone to my wife and children. I couldn’t
sleep, I wasn’t eating properly and occasionally the pain would flare
up to such a degree that it left me without prospect of comfort. The
medications I had been given were not only unhelpful but gave me
side effects that compounded the pain.

Above all though, I had this awful feeling that has never really left
me since the accident. This feeling is difficult to describe, but I
sensed the accident had strewn me or some how disrupted or
ontologically dislocated my sense of self. I sensed that things were
greatly disturbed. I couldn’t see properly; my bowels were not
working as they had and they leaked an almost clear fluid. I couldn’t
empty my bladder and despite sometimes standing over the toilet
for many minutes I would have what was to be called terminal
dribbling for up to half an hour later. I also couldn’t think very clearly
at all, sometimes mangling sentences that would have flowed
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before the accident. Mostly though, the pain manifested itself
through my neck, particularly the left side and, it would spread
down my left arm to make my thumb, fore and middle finger tingling
sore. It would continue down my back, into my left leg to produce a
strangely painful semi-inflated balloon for the sole of my left foot.
The headaches too were literally and figuratively blinding. On the
few occasions my wife and I had tried to make love, what had been
for me, the most beautiful of dances was horribly staggered, and
pain flared down my neck, left arm, back and left leg before inflating
the balloon that had become my left foot.

What really worried me however, was this feeling of being strewn
too far, too wide. Secretly I felt I might even after such a period, be
dying. I also had flashbacks of the accident itself. I was suddenly
lying down in the car. The backseat was under the front seat, the
boot was where the backseat used to be and my driver’s seat had
collapsed over it all. I couldn’t breathe. There was a man starring in
at me from the middle of the road. He had a lit cigarette and
breathed smoke onto the pane. I tried to get him to help me but I
couldn’t move. He turned away with a numbing indifference. I still
couldn’t breathe and I started to become thin, to again spread out.
Then I was in the ambulance with an oxygen mask on my face with
this officer reassuring me. I heard the siren going every now and
then and each bump in the road striking through me like lightning.
Then I was getting thin again, strewn again.
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I still have the greatest difficulty discussing this with trained
psychologists let alone loved ones. The following excerpt from the
play between Sally and Simon portrays such an experience:
Sally

Simon Sharrin?

Simon

I used to be…

Sally

Tell me about your pain?

Simon

It was a four wheel drive…

Sally

He was drunk.

Simon

I got so… thinned… like I was becoming a gas

Sally

Tell me about your pain.

Simon

It’s the price I pay…

Sally

For not dying? What is it – your pain?

Simon

There aren’t the words…

Sally

Never?

Simon

There are no words…

Sally

There’s always hope… (Buchanan, 2005, p 186).

I walked into John Quintner’s office and wanted to tell him about all
these things. Instead I found myself telling him the usual facts
about the accident. I was hit by a hit-and-run drunk driver who left
the scene of the accident. He had hit me doing 90 kilometres per
hour. He couldn’t have seen my car stationary at a red light. I was
knocked out and taken to Fremantle Hospital by ambulance.

I was gob-smacked when he replied “I don’t care what the accident
was like.” I had an inclination to stand up and walk out then and
there. Instead I said: “I’m in terrible pain!” He just looked at me and
said: “Prove it…” I looked at him as if he was mad, but then I saw in
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his eyes that this clause, “prove it”, was the great issue surrounding
my ‘condition’.

I left his office feeling something that has never left me since. How
could my pain, which was so overwhelmingly obvious to me be the
cause of so much doubt in others?

Chapter 2
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Ringing the Bell…

Immanuel Kant argued that the experience of pain was proof of life:
Pain is the spur to activity, and only through pain do we feel
ourselves to be fully alive. Without pain we should be lifeless. (Kant,
1798, p 392).

This is a maxim summed by the aphorism: in life is pain, in pain is
life. Proving however, that pain exists in any one person at any one
point in time, is a matter that has confounded and indeed still
confounds the full spectrum of multi-disciplined healthcare
professionals, legal systems, insurance and governmental
institutions right down to the sufferer and their most intimately
known and lived relationships and subjective experiences (Scarry,
1984, p 3). The empirical conundrum of pain can be summed up by
the notion that while we know that it exists, we have little idea how
it works (Chapman, 2004). Pain represents theoretically at least, an
aporia or a space to which we are denied access if only because
we are denied access to the space of its secrets, and yet, it will not
allow us to be free of it either (Derrida, 1994, p 12) [1]. Like
Derrida’s vantage on death – ‘My death cannot be held as death
itself holds what I am’ (Derrida, 1994, p 54), my pain cannot be held
as pain itself holds what I am.

In terms of clinical practice what may be happening with people in
pain has been and often is still informed by the single most
influential hermeneutic for pain: the classical specificity theory of
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pain (Melzack, 1977, p 126 – 7). [2]. The classical specificity theory
undoubtedly owes its origins to the drawing L’Homme and
subsequent explanation by Renes Descartes in 1644:

Descartes’ L’Homme (1644)

Rene Descartes (1644), L’Homme

(Descartes, 1644, cited in Melzack, 1977, p 127)

We can see above that this boy has his toe, marked B, too close to
the small fire, marked A. The line (or rope) drawn between B and a
small circle or centre in the brain marked F, is marked C. Melzack
and Wall consider this single drawing and its lineal and mechanistic
explanation of pain to be the rock upon which the classical theory of
pain has been built. (Melzack and Wall, 1984, p137) As Descartes’
own explanation attests, pain is, for this classical theory, always the
predictable result of an obvious lesion caused by an equally
obvious external force:
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If for example fire comes near the foot, the minute particles of this
fire, which as you know move with great velocity, have the power to
set in motion the spot of the skin of the foot which they touch, and
by this means pulling upon the delicate thread which is attached to
the spot of the skin, they open up at the instant the pore against
which the delicate thread ends, just as by pulling at one end of a
rope makes to strike at the same instant a bell which hangs at the
other end. (Descartes, cited in Melzack, 1977, p 127).

There is a syllogism at work here in the ringing of Descartes’ Bell
that entails more than just without fire there can be no pain. Indeed,
this syllogism is bound to the idea that the brain and its nervous
system are hardwired, that is to say a causally reflexive and
structured mechanism that is inherently predictable in terms of any
input reflecting a congruent, predictable and reflexive output.
(Melzack, 1973, p 127). As the terminal clause of Descartes’
explanation suggests; there must be a fire or some external spatial
phenomenon that causes material tissue damage. This tissue
damage (A &B) in turn is lineally and temporally relayed as an
upwardly mobile message that is at the same instant conveyed by
the nerves (just as by pulling at one end of a rope) C, strikes a bell
which hangs at the other end, F. The syllogism is, then, unless you
have fire in real time causing actual tissue damage, the rope of the
nervous system cannot be pulled and the bell of pain in the brain
cannot ring. In short, without tissue damage of the instant there can
be no physical pain as the following dialogue from the play explores
this as it is inculcated into psycho-medical discourse:
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Andrew

…In 1644, he drew a little bloke with his toe getting
burnt by fire… which pulled on a bloody rope that
was attached to a bell in the brain! Fire, pulls the
rope, rings the bell – pain! (He goes through the
routine) Descartes’ bell. And the moral of Simon’s
story is… if there’s no fire – there can be no pain.
(Buchanan, 2005, p 202).

The problem that arises here is that Simon, like myself and many
thousands of others, experience a persistent pain sans fire. When
there seems to be no temporal, spatial or material causality for the
experience of pain, the experience of pain must be due to the
nonphysical phenomena of the mind. (Besson, 1999, p 1610). This
is then the flip side of this same wholly physical Cartesian syllogism
of pain: if there is no lesion to be found in the body, any experience
of pain must be the product of the mind. This theory of pain which
we can call ‘classical’, differentiates two distinct and utterly
separate types of pain. The first is bodily or physical pain and the
other is all in the mind (Quintner and Cohen, 1999, p 1092).

In the absence of a verifiable lesion afflicting someone then any
pain must be the product of Mott’s psychoneurosis (1919) or as
clinician’s such as Ferrari and Shorter (2003), Barsky (1992) and
Lucire (2003) argue: somatisation. All of which, as one barrister for
the Insurance Commission of Western Australia put it when arguing
against the validity of a sufferer’s claim of pain, amounts to a
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phantom pain falling into line with Descartes’ bell (Peace, 2002, p
12).

The risk inherent in the above body-mind explanations is when a
bodily cause cannot be found, they may delegitimise the
experience of pain as phantom pain because it is all in the mind.
The signifier mind however, is at the very least, subject to that
which Derrida termed ‘the metaphysics of presence’, since
linguistically the signified of the mind assumes the presence of a
locus, a centre or a natural site. Derrida points out that such a
linguistic presence is metaphysical:
Since these concepts are not elements or atoms, and since they are
taken from a syntax and a system, every particular borrowing brings
along with it the whole of metaphysics. (Derrida, 1978, p 355).

Derrida argues here that the metaphysics of the mind, lacks any
actuality of elements and atoms, and thus entails a presence of the
mind’s locus or centre only within the construction of syntax. So,
just what the mind actually is has always been historically enigmatic
dating right back to Empedocles and continuing through modernist
thinking, as D.B. Klein outlines:
The perennial nature of the mind-body problem in history is revealed
by recurrent references to it age after age from ancient Greek times
to present. …The notion of a cleavage between mental life and the
bodily organism was already manifest in Plato’s concept of a
separate realm of universal ideas, in his doctrine of reminiscence,
as well as in his mystical belief in reminiscence. Both he and
Aristotle, had something to say about the bodily locus of mind, with
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Plato selecting the head and Aristotle, following an earlier teaching
of Empedocles, selecting the heart. (Klein,1970, p 228 - 29)

It wasn’t until the 1600s however, that Rene Descartes refined the
presence of the mind to something which constituted a thing, or, as
he described it, the res cogitans (the thinking thing). Descartes’ res
cogitans has undeniable influence on philosophy from it’s
inculcation into the reason of the enlightenment and its subsequent
inculcation into medical and psychological discourse over the last
three centuries (Melzack, 1977, p 134). If Aristotle and Plato gave
conceptual weight to the mind’s metaphysical premise and mystery,
then Descartes elevated the status of the mind to that of a thing,
working in an utterly distinct way from the body. In A Bell in the
Storm, Andrew discusses this presence with Sally (Simon’s
psychologist) in relation to Simon’s experience of pain, in the
prevailing medico-legal explanations of pain without verifiable
lesion:
Andrew

But if he complains of pain – then (he taps his head)
it must be a ‘phantom’ pain and he’s referred to
someone like you who deals with the mind and he
won’t get a brass razoo cos his pain’s not real!
(Buchanan, 2005 p 202).

Clearly the suffering of a pain state that resides in the mind not only
poses the question of whether or not the pain is real or phantom
but, entails a consequent skepticism, doubt and even
disparagement towards the sufferer by others and institutions alike

32

33
who are influenced by the dominant discourse of the classical
theory (Merskey and Teassel, 2000). In the clinical practice of
treating pain in those without verifiable lesion, the presence of the
mind as the cause of this pain is rarely challenged (Quintner and
Cohen, 1999, p 1094). Little wonder that so many sufferers are
diagnosed with somatisisation and excluded from compensation
claims and the sense of having a legitimate pain state (Lucire,
2003) [3]. The presence of the mind in medical and psychological
discourse and practice has assumed the weight of common sense,
but how this presence is defined is rarely scrutinized.

The Macquarie Dictionary lists forty two different definitions for
mind (Delbridge et al Ed., 1999, p1368). I would however, like to
focus on just three of them: definition one, two, and twelve, since
the others seem to merely outline the semantics of an uncontested
and already assumed or received metaphysics of presence.

Definition one defines the noun mind as:
…that which thinks, feels and wills, exercises perception, judgment,
reflection, etc., as in a human or other conscious being: the
processes of the mind.” (Delbridge et al Ed., 1999, p1368 – their
italics).

“That which thinks, feels…” is undoubtedly informed by Descartes’
(1664) res cogitans (res – the thing, cogitans – thoughts or the
infinitive to think) because the definition considers the mind to be
something with the agency and power to be ‘that which thinks,
33

34
feels…’, that is Descartes’ thing that thinks. The epistemological
problem here is the qualification necessary to establish the
connection of the res or the thing to these thoughts is circular,
because the premise asserts rather than proves its conclusion and
vice versa. What we end up with in this argument is a circle: for
mind, see mind. In the absence of Derrida’s elements and atoms,
Descartes’ proclamation of res cogitans asserts a unique essence
or centre in terms of the signified mind without ever proving its
essence. This practice of “…giving it a centre or referring it to a
point of presence, a fixed origin” hits a metaphysical brick wall but,
possesses none-the-less, an important function necessary for its
currency in any discourse. As Derrida argues:
The function of this centre was not only to orient, balance and
organise the structure … but above all to make sure that the
organising principle of the structure would limit what we might call
the play of the structure. (Derrida, 1978, p 352).

In other words, the existence and structure of the body and the
mind is limited to structures that are governed by organizing
principles that as Belsey has argued, “…inhere timelessly and
universally to each of us” (Belsey, 1982, p 7). Derrida argued that
the centrality of the thing, which in this case is the res cogitans, was
imposed or constructed by a desire to orient, balance and organize
a structure that produces predictable and coherent phenotypes in
order to project a (pseudo) security that we know. There is of
course a contradiction in this position because without the presence
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of elements and atoms, that is some corporeal reference, we can
never have the security that we know. As Derrida again points out:
Thus it was always thought that the centre, which is by definition
unique, constituted that very thing within a structure which while
governing the structure, escapes structurality. … The centre is not
the centre. … And as always, coherence in contradiction expresses
the force of a desire. (Derrida, 1978, p 352)

The metaphysical problem of the mind is always faced with the
unprovable structure. The mind’s thing-ness is simply not there to
be centred; we face a circular contradiction and enforce coherence
through a desire for an organizing principle of security and as
Derrida suggested, “…even today the notion of a structure lacking a
centre represents the unthinkable itself.” (Derrida, 1978, p 352).
Indeed it seems almost unthinkable to consider that the vast
discourse of the mind (philosophy, psychology, psychiatry,
medicine, and nursing to name but a few members) would
challenge its own lack of centrality, its own absence rather than
presence. At stake here is the question does the mind as the thing
(res cogitans) exist, outside the play of this desire and the language
that engenders it?

The MacQuarie’s second definition of mind italicizes its own
definitive premise: “Psychology the psyche; the totality of conscious
and unconscious activities of the organism.” (Delbridge et al Ed.,
1999, p 1368) Here, the mind as a thing has gone on to be
explored and colonised by the practice of psychology and indeed
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psychology entrenches the mind as presence into not only its own
discourse but a general one as well, as Harold Bloom remarked:
Psychology has gone on to become the most powerful mythology of
our age.” (Bloom, 2000, p 123).

The problem with this mythology being passed off as a scientific
knowledge base has been acknowledged even within psychology,
and, it is explicitly conceded in terms of the psychophysical riddle.
As Klein observed thirty-five years ago:
All such theorizing was, of course, little better than vague
speculation; but it does suggest an incipient recognition of what in
later centuries developed into explicit recognition of the
psychophysical riddle: how is the mind as known to psychologists
related to the body as known to physiologists? (Klein, 1970, p 229).

Why is not this psychophysical riddle foregrounded
when considering diagnoses like somatisisation for the
understanding and treatment of pain? Even if persistent
unexplained pain (that is, pain without a verifiable lesion) is
considered to be a product of the mind, then surely this begs a
bigger question: how does this pain produced by the mind, relate to
the pain that is said to be experienced in the body? How can
practitioners and interpreters of the mind be so sure of their
diagnoses when their Freudian epistemological base is itself
unprovable? As Wittgenstein objected in a Berkely lecture, “Freud
is essentially speculation, not even reaching the level of
hypothesis!” (Cited in Bloom, 2000, p 113).
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Wittgenstein’s objection seems to uphold Derrida’s concerns of a
metaphysics of presence in the absence of anything other than the
psychophysical discourse’s desire for the mind’s presence.
Descartes’ mind has evolved into the practice of Psychology, and
has through such an philosophical evolution (from Cartesian to
Freudian thinking), presumed a presence complete with conscious
and unconscious, with ids, egos and super-egos to comprise the
hidden structures of the modernist subject (Derrida, 1978, p 246 291).

It is the question surrounding psychology’s structures though, that
foregrounds its linguistic presence and the subsequent currency
within its discourse, that continually encounter the intrinsic
epistemic and linguistic problems of being ‘trapped in a circle’
(Derrida, 1978, p 355): for Psychology, see Psychology. This circle
is essentially the same as the one for mind see mind as it can only
assert rather than prove its presence. This circle gives us the sense
that we are going forward and making a kind of teleological
progress when we are only circling an aporia we can but speculate
upon, as Derrida points out: “There is no sense of doing without the
concept of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics.” (Derrida,
1978, p 354). When it comes to the presence of the mind outside of
language we must acknowledge an absence an elsewhere-ness.
Far from the security of we know, we apprehend instead a profound
epistemological vantage point that James K Smith describes as
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‘kenotic humility’ (Smith, 2004, p 4). That is, in apprehending this
riddle of the mind, we are both emptied and humbled rather than
being full of a constructed certitude.

Derrida’s use of Montaigne’s aphorism seems fitting here: “We
need to interpret interpretations more than to interpret things.”
(Cited Derrida, 1978, p 351, his italics). This theoretical position
though invites hostility, as Culler points out: “A good deal of hostility
to theory comes from the fact that to admit the importance of theory
is to make an open-ended commitment, to leave yourself in a
position where there are always important things you don’t know.”
(Culler, 1997, p 16) We are caught within this history of
metaphysics, which always already has the inherent paradox of its
own heuristic endeavour – that is, is every theory just a story in a
language system of differences? Culler poses this intrinsic
theoretical dilemma through his engagement with theory and our
desire to reflect the world vying with our need to tell stories about it
in order to plug the gaps of our inabilities to know. Culler argues
that:
…the basic question for theory in the domain of narrative is this: is
narrative a fundamental form of knowledge (giving knowledge of the
world through its sense making) or is it a rhetorical structure that
distorts as much as it reveals? Is the knowledge it purports to
present a knowledge that is the effect of desire? (Culler,1997, p

94)
The idea that the mind’s knowledge base is an oscillation between
sense-making and desire for sense, poses enormous questions for
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the discourse of the mind, which any attempt to answer will always
conflict between reflecting or constating the world as it is and
narrating the world we desire to have and see. Culler elaborates
further:
To answer these questions we would need both knowledge of the
world that is independent of narratives and some basis for deeming
this knowledge more authoritative than what narratives provide...
But whether there is such authoritative knowledge separate from
narrative is precisely what’s at stake in the question of whether
narrative is a source of knowledge or of illusion. So it seems likely
that we cannot answer this question, if indeed it has an answer.
(Culler, 1997, p 95)

Without due consideration and apprehension of Culler’s narrative
and the aporia it encounters in the insuperable oscillation between
sense-making and desire-for-sense, ‘Psychology’ may continue to
appropriate the enforcement of a totality in order to empower its
own desire for its very existence. Even psychologists are
recognizing and openly discussing this problem. For example, the
noted psychologist Carl Vanderwoolfe explains:
It has been repeatedly pointed out that psychology, in contrast to
other scientific fields…has made very limited progress in the past
century… despite strong institutional support and a phenomenal
increase in the number of psychologists. It seems to me that a major
cause of this state of affairs is the failure to abandon an outdated
set of concepts which pose misleading or insoluble problems and
encourage the continued use of ineffectual methods.
(Vanderwoolfe,1998, p135)

Vanderwoolfe’s argument highlights the same problem of the
insoluble circularity for mind see mind. His use of “misleading or
insoluble problems” explicitly refers to psychology’s inherent
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epistemological problem of asserting the mind as a thing complete
with a centre that desires a natural site when any determination of
this position is insoluble. Theoretically, psychology begins in this
sense to encounter that which Derrida termed the noncentre and
play in the discourse of literary theory in the 1960s:
Henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no
centre, that the centre could not be thought in the form of a presentbeing, that the centre had no natural site, that it was not a fixed
locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite number
of sign-substitutions came into play. (Derrida, 1978, p 353)

This play invited Montaigne’s need to interpret interpretations in any
practice rather to desire the one true historically present presence,
which adhered timelessly to a structured and fixed natural site.
There exists here a tension between not just the history of the mind
but, its presence as well. As Derrida suggested concerning a more
universal epistemology:
Besides the tension between play and history, there is also the
tension between play and presence. Play is the disruption of
presence. (Derrida, 1978, p 369)

The notion of Psychology and the mind having a natural site
confers upon both of them a presence, which we have seen, is not
only circular in its desire to make sense of itself but, is disrupted by
a centre that is not a centre and, as Derrida wrote:
Being must be conceived as presence or absence on the basis of
the probability of play and not the other way around. (Derrida, 1978,
p 369).
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Psychology’s Being confers upon itself the status of a natural site or
a locus that “..seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or
an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign and which
leaves the necessity of interpretation as an exile.” (Derrida, 1978, p
369) For Derrida, interpretation is so necessary because it is all we
have in the absence of the centred origin. If you exile the
interpretation of play then you enforce a heuristic desire (that
dreams of deciphering a truth which escapes play) for a centre and
you become “…trapped in a kind of circle” (Derrida, 1978, p 353).
Psychology exists through this circular linguistic practice that
desires certitude but never achieves it. Vanderwoolfe makes this
point as he argued:
The fact that mentalistic terms are a useful part of everyday speech
might be suggested as an argument that such terms must refer to
some aspect of cerebral function. We all know perfectly well what is
meant by such expressions as “pay attention” or “remember this”
but we also know what is meant by such terms as “heartless”,
“broken heart”, “soft heart”, “hard heart”, “taking heart” or “losing
heart”. The latter terms are linguistic grave markers of long dead
ideas; apparent vestiges of Aristotle’s theory that the heart is the
seat of higher psychic functions. No one imagines now that they
have the slightest relevance to cardiology. (Vanderwoolfe, 1998, p
135).

Something other than naming the pre-existent res or the thing is at
work here in apprehending the mind, and on a linguistic level, this
something is that which Derrida signed as the play of language.
The mind as a concept, as a signified presence and employed on a
daily basis in the discourse of pain, attempts to transcend this play.
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This play is where language is not so much reflecting pre-existent
entities like the diagnosis of somatisisation but, that language itself
performs or engenders, that is to say plays with our universal
experience. As Derrida claimed:
This was the moment when language invaded the universal
problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a centre or origin,
everything became discourse… that is to say, a system in which the
central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never
absolutely present outside a system of differences. The absence of
the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of
signification infinitely. (Derrida,1978, p 354)

The transcendental signified for ‘the mind’ fails then, to be ‘the
totality of the organism’ as required by definition two of the
MacQuarie Dictionary. The mind cannot be reduced to the
conscious and unconscious activities within its own definition
because they are disrupted by their own inability to transcend their
absence, their lack of centre and origin. The Cartesian and
Freudian dualism of the body-mind binary complete with its res or
its structure cannot exist outside the play of its own language. As
Derrida argues:
The centre is at the centre of the totality, and yet, since the centre
does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totatlity), the totality
has its centre elsewhere. The centre is not the centre. (Derrida,
1978, p 352)

Here, the mind’s nonlocus, its elsewhere-ness to any natural site
leaves us apprehending a concept or in actuality, Culler’s problem
of narrative’s sense-making versus the desire for sense. Derrida
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argued that this leads to a teleology which destroys the previous
sense-making narrative in order to proclaim another (teleological)
advance in the never-ending quest for certitude “…with as much
lucidity and rigor as bad faith and misconstruction, as the last
metaphysician, the last ‘Platonist’” (Derrida, 1978, p 353). Thus we
can argue that the great hermeneutic or heuristic endeavour for
certitude begets only another teleological extrapolation towards
what amounts to a desire for its own totality. Thus what seems an
advance in the discourse of the mind, stemming from a superior
body of evidenced based knowledge, time and time again butts up
against the metaphysical wall of Vanderwoolfe’s insoluble
problems. The whole history of the western continuum concerning
the mind has made and makes us desire mastery of its constructed
psychoanalytic phenomena. From Descartes to the enlightenment,
to Freud and post-Freudian thinking, the mind as res cogitans has
attempted to organize and understand a set of phenomena (hitherto
described as psychodynamic and/or mentalistic) in increasingly
sophisticated ways, that nonetheless share the same pitfalls of any
interpretation beyond its own desire, that is to say, beyond its own
epistemological circular story of itself for itself. Any sophisticated
apprehension of the mind leaves us wondering because there is
always more to know, if only because the theory upon which the
mind has been authored assumes and literally creates its own
existence. It is reasonable to point out here that to diagnose
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persistent unexplained pain as being all in the mind is a construct of
‘belief and desire’ (Lucire, 2003, p 4).

In this context it is time psychology and the discourse of pain theory
contemplated the last fifty to one hundred years of literary and
linguistic theory, which has seen literature apprehend a theoretical
state that undoes rather than reveals certitude. As Culler describes,
“You have not become the master, but neither are you where you
were before.” (Culler, 1997, p 17) In this sense we apprehend a
vantage point from which alterity emerges over certitude,
differences over essences, humility over proclamation, subjectivity
over objectivity, narrative over teleology or as Culler (Culler, 1997,
p 94) puts it: “We stop dancing around and contemplate the secret.”

The MacQuarie dictionary’s definition twelve defines the mind as a
“psychic or spiritual being, as opposed to matter.” (Delbridge et al
Ed., 1999, p 1368). This defines the mind through how it is
essentially different to the matter of the body. Thus, the body-mind
binary persists and the same heuristic problematic is conferred, but
at least in this definition the problem of the centre and its essence
is also, albeit implicitly, conceded because this definition shies
away from defining the processes and highlights the differences
between the body and the mind, in-so-far-as we don’t know what
the mind is, we only know it is different to the body. As Saussure
(1915) found, the arbitrary attribution of sense making through
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language goes about its business by teasing out how signs are
different to the other signs and arbitrarily different again between
the different cultures of the world. Language is not the handmaiden
to inherent and natural truths but arbitrarily and culturally
constructed (Rice and Waugh, 1996, p 3). Vanderwoolfe again
points this out in the discourse of psychology:
Mentalistic terms such as attention, cognition, fear, belief or desire
are not easily defined since they commonly refer vaguely to several
quite distinct things including: (a) a presumed state of
consciousness, (b) some sort of behaviour, and (c) an
environmental context. Different languages have different verbal
conventions. Thus, according to Wilkes (245 his reference), ancient
Greek, Chinese, and Croatian do not have ready equivalents for the
English words ‘mind’ and ‘consciousness’. (Vanderwoolfe, 1998, p
135)

Definition twelve has thus shifted paradigms because this definition
has hopped off the circular argument of for mind see mind, to, for
mind, see how it is different to the matter of the body, with a
passive nod to Derrida’s universal problematic that its centre is
elsewhere. Here at least we begin to ‘contemplate the secret’ in
Culler’s terms in-so-far-as how it differs to the atomic structure of
matter. This secret is acknowledged yet remains unapologetically
dualistic for over four decades. The pre-neuroplastic
neuropathologists Penfield and Roberts espoused exactly this
point:
Theorists… may be able to give up dualistic terminology. But
biologists are not theorists. And there is no place in scientific
medicine for the unprovable hypothesis. We must be content to
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study man and animal by the scientific method, using the language
of “busy common sense”. This is the language of dualism. (Penfield
and Roberts, 1959, p 10)

If, as Penfield and Roberts asserted, there was no place in scientific
medicine for the unprovable hypothesis, then why has the insoluble
problem of the mind so been implacably centred in the above quote’s
language of dualism? There is at the least, a tautology inherent in
this position, if only because Penfield and Roberts attempted to
practice in a provable way, the ways of the body-mind riddle. No
practice is exempt from the theories that underpin its practice,
especially when any scientific medicine must relate to the riddles of
the brain-mind relationship. As Penfield and Roberts themselves
articulated:
We have at present no basis for a scientific explanation of the brainmind relationship. We can only continue to study the brain without
philosophical prejudice. And if the day should ever dawn when
scientific analysis of body and brain solves the “mystery,” all men
who have sought the truth in all sincerity will rejoice alike: the
professing materialist and the dualist, the scientist and the
philosopher, the agnostic and the convinced worshipper. Surely no
one need fear the truth. (Penfield and Roberts,1959, p 10)

The difficulty with this position was that nothing is at work here as
much as the unprovable hypothesis of the mind. The risk was and
still is undeniable that the spectre of a Derridean play haunted, and
if such thinking still persists, haunts, Penfield and Roberts’ scientific
medicine and its extension to a busy common sense in the general
discourse of medicine and psychiatry (Merskey and Teasell, 2000).
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This is not, as Belsey and many other commentators have pointed
out, the first time a common sense empiricism has theoretically let
us down through the circles it prescribes. [4]

If (non-dualist) theory was already challenging this body-mind
dualism in 1959, then by 1993, the same scientific method through
the work of one neurophysiologist, Janos Szentagothai, was
coming up with scientific findings that would revolutionise our
understanding of the brain “…as neither dualist nor monist”… would
“pose problems for professional philosophers.” (Szentagothai,
1993, p 113). Far from being solved, the “mystery” of how the body
and mind interrelate was deeper and wider than ever, and the
neuroplastic actuality was far less sanguine than either Penfield or
Roberts had dreamed. The brain-mind duality was left both
scientifically and philosophically insupportable and Wittgenstein’s
concluding judgment upon (the father of) psychology as “not even
amounting to speculation”, more potent than ever before.

John Quintner’s challenge concerning my pain – “prove it” – was,
however, never more open to Derrida’s signpost of an active
interpretation (Derrida, 1978, p 370). If my x-rays, CT and MRI
scans were all ‘clear’; if no fire, no tissue damage existed to ring
Descartes’ bell in any instant, and if the problematic of the mind
was simply unable to contain the mystery of my pain; then what
interpretation might at least apprehend it? When I put this question

47

48
to John, there was only the barest of hints of something behind the
twinkle in his eyes, as he looked up to a kind smiling portrait that
hung from the wall of his rooms.
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Chapter 3
Beyond the Bell – from the Variable Link to Neuroplasticity,
and Language in self-organising systems of difference

Introduction
Theories of pain beyond the Cartesian-informed specificity theory
are predicted upon first ideas, and then evidence that the brain and
nervous system cannot be hardwired and reflexively predictable
(Quintner and Cohen, 1999, p 1098). These ideas and evidence reinterpret Descartes’ rope to be more complex than a mechanistic
pulley relaying some phenomenal energy in a one-way upwardstraveling signal to ring the bell of pain in the brain.

The Variable Link
The first of these post-specificity theories was generated by
Melzack and Wall in 1965 and is generally known as the Gate
Control Theory (Melzack and Wall, 1983, p 222). In the late 1970s,
Liebeskind and Paul said, “Probably the most important theory in
pain was the appearance in 1965 of the gate control theory of
pain… This theory has like none before it, proved enormously
heuristic.” (Liebeskind and Paul, 1977, p 41) Even the noted
anaesthesiologist of the day, John J. Bonica, called it ‘undoubtedly
one of the major revolutions in our concept of pain in the last 100
years.’ (Cited Melzack and Wall, 1983, p 233). It was equally
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inspired by the sufferings of those with an inexplicable pain that
persisted despite there being no obvious injuries and those who
had clearly suffered major injuries but for whom there was either
little or no pain, or, a marked delay in the experience of pain
inconsistent with the injuries sustained within the heuristic of the
specificity theory. Melzack and Wall state that:
The link between pain and injury seems so obvious that it is widely
believed that pain is always the result of physical damage and that
the intensity of pain we feel is proportional to the severity of the
injury… However there are many instances in which this relationship
fails to hold up. For example, about 65% of soldiers who are
severely wounded in battle and 20% of civilians who undergo major
surgery report feeling little or no pain for hours or days after the
injury or incision (Beecher, 1959). In contrast, no apparent injury
can be detected in about 70% of people who suffer from chronic low
back pain (Loeser, 1980). Clearly, the link between injury and pain
is highly variable: injury may occur without pain, and pain without
injury (Melzack and Wall, 1983, p 15).

Melzack and Wall went on to describe this variability and the lack of
obviousness about the predictability of pain as the “Variable Link”.
This variable link disrupts, that is ‘plays’, with the obviousness of
the universal foot on the fire ringing Descartes’ Bell. But as Mott
had found in the three groups of shell shock victims in World War 1,
such variability had long been known to exist. Indeed in civilian
western cultures, this variability dated back to at least the condition
known as Railway Spine in the 1850s (Cohen and Quintner, 1999).
What appears less and less plausible, in purely theoretical terms at
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least, is the adequacy of the body-mind heuristic to determine the
experience of human pain – physical or otherwise.

Much more seems to be at play within this variable experience. The
traditional view had been of course to ascribe the experience of
persistent unexplained pain to being ‘all in the mind’, but this
depends on what the mind might ‘be’. The mind’s being however, is
itself fraught with the unprovable hypothesis (which amounts to
Wittgenstein’s claim that it is mere speculation) and the Derridean
epistemological problematic that it is trapped in the language of
dualism.

While the gate control theory had its excited proponents it was, like
Derrida’s theories concerning linguistic play, both irreconcilable and
irreducible to the metaphysics and discourse of the structured mind
because it ruptured its circular argument. In this sense the Gate
Control Theory was like Copernicus’s theories that decentred the
earth of the 1500s, forever changed the paradigm and discourse for
pain. What was at stake here for the proponents of specificity
theory is that the mind and its psychodynamic progeny was not the
centre of things that they had believed it to be, because the brain
could not be a hardwired reflex driven and predictable organ
(Szentagothai, 1993, p101). If we inspect the gate control theory
more closely then the following diagrams are very useful for
medical laymen coming to terms with its science.
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Diagram1 – Gate Control Theory

The gate control theory of pain
S = small fibres

S

On E

T

E = excitatory inter-neuron

Brain

(Melzack and Wall, 1983)

Here this diagram illustrates the first instance of the complication of
Descartes’ rope. The white line (apropos of ‘the rope’) traveling
from left (the body) to right (up to the brain) is interrupted by the
circle “T” before going upwards as arrowed to the brain. ‘T’
represents the spinal region referred to as the dorsal horn or where
the “modulation of spinal signals evoked by injury-detecting
afferents [nerves]” (Cervero et al., 1976, Handwerker et al., 1975).
The modulation of the signals is the crux of the theory. Melzack and
Wall postulated that the dorsal horn of the spine acted like a gate
between the signals of two different systems – the peripheral
nervous system or the fibres below the dorsal horn and the central
nervous system above the dorsal horn, which included the brain. In

52

53
diagram 1 the small fibres of the peripheral system signal to the
dorsal horn which then through the excitatory inter-neuron ‘E’
passes through ‘T’ (the dorsal horn) and through this gate up to the
brain to elicit pain.
Diagram 2 – Gate Control Theory.

The gate control theory of pain
S = small fibres

S

On E

E = excitatory inter-neuron

Brain

T
L

L = large fibres

Off

I
I = inhibitory inter-neuron

(Melzack and Wall, 1983)

In diagram 2 there is the second level of complication to the
hardwired rope of the specificity theory. If small fibres conveyed
and excited the excitatory inter-neurons of the dorsal horn
(effectively opening the gate) then large fibres of the peripheral
nervous system could invoke an inhibitory inter-neuron response at
the dorsal horn and effectively shut the gate to delay or inhibit the
(pain) signal, and thus invoke the phenomena described in the
variable link.
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Diagram 3 – Gate Control Theory

The gate control theory of pain
S = small fibres

S

On E

E = excitatory inter-neuron
CENTRAL CONTROL

Brain

T
L

L = large fibres

Off

I

CENTRAL CONTROL
I = inhibitory inter-neuron

(Melzack and Wall, 1983)

In diagram 3 there is a third level of complication to Descartes’ rope
that was to “evoke controversy among scientists and clinicians in
the field of pain.” (Melzack and Wall, 1983, p 233). Melzack and
Wall postulated that pain was engendered not just by upwards
traveling signals that either passed or not through the gate of the
dorsal horn but through that which Janos Szentagothai was to call
‘downwards causation’, which involved the central nervous system
sending signals of its own to either open or close the gate(s)
(Szentagothai, 1984, p 1). This part of the theory invoked a brain
that was anything but hardwired, in-so-far-as pain was not merely
reflected by the brain as a reflex response when peripheral system
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nociception or injury occurred. Instead the brain could of itself
mediate and/or interfere with and even engender the experience of
pain.

Quite how the brain was able to do this was a complete mystery but
the idea of a downwards central nervous system causation (that is
an active brain beyond a passively fixed, reflexive and therefore
predictable organ) had been born. This proffers a paradigm shift or
at least the birth of a new paradigm both in understanding the way
the brain mediates and begets our ontology and in the way our
ontology organizes our brain’s neurophenomenology. Indeed, this
birth seems similar to the one Derrida wrote of when he concluded
his Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human
Sciences (coincidentally also dated in the mid 1960s) with:
…a kind of question, let us still call it historical, whose conception,
formation, gestation and labour we are only catching a glimpse of
today… when faced by the as yet unnamable which is proclaiming
itself and which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in
the offing, only under the species of the nonspecies, in the formless,
mute, infant and terrifying form of monstrosity. (Derrida,1978, p
370).

The monstrosity of this birth of the gate control theory was - like
Derrida’s ‘birth’ of the noncentre and its play in linguistic
epistemology - its invasion of the universal problematic, that is to
say, its decentring of Descartes’ bell being a natural site with a
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locus – a centre. With the gate control theory, there was something
else at play that spoke of an entirely new and complex dimension
as Melzack and Wall themselves concluded: “We now suspect that
there is a further dimension which could explain the plasticity of
connections.” (Melzack and Wall, 1983, p 239). Given this
monstrosity, the gate control theory had its strident critics and
“provoked outrage in believers of specificity theory” (Melzack and
Wall, 1983, p 233). It was attacked with vituperation and, for many
years, as being incomplete and lacking veracity. These responses,
however were “modified when careful experimenters observed
modulation of spinal signals.” (Melzack and Wall, 1983, p 234).

Melzack and Wall had the last word against those critics of the time
(early 1980s) when they clarified:
…The gate control theory, by eschewing a straight through pain
pathway and a rigid relationship between injury and pain, is able to
give serious consideration to prolonged neural activities related to
pain. There is little doubt that such mechanisms are necessary to
explain several fascinating clinical and experimental observations.

We formulated a hypothesis that seemed to us to bring together all
the facts available in 1965. Since that time much has changed.
Some of the ‘facts’ were wrong. Much more is known now. (Melzack
and Wall, 1983, p 256, 234).

If that last statement that much more is known was true in 1983,
then it is even more so in the 2000s, if only because the advances
in neurobiological research have grown exponentially in those two
decades (Le van Quyen, 2003; Faingold, 2004). If in the mid1960s,
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Derrida introduced the historical question of the universal
problematic of ‘play’, then it was also in the mid 1960s that Melzack
and Wall introduced a neurophysiologcal universal problematic of
‘play’ for body-mind dualism, and not only in terms of the human
experience of pain.

The first theoretical glimpses had been glimpsed of a brain that is
other than hardwired and despite the latest neurophysiological
advances and apprehensions, the brain remains “a miracle”
(Chapman, 2004). In his presentation to the 2004 Annual Scientific
Meeting of The Australian Pain Society, Professor of
Neuropsychology at the University of Utah Richard Chapman,
made the point that “pain is all in the brain” (Chapman, 2004, cited
in presentation). Melzack and Wall’s gate control theory
hypothesized that there was central nervous system involvement,
that is, the brain was somehow involved in pain variability. Their
locus of theoretical concentration however, remained the dorsal
horn of spinal modulation as the gate for this nervous system
involvement.

In concentrating on the dorsal horn region of the spinal column,
Melzack and Wall spotlighted that if the changes at the dorsal horn
occurred to incur the variable link of pain, then the brain must be
involved in downwards causations that defied our previous brain
theories. The variable central nervous system involvement at the
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dorsal horn came from the dark continent of the brain [5]. In other
words, something miraculous was happening. There was always
though, going to be the implied questions of the brain’s secrets: if
the gate barred or facilitated access – then to what or from what
was it opening or closing? If much more is now known about the
brain, it was through the groundbreaking conceptual and scientific
work of one extremely humble, shy and stunningly brilliant
Hungarian professor of Neurophysiology, Janos Szentagothai and
his colleagues Arbib and Erdi.

Neuroplasticity
The concept of neuroplasticity sees the brain as a complex
interpretative mechanism rather than simply as a device to receive
and process information like a computer (Coderre et al, 1993, p
259). Hitherto this hardwired concept of the brain has been
understood in terms of the classical reflex principle (Szentagothai,
1993, p 101). This classical reflex theory is to neurology what the
specificity theory is to pain. Both are undoubtedly informed by
Descartes’ rope ringing (that is to say a hardwired brain processing
upwards travelling reflexed responses) in fixed centres within this
hardwired brain that, for pain at least, rings a bell. Here, the brain is
a device. In other words input to the system equals the output of the
system. This paradigm shifting concept of neuroplasticity, however,
views the brain as being a self-organising and interpreting
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complexity that led Janos Szentagothai and his colleagues Arbib
and Erdi to argue:
…the philosophical tradition of hermeneutics which is a priori neither
monist or dualist, can be applied to the brain. Playing with the idea
that the “device approach” to the brain and the philosophical
approach can be reconciled, we have concluded that the brain is a
physical structure which is controlled and also controls, learns and
teaches, processes and creates information, recognises and
generates patterns, organises its environment and is organised by it.
(Arbib et al, 1997, p 234)

Implicit in these binary interactions is the notion that these opposites
of learning and teaching, processing and creating, recognising and
generating are not operating in opposition but rather, co-operate
inseparably from the other. Szentagothai points out that the brain is
both pupil and teacher, processor and creator, recogniser and
generator, environmental organiser and yet it is something that is
organised by the environment. It is not a device of either/or but
inseparably engenders both our ontology and neurophenomenology.
That is to say there is no way of separating the biophysics of our
being from the being of our biophysics (Rudrauf et al, 2003).

Susan Greenfield’s observation is pertinent here concerning the
concept of human clones that would have theoretically, identical
brains (Greenfield, 2002). She points out that these clones could not
be identical ontologically because their brain would not be the same.
This is because their second to second ontology would differ from
each other and thus their brains would have different neuronal
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organisations and therefore each supposedly identical subject would
engender vastly different subjective experiences (Greenfield, 2002, p
20). The brain then is always already involved in the recording and
formation of this subjective experience. Our ontology and
neurophenomenology is entailed in ways that entail each other, that
is to say, our neurophenomenology engenders our ontology, and, our
ontology engenders our neurophenomenology. As Szentagothai
concludes, the brain:
…is an ‘object’ of interpretation, but also it is itself an interpreter.
The brain not only perceives but also creates new reality: it is a
hermeneutic device. Not only are our theories of the brain
metaphors, the brain itself represents the world through schemas,
which may themselves be viewed as metaphors. (Arbib et al, 1997,
p 234).

Szentagothai had ventured into the dark continent of the brain, not
through speculation or the teleology of metaphysics but, through
scientific experiments involving the cultivation of nervous tissues.
What he found as a result of these experiments is still actively
challenging thinking not only about the brain but ontology as well.
He thought the discovery of self-organisiation necessitated the
rethinking of all that had been thought self-evident through
Cartesian discourse, not only about the brain but about how such a
discourse thought it engaged in the phenomenal world.
Szentagothai considered this was a problem that went well beyond
the science of neurobiology (Szentagothai, 1993, p 100). This
seems valid when a theoretical point from the above conclusion
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(that the brain is a hermeneutic device that none-the-less
represents the world through schemas that can be viewed
themselves as metaphors), invites the idea that such metaphoricity
sees the brain involved in what I termed ‘a creation-ness’ in A Bell
in the Storm. This ‘creation-ness’ is beyond the heuristic of the
hardwired reflexive organ, which Szentagothai described as ‘selforganisation and/or autopoiesis’ (Szentagothai, 1993, p101). The
self-organising or autopoietic brain is beyond mere speculation, that
is, such ‘creation-ness’ can actually be observed. As Szentagothai
stated:
The classical reflex principle – as the basis of neural functions – has
to yield to new ideas, like autopoiesis and/or self-organisiation, as
the basic paradigm in the framework of which the essence of the
neural activity can be better understood… Under suitable conditions,
both in nervous tissue cultures and embryonic tissue recombination
experiments, the conditions of such autopoietic activity can be
studied. (Szentagothai, 1993, p 101).

This evidence of self-organisation requires the brain’s involvement
in engendering pain to be above scientific hypothesis and
theoretical speculation. In his groundbreaking essay “Selforganisation: the Basic Principle of Neural Functions”, Szentagothai
used the term ‘autopoiesis’ to describe the ‘self-organising’
processes of the brain. He referred to “…the concept of selforganisation as the principle in which I believe neural activity to
have its origins.” (Szentagothai, 1993, p 112). The theory of the
brain working as an interpretative hermeneutic device, which also
uses metaphor and metonym to interpret the phenomenal world

61

62
through a schemata of creation-ness, beyond the practical limits of
a processing device like a computer.

Under clinical experimentation, autopoiesis is there to be seen and
not merely speculated. Szentagothai, then, was like Galileo on the
back of Copernicus’s initial hypothesis actively witnessing the new
space – the new universe of our miraculous brain. If Melzack and
Wall were the nascent theoreticians in this autopoietic paradigm
shift and like Copernicus who hypothesised the Earth was not the
centre, then Szentagothai was the Galileo following Copernicus,
who actually witnessed that the centre was indeed elsewhere.
Szentagothai thus upgraded ideas of our brain as miraculous, from
hypothesis to integrated theory. Szentagothai was, to borrow from
Ezra Pound, making it new! (Pound, 1914 cited in Rothenburg and
Joris, 1995, p 372). Unlike Pound however, Szentagothai was far
more cautious about any proclamations or the deliverance of any
manifesto of conclusive truth-claim, because, like the universe, the
brain was simply too complex and big to proclaim over:
Peter Erdi and myself had originally more ambitious goals in mind
when starting our common work, i.e. even in playing with the thought
that an explicit ‘brain theory’ might be the ultimate objective
envisaged. Recently we have both become more modest in
understanding that it would be more realistic to abide with certain
elements that might contribute to a brain-theory in the more distant
future. (Szentagothai, 1993, p 102)

In other words, a reliable and predictable theory of the brain would
take a more distant future to crack the codes of the self-organising
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brain. In theoretical terms Erdi and Szentagothai have stopped
dancing around and have begun to contemplate Culler’s secret of
epistemological humility in the face of a staggering complexity. Erdi
and Szentagothai then “warned” theoreticians themselves about:
The remarkable new observations… on ‘memory fields’… that
legitimate neurobiology may soon be in the position to make direct
biological observations about functions of the brain that were
hitherto considered as being in the exclusive domain of theory
(Szentagothai, 1993, p 113).

This statement declares that the self-organising brain thrusts us into
the domain of a self-organising unpredictability and a metaphoricity
that had previously been the exclusive domain of linguistic theory.
My argument here then is that this is the same ontological,
epistemological, and hitherto, purely theoretical reference, of the
poststructuralist enquirers Derrida, Paul de Man, Roland Barthes,
Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva and others. Could it be that both
language and the brain engender rather than reflect our
phenomenal world in theoretically similar self-organising ways?
The idea of a theoretical cooperation between post-structuralist
linguistics and the corporeal self-organisation of the brain began
during a conversation I had with John Quintner in his rooms, about
three months after my accident. John was lamenting the lack of a
mapped medical theoretical territory beyond the dualistic approach
to pain. John concluded: “Pain comes out of complexities in the
brain we are only beginning to understand.” (Personal
correspondence, 2000). Immediately I thought of Derrida’s use of
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Montaigne’s “We need to interpret interpretations more than to
interpret things.” Then my thoughts turned to those complexities in
the brain and I made the association with Derrida’s ideas of ‘play’;
particularly his declaration that “Play is the disruption of presence.”
(Derrida, 1978, p 367). I discussed with John the idea that dualism
was simply a form of interpreting pain that nonetheless had
accumulated a dominant and dominating presence. The presence
of dualism in this context was however, given to complexities that
disrupted and played with this presence and, there was, over fifty
years of mapped literary theoretical terrain that perhaps, could
guide us. We quickly exchanged articles and books that began a
collaboration that has been published internationally and expanded
to include Foundation Professor AndrewTaylor (Edith Cowan
University), Associate Professor Milton Cohen (University of New
South Wales), Mr Owen Williamson (Spinal Surgeon, Monash
University), and Associate Professor Jim Katz (Washington State
University, USA).

In attendance at the March, 2004 Annual Scientific Meeting of the
Australian Pain Society in Canberra, I was particularly struck by
Chapman’s finding that while we understand so much more now
than Szentagothai pioneered (in particular nonlinear theory).
Chapman pointed out that he could research the autopoietic and/or
self-organising brain to certain vantage points before he had to
concede “…then a miracle occurs and you get pain” (Chapman,
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2004). I include his actual slide used in the lecture with his kind
permission:

CAS Theory Is Nonlinear

It is an alternative to mechanistic reductionism.

This knowledge of the brain’s self-organisation does not however,
carry with it the great secrets of how exactly the brain goes about
this self-organisation. A humility that urges caution against the
proclamation of truth claims ought to be encouraged, not least
because even the best researchers still don’t know what pain is - as
step two’s irony in the above slide depicts. They know that pain

65

66
exists but not how it exists or what exactly it is either in time, space
or matter (Chapman, 2004). The closest science has can come to
this is to record what we think it might be in blood flow or perfusion
studies of functional MRIs, McGill Pain Questionnaires and
personal narratives (Williamson et al, 2005). Again a confluence
between literary and pain theory occurs: for pain in medicine as for
the text in literary theory, there is, as Culler says,
…always more to know, but, more specifically and more painfully,
because theory is itself the questioning of presumed results and the
assumptions on which they are based. The nature of theory is to
undo, through a contesting of premises and postulates, what you
thought you knew, so the effects of theory are not predictable. ”
(Culler, 1997, p 17)

Nor is the brain’s self-organisation, predictable.

Language and self-organising systems of difference

If the brain engenders rather than reflects our experience in much the
same way language has been speculated to function since Saussure,
then, is there a legitimate confluence between language,
consciousness and the autopoietic brain. This confluence has been the
theoretical and research terrain of the Argentinean neurobiologists
Humberto Maturana and his colleague, Francisco Varela’s general
‘Biology of Cognition’. (Maturana, 1995) Maturana discusses this
biology of cognition on his web site:
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The Biology of Cognition is an explanatory proposition that attempts to
show how human cognitive processes arise from the operation of
human beings as living systems. As much, The Biology of Cognition
entails reflexions oriented to understand living systems, their
evolutionary history, language as a biological phenomenon, the nature
of explanations, and the origin of humaness. As a reflection on how
we do what we do as observers it is a study in the epistemology of
knowledge. But, and at the same time as a reflection on how we exist
in language as languaging beings, it is a study on human relations.
(Maturana, 1995)

Both Maturana and Varela have explicitly argued for a selforganising biological co-operation with language that engenders
both our ontology and our neurophenomenology. Maturana
explicitly argues that our ‘humanness’ as ‘languaging beings’ sees
language and our beingness, and the brain and our beingness as
cooperative process that cannot be teased apart let alone reduced
to separate entities or phenomena. This position begs the question
though that this bio-linguistic cooperation has always already
existed. In Part ‘6’ of his essay titled ‘Philosophical Consequences’
Szentagothai ventured, “We have no other alternative than to go
along with the challenge of an entirely new paradigm.” Szentagothai
continued that the “…true autopoietic nature of neural functions…
(presents) an entirely new challenge for ‘brain-mind philosophy”
(Szentagothai, 1993, p 114). He concluded: “We would consider
this as a challenge for thinkers with a professional background in
philosophy.” (Szentagothai, 1993, p 114).
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In the Medical Journal of Australia editor Martin B Van Der Weyden
cited the United States physician and ethicist Howard Brody in
linking the theories and endeavours behind both literature and
medicine:
Stories are essential as a means of perceiving how scientific
knowledge in its generality can be applied to individuals in all their
particularity. The exploration of literature is now a growth area in
some medical schools. (Van der Weyden, 2002, p 405)

Narrative and medicine are making appearances together in many
of the influential medical journals (New England Journal of
Medicine, British Medical Journal, The Lancet, Australian Medical
Journal) but they ought to do so with a caution in first
acknowledging the past one hundred years of literary theory
discourse that leads us to Derrida, Hart and Culler’s vantage points
of a chastened alterity and a requirement to contemplate the secret.
It would seem that a self-organising biology is cooperative with selforganising linguistic theories and, together, may facilitate scientific
and medical knowledge by providing an epistemological space for
medical science to grow outside the domains dualism and its
subsequent reliance on a discourse of mechanistic and
reductionistic determinism. For, as Derrida pointed out, this
determinism is a quest for certitude that “…dreams of deciphering a
truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign and
which leaves the necessity of interpretation as an exile” (Derrida,
1978, p 369). Given the evidence of the autopoietic brain, there
has perhaps never been more evidence to suggest that a wider
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more open and active interpretative practice, beyond the language
of dualism, should be included at all levels of interpreting pain in
others. Pain Medicine ought to be a stochastic enterprise that in
acknowledging the self-organising brain, also acknowledges that it
is as dependent upon the art of interpretation as is literature.

Szentagothai’s self-organising brain and Maturana’s findings and
conclusions concerning the Biology of Cognition and language
intersect with Saussure’s point about language: “…in language
there are only differences.” (Saussure, 1915, p 121) If we were to
interchange language with the brain in the above apprehension,
then the most influentially Copernicun comment on linguistics in the
last one hundred years has potentially the same ramifications for
how our second to second subjective experience is engendered
rather than reflected by our miraculous brain (Greenfield, 2002, p
91). For if one was to exchange the sign ‘philosophy’ with ‘literary
theory’ (for both signifiers apprehend the relevant epistemology at
stake here), then Szentagothai’s call for help from professional
thinkers in theory may reveal the ground for an transdisciplinary
theory that sees the subject in pain supported by the positions
beyond the dualism of Descartes’ bell.

The ground for this transdisciplinary theory may well combine
Derrida’s noncentred play cooperating with Szentagothai’s
autopoietic and self-organising brain, and given the irrefutability of
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the brain’s autopoiesis, are compelling, because of the way both
language and the brain co-operate in the invasion of ‘the universal
problematic’ (Derrida, 1978, p 354). For both the brain and
language play with the phenomenal world and go about their
sense-making business through very complex systems of selforganising contiguity, as the noted contemporary neurologist VS
Ramachandran put it: “The brain makes sense of the world through
a series of comparisons.” (Ramachandran, 1999, p 152).
Ramachandran’s ‘comparisons’ closely resemble Saussure’s point,
“…in language there are only differences” (Saussure, 1915, p 121).
Our ‘humanness’ in Maturana’s terms goes about its sense-making
through linguistic and neuronal self-organising networks relating to
each other contiguously. As the editors of one literary theory
anthology write in what is now a commonplace in their field, “In
effect, language functions by identifying the differences between
signs rather than revealing pre-existing truths or essences” (Rice
and Waugh, 1998, p 4).

There are however, two further qualities the brain cooperates with
poststructural notions of language. The first quality is Derrida’s
notion of the noncentre and Szentagothai’s observations on the
noncentredness of neural activity. The second, is Szentagothai’s
signpost of negentropy (negative entropy) that align with Derrida’s
ideas concerning supplementarity and linguistic play (Quintner et al,
2003). I will address these in turn now.
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Noncentredness
In discussing the potency of the brain’s noncentredness,
Szentagothai remarked:
One of the most miraculous features of neural systems is that the
same piece of neural tissue can perform a large variety of
processing functions, depending on the input… This variety is
indeed so large that the beholder is naturally tempted to become
sceptic about the idea of a modular architectonics principle of the
cortex…” (Szentagothai, 1993, p 112)

It seems the complexity of these neural systems defies the idea that
any one locus of the brain is the centre for any one function or
subjective experience. This noncentred contiguous complexity is
similar to the quantum physicist Fotini Kalamara‘s notions of how
atoms relate within a larger system of matter: “An atom is a piece of
the network and its identity is given by its relation to the rest of the
network.” (Kalamara, 2005, p, 48). This relation to the rest of the
network is theoretically congruent with Saussure’s anti-essentialist
system of differences and contiguity in language and Derrida’s
presence of the noncentre - where the fixed origin or archè of signs
in a contiguous linguistic system of differences is elsewhere
(Derrida, 1978, p 354). Szentagothai’s scepticism concerning a
modular [lineal] architectonics of the cortex is like Kalamara’s atoms
in matter and Saussure’s signs in language, in as much as neurons
have no fixed identity or central intrinsic function, rather, they relate
to other neurons in highly noncentred and contiguous ways to the
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rest of the network. Any intrinsic and centred identity and meaning
is therefore not able to be reduced to the essence of individual parts
but through the way these parts relate and contribute to an
irreducible and miraculous whole in an infinitely complex system of
differences (Rudrauf et al, 2003).

In short, there can be no bell or centred function in the brain that
becomes the fixed origin of a sole functionality in the processing of
pain. This however begs the question of just what might the
noncentre be? If the centre in Derridean terms is elsewhere – then
what is the nature of this elsewhere-ness and the brain? At this
vantage point I recall my first apprehension of Derrida’s noncentre
as a concept when I was being taught Derridean theory by
Professor Andrew Taylor in an honours class just before my
accident in April 2000. He gave a few examples: the world wide
web, it has no centre, no one single point of arche or origin and
forms an interwoven type of construction more like a tissue is
interwoven. Any water mass has no one point of molecular origin
rather like Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizoid patterns that again
interconnect and interweave to form the overall lawn of the
ryhsomic whole (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Within the lawn,
there is no intrinsic origin where rhysomic patterns literally begin, as
they extend and expand their complex web of heterogeneity within
that which Derrida termed ‘…the presence of the noncentre’
(Derrida, 1978, p 356).
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Another highly developed example of the noncentre concerns this
MRI (below) depicting perfusion of blood flow in the brain over
timed intervals related to the experience of chronic pain.

Thalamic
blood flow
asymmetry
during
chronic
pain.

In effect – we are observing a cartoon of the brain (as one frame is
contiguously different to the other in space and time) depicting the
intensity of blood perfusion to multiple and various parts of the brain
in a patient in persistent pain. Here the doctors involved have
concentrated on the thalamic areas ringed in red on the right, but of
course there are multiple areas throughout the cortical regions that
are ‘lighting up’ from blue, to green to yellow to red, which directly
explicate Szentagothai’s variety of processing functions
observations as “one of the most miraculous features of neural
systems.” (Szentagothai, 1993, p 112) In this sense this functional
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MRI of the perfusion of blood flow is a map as readable as the
Bureau of Meteorology’s radar scan is for a lay storm-chaser to
interpret, regarding areas of rain intensity indicating the likelihood of
lightning in thunderstorms.

These weather scans are available to the public on the internet and
are in general, easily interpreted. For the MRI scan, the heaviest
perfusion of blood flow is in red (just like the heaviest rain is in red
on the radar), then descending to yellow, then green then blue. The
similarities with a storm-chaser reading a radar continue in-so-faras the red through to blue areas do not of themselves discover a
storm – rather they depict activity that is known to be associated
with these phenomena. That is, intense rain may have an
association with thunder and lighting, and intense perfusion of blood
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flow with pain, but neither can tell us what either a storm or pain is.
What is clear though, is that there is no Cartesian centre ’F’; no bell
in the brain that rings in the human experience of pain; because the
neural activity is going off all over the place (Buchanan, 2005, p
235). Szentagothai again points out this noncentred presence when
he states:
…the processing at the …cortical level is only the very first step on
an infinitely long journey… [that] makes one realise the immense
complexity of the total connectivity of the brain... It would lead us far
beyond… (any) line of speculation in order to develop a brain theory
of our own.” (Szentagothai, 1993, p 111 -12)

Szentagothai has found that not only is the brain autopoietic or selforganising but is also in its processing functionality – noncentred. It
is my argument however that, any Cartesian centre ‘F’ is elsewhere
both in the linguistic and neurobiological sense. This apprehension
however then determines the noncentre otherwise than as loss of
centre (Derrida, 1978, p 370) in the same way Galileo’s
confirmation of Copernicus’s loss of centre [of the earth] meant we
didn’t so much lose the Earth’s importance as the centre of the
universe as gain the affirmation that the universe is bigger and
more complex than we had ever supposed. In this sense, a general
and transdisciplinary interpretation cannot be exiled here, since the
only conclusive medico-scientific finding to make concerning the
presence of this noncentre is Montaigne’s point, “We need to
interpret interpretations more than to interpret things.”(Cited,
Derrida, 1978, p 350).
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Negentropy
The second quality of neuronal self-organisation: Szentagothai’s
final signpost in terms of a philosophical apprehension of the brain:
negentropy. Negentropy is the concept of a system which differs to
Newton’s second Law of Nature: entropy. The Oxford English
Dictionary defines negentropy as negative entropy. If entropy is the
loss of energy given off by any system for example light and heat
from “…the framework of our classical views on the physical world
as being closed (laws of thermodynamics etc) (Szentagothai, 1993,
p 114), then negentropy is the lack of this entropy occurring in a
predictable way. In a negentropic system, more than the
thermodynamics of entropy is going on and the negentropy defies
our abilities to interpret the system predictably. Szentagothai
pointed out that all of his findings concerning the open systems of
downwards causation, self-organisation and noncentredness were
incompatible, or in Derridean terms irreducible, with the classical
Cartesian reflex paradigm:
As long as the original Cartesian reflex paradigm of nervous system
was valid, there was simply no way to accept ‘downwards causation’
(etc)… within the framework of our classical views on the physical
world being closed… However, if higher neural functions were
visualised … this obstacle might be overcome in the framework of
the relation between information and order (negentropy).
(Szentagothai, 1993, p 114.)
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The parenthesis of the word ‘negentropy’ above here is a very
important signpost, for both literally and figuratively, any definition of
negentropy is more, much more, than ‘the lineal relation between
information and order and cause and effect’ (Szentagothai, 1993, p
114). In Derridean terms, certitude is ‘elsewhere’. Szentagothai’s
close colleague, Peter Erdi explored this unpredictable complexity
in the brains systems of differences before and after Szentagothai’s
death (Erdi, 1993). In his paper ‘Neurodynamic System Theory:
Scope and Limits’, Erdi critiqued many different theories and
approaches, from the difference between static and dynamic
structuralism through to chaos theory in a bid to tease out a way of
structurally coping with the complexity of the brain. Erdi found:
Such kinds of concepts as circular and network causality, chaos,
unpredictability, information, emergence, complexity, etc., lead to
the limits of ‘dynamic structuralism’. The hegemony of the
Newtonian paradigm, has… been weakened by physics and
chemistry motivated neostructuralist theories such as the theory of
dissipative structures, and of synergetics. In spite of their ambitious
endeavours, and undeniable success, no theory of the brain can be
given within a pure structuralist framework. (Erdi, 1993, p 147)

No matter how intricate and complex the structuralist theory, it
simply is unable to cope with the self-organising, noncentred,
negentropic and therefore unpredictable complexities of the brain.
Whether the signifiers self-organising, noncentred and negentropy
denote and/or connote the necessary signifieds to cope with the
complexities of the neurodynamic system remains to be seen. Erdi,
as long ago as 1993, referred to the brain’s complexity as self-
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referential. The brain’s structurality, like language’s structurality in
Derrida’s terms, escapes its own structurality. Erdi’s argument is
science’s chaos, unpredictability, traffic information, and/or
emergence are signifiers limited in their ability to reflect the
conceptual neurodynamic complexity going on. Such selfreferentiality defies any structuralist theory to interpret the brain and
Erdi concluded, “Brain theory… ought to be ‘poststructuralist’. (Erdi,
1993, p 147).

Erdi was utterly clear: no structure or structuralist approach, no
matter how dynamic can cope with the three factors that are at
constant complex play in making sense of the self-referential brain
because: 1., it has the ability to self-organise; 2., it goes about this
self-organisation in infinitely complex heterogenic noncentred ways;
and 3., it is a system that within this autopoietic noncentredness
may induce activities that gain rather than lose energy, or, as
Faingold succinctly defines it, “[where] the output of a system can
exceed the input.” (Faingold, 2004, p 57)

Richard Chapman’s miracle at step two has reappeared: input
occurs, then a miracle happens and the output exceeds the input.
Such a system sees lived experiences like persistent pain emerge
in unpredictable ways, which defy our scientific heuristic
endeavours but particularly our common sense and especially, the
language of dualism.
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To illustrate however, how the language of dualism still pervades
the scientific hermeneutics of the brain, Owen Williamson, a spinal
surgeon of the Medical School at Monash University, asked
Richard Chapman after his presentation at the 2004 Pain
conference what he thought about the occurrence of the miracle of
the brain and pain, and this was Richard Chapman’s reply:
My view of the miracle is that it is emergence. Emergent properties
are always a surprise, given the elements from which the thing
emerges. However, I don’t mean to imply “merely” emergence, as
phenomenal reality is a huge leap from the biological brain. It would
seem that brains are machines designed to produce the emergent
phenomenon of consciousness. This, I guess, is adaptation to the
environment. Clearly, pain is an aspect of consciousness, and I
must reason, then that it is an emergent property. Sometimes, it
does not emerge when nociception is present. We need to
understand why this happens. (Chapman, personal email
correspondence to Wiiliamson, 2004)

In any interpretation of Richard Chapman’s reply it is necessary to
scrutinize what is meant by ‘emergence’ within the discourse of
neurobiological science. Mikulecky (1996) defines emergence as
‘the sudden and unpredictable appearance of new forms of
organization.’ (Mikulecky, 1996, p 181) If we return to Melzack and
Wall’s variable link, sometimes pain does emerge when nociception
in the instant is either not present or cannot be detected. In fact it is
pain without lesion (ergo nociception) that is the bearer of the
heaviest investment in a reductionist and circular dualism - certainly
in medico-legal discourse as well as the medico-epistemological
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problems posed by diagnoses such a Railway Spine, Shell Shock,
Repetitive Strain Injury, Fybromyalgia and Trauma Disability
(Quinter and Cohen, 1996). There is a far greater concern however,
with the position with Richard Chapman’s ‘and I must reason’ of the
brain as machine that is essentially res extensa, that is the brain as
machine concerns a view of the brain that is of a purely separate
body from the consciousness that is presumably of the separate res
cogitans of the mind. Richard Chapman’s argument is thus trapped
in the familiar circle of dualism because if the brain is not separable
from consciousness then the oppositions of res extensa and res
cogitans can only exist in a circular story of themselves.

The signifier emergence here may become a transcendental
signified for the miracle while still accommodating the language of
dualism that reflects a machine that is res extensa complete with its
opposite, consciousness: res cogitans. Owen Williamson’s
conjecture (below) to Richard Chapman’s explanation is worth
including here not only because of its succinct validity, but because
it demands the inclusion of an active interpretation outside the
language of dualism:
I’m not sure what he [Richard Chapman] means by emergence,
other than consciousness arises from the brain, because we have
brains and are conscious. It seems he is relabelling the miracle,
without increasing understanding. (Personal email correspondence
to author, Williamson, 2004)
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This was Erdi and Szentagothai’s point over eleven years ago, that
in turn echoed Derrida’s invasion of the universal problematic
nearly thirty years before that:
What can a brain theoretican do after realizing the crisis of the
notion of universal rationality? He or she can attempt to accept that
modern (reductionist) science lacks self-reflexivity and perhaps turn
to hermeneutics and emphasise the cyclic nature of perception and
learning (Erdi, 1993, p 148).

The ‘crisis of the notion of universal rationality’ I take to be the
equivalent of Derrida’s invasion of the universal problematic, as
both realize the miracle is too playful or self-reflexive to rationalise
or reduce to its component parts. Little wonder Szentagothai left it
“as a challenge for thinkers with a professional background in
philosophy” (Szentagothai, 1993, p 114). Whether a hermeneutics
and/or a poetics would offer more supportable and suitable
vantages from which to engage such active interpretation was a
valid concern to Szentagothai’s challenge. Intrinsically what is still
at stake here is nothing less than the (poststructural) self-referential
brain’s engenderment of human sentience and the ensuing
philosophy, theory, science and cultural studies of pain, and this
endgenderment moves between (as literary/linguistic theory has for
the last one hundred years) the important differences between a
Hermeneutics and a Poetics.

Jonathon Culler defines a Poetics as ‘…modeled on linguistics’
which ‘takes meanings as what must be accounted for and tries to
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work out how they are possible.’ (Culler, 1997, p 61). The
endeavour of the A Poetics then is Montaigne and Derrida’s
concerns with the necessity of interpretations: that is, we need to
interpret interpretations more than to interpret things. This is
especially the case when the thing is both self-referential and
aporetic, which is the case for the emergence of pain from the selfreferential brain. Culler accounts for the contrast of a Hermeneutics
as a heuristic endeavour that ‘starts with things and seeks to
interpret them, to tell us what they really mean.’ (Culler, 1997, p
61). The hermeneutic approach bids to uncover the secret rather
than contemplate it, that is, it attempts to tell us what is really going
on, and, in so doing falls into the trap of proclaiming certitude when
the aporetic encounter always spawns more questions than
answers. Erdi’s point concerning notions of universal rationality
lacking self-reflexivity is crucial because any science of the brain
and pain is compelled to enter the interpretative realm of a Poetics
because the heuristic endeavour of a hermeneutics is limited by the
nature of pain’s aporia. These limitations are compounded when
the discourse of medical science can no longer validate its own
metaphysics, especially within the language of dualism, under the
weight of the self-referential yet very biophysical, miraculous and
therefore unpredictable brain.
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Chapter 4
Language, the Brain and Pain: the problem of reference in the
intersubjective befalling of the Uncanny

In the theory of self-referential linguistics and deconstruction, a
theoretical and historical disquiet has emerged, regarding weighty
misgivings of deconstruction eschewing a reference that makes
sense of the world (Caruth, 1996, p 73). This disquiet alleges that
self-referentiality prevents a knowledgeable access to history,
language and even cognition. That is, a problem of reference
ensues from its very self-referentiality. This disquiet has led to an
allegation that self-referential notions spawn a denial of historical
access to the world and especially the world of science. Cathy
Caruth sums up these concerns:
The constant focus by poststructuralists on the linguistic devices by
which meaning is produced, and by “deconstruction” on the
difficulties these devices create for our understanding of a text,
seems to amount to a claim that language cannot refer adequately
to the world and indeed may not truly refer to anything at all, leaving
literature and language, and even consciousness in general, cut off
from historical reality. (Caruth,1996, p 73 – 4)

Implicit in Caruth’s concerns is a nexus between language and
consciousness. Maturana’s point about us being languaging beings
is highly relevant here because of consciousness’s inseparability
from a self-organising biology that itself defies a universal and
predictable structure:
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As much, The Biology of Cognition entails reflexions oriented to
understand living systems, …language as a biological phenomenon,
the nature of explanations, and the origin of humaness. As a
reflection on how we do what we do as observers it is a study in the
epistemology of knowledge. But, and at the same time as a
reflection on how we exist in language as languaging beings, it is a
study on human relations. (Maturana, 1995)

The Cartesian dualism of I think therefore I am, is problematised
through a linguistic and neurobiological play, which is mediated
through systems of differences of both the brain and language that
are not necessarily in opposition. Szentagothai and Erdi’s
poststructure and Maturana’s biology of cognition invites us to
consider a continuum of complexity. Descartes’ I think therefore I am
therefore looks at the very least more like I am this miraculous selforganising thing which is inseparable from my second to second
ontological engagement with the environment and I operate within a
self-organising language system therefore I think; and I think
because I am this miraculous self-organising thing which is
inseparable from my second to second ontological engagement with
the environment… At this point I suspect Richard Chapman’s step
two miracle makes its reappearance because we are denied access
to the secrets of this miracle while knowing full well it is a miracle.

Despite the inaccessibility of the miracle, the problem of reference
remains and I would like to discuss briefly the signified(s) of
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‘deconstruction’ in order to tease out the theoretical disquiet. Like any
signifier, the signifieds of ‘deconstruction’ are subject to a play that
can leave us in an epistemological metaphysics of presence. The risk
is that ‘deconstruction’ takes on a currency of meaning unintended by
the play it intended to apprehend. Derrida himself was well aware of
this danger when he sought to clarify what deconstruction is by
determining what it was not:
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from
the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take
accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them
in a certain way, because one always inhabits. and all the more
when one does not suspect it. Operating necessarily from the
inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of
subversion from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, that
is to say without being able to isolate their elements and atoms, the
enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its
own work. (Derrida, 1978, p 24).

Deconstruction, Derrida tells us, is not a pulling apart of the text to
reveal hidden and underlying universal truths or meanings that go on
to necessarily affirm the principles of New Criticism and the natural
principles of a humanist idealism: complexity, paradox, life affirming,
irony, humour, seriousness, for example. [6] Rather, deconstruction
is as Barbara Johnson phrased, “a teasing out of warring forces of
signification within a text” (Johnson, 1985, p 5). Derrida in the film
Derrida, describes it off-the-cuff as a process whereby any centre,
has within it something that is always already present, that undoes its
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own project, its own centrality, its own teleology. In language it is
undoubtedly the always already present qualities of play, selforganisation, noncentredness and the propensity of language to keep
supplementing itself (Derrida, 1978, p 369). Supplementarity for
Derrida, is the ability of language to keep gaining in not only its
sense-making but in the literal number of signifiers and the differánce
of the eventual signifieds, in the sense that the Complete Oxford
English Dictionary is never complete but is in a constant
diachronically dynamic state of ‘gain’, which shares an uncanny
likeness to Szentagothai’s signpost of negentropy for the brain, in
that the output of the language system exceeds its input.
These linguistic features of a self-organising play, noncentredness
and supplementarity have a striking resemblance in their
poststructure to Szentagothai and Erdi’s self-referential brain with its
own qualities of self-organisiation, noncentredness and negentropy.
There is a crucial point to be made: both the brain and language in
their self-referentiality pose great difficulties for any practice that, as
Caruth suggests, seeks to model ‘…the principles of reference on
those of natural law, or, we might say, of making reference like
perception.’ (Caruth, 1996, p 74). Caruth’s point is that when our
perception and references become blurred then we can and do
mistake our stories of natural law, for natural law. Nowhere is this
clearer than in the ideas that were held as dogma, for many
centuries, that the earth was the centre of the universe. All our
perceptions dictated the centrist reference, as after all the sun rises

86

87
in the east and sets in the west, and the sun seems to circle us and
not the other way around.
That our perceptions may erroneously reference natural law has led
us to establishing empirically based principles, such as the classical
reflex principle in neurology, and/or the res cogitans of Cartesian
dualism explicit in the specificity theory of pain, that are more stories
of our perceptions than natural law. What is crucial to this insight is
that it is not so much what we are perceiving that matters but, who is
doing the perceiving.
In my radio play To Fall Without Landing, the character Cathy suffers
from Vestibular Syndrome where the phenomenal world swirls
around her. Her persistent vertigo is caused by the earth literally
falling through space when some abnormality in her abilities to
stabilise and balance occurs. This syndrome is quite rare and is
usually caused by an abnormality of the tiny vestibular bones in the
inner ear or, as in Cathy’s case, when no abnormality is detected, the
cause is often thought to be for psychological reasons. Cathy is
referred to a psychiatrist called Searle. Her condition is at its worst
when she opens her eyes and attempts to walk to someone. She
often walks in tight circles with her head swirling around and around
to try and keep the other ‘stable’ enough to focus. Searle asks her
how this feels and she replies:

Cathy

I think we all know how I feel… because the
bigger reality is we’re all just… like… me.
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Searle

How so?

Cathy

Falling through space on the third rock from a
tiny sun…

Searle

You make it sound so nihilistic?
(Buchanan, 2005, p 263)

Behind Searle’s objection is the American philosopher John R.
Searle’s position that the existence of an external world is comprised
of ‘brute facts’, like snow on Mount Everest (Searle, 1992, p 17). His
argument against deconstruction is that to deny our access to the
brutally factual existence of the snow on Mount Everest is
preposterous (Searle, 1992). Cathy’s swirling to the psychiatrist
Searle, is also preposterous because we seem so empirically fixed
by the ‘brute facts’ of our seeming fixity of place. This is akin to the
joke: Did you hear about the literary theorist who got hit by a truck?
He thought it was a cultural construct. But this is to miss the point
about what Horst Ruthrof terms a ‘corporeal turn’ where the
existence of the snow on Mount Everest is never denied, but how we
interpret it and what it may mean to us is mediated in quasiperceptual ways (Ruthrof, 2000, p 9). Phenomenally, the snow is
perceived through neurobiological structures that of themselves
escape structurality. That is, these neurobiological structures do not
reflect the pre-existent snow on the mountain as a simple reflex to an
unmediated presence – rather these poststructures are deeply
constitutive of the perception through their active self-referentiality.
Such an active interpretation is further mediated when this perception
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is communicated to others through the self-referentiality of language.
Ruthrof cites Helen Keller to apprehend this perceptual complexity:
When I think of hills, I think of the upward strength I tread upon.
When water is the object of my thought, I feel the cool shock of the
plunge and the quick yielding of the waves that crisp and curl and
ripple about my body. (Keller cited in Ruthrof, 2000, p 1).

No-one is denying the external reality of these hills or waves. The
idea of a brute fixity that amounts to a fixed mark of external
empirical reference, which adheres timelessly as a universal law in
terms of the ways we perceive this phenomena, seems more and
more problematic. This problem of reference is further compounded
when the phenomenal world is always mediated by the selfreferentiality of both the brain and language.

Subjective, intersubjective, objective
Donald Davidson’s work problematises the traditional philosophical
distinction between subjective and objective by examining the
interconnectedness and inseparability of the intersubjective from
the traditional subjective-objective binary (Davidson, 2001, p 7).
Davidson argues that knowledge of our own perception (subjective)
and the shared world (objective – that is Searle’s snow on Mt
Everest) is always deeply influenced by the perceptions of others.
This realm of the other’s perceptions he considers to be the
intersubjective. He argues that the intersubjective is always at the
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fore of our sense-making but that none of the three forms of
knowledge could exist without the other:
If I did not know what others think, I would have no thoughts of my
own and so would not know what to think. If I did not know what I
think, I would lack the ability to gauge the thoughts of others.
Gauging the thoughts of others requires that I live in the same world
with them, sharing many reactions to its major features, including its
values. (Davidson, 2001, p 17).

Here as Derrida would put it, there is always already a language
system ‘inhabiting in a certain way’ (Derrida’s italics) the structures
within those intersubjective values, which is engaged in the
arbitrary process of culturally conceived sense-making systems to
engender and communicate our gauging thoughts. Paul de Man, in
his essay “The Resistance to Theory” attempted to distinguish
reference from natural law (de Man, 1982). Necessarily de Man’s
argument was tied to his understanding of the relationship between
constative and performative language weaving that which we think
we are reflecting, when in actuality, we are making up
intersubjective stories as we go along (Caruth, 1996, p 73).

De Man’s concentration upon the differences between constative
and performative language is crucial because “the constative is
language claiming to represent things that are already there,
(whereas) the performative is the rhetorical operations, the acts of
language, that undermine this claim by imposing linguistic
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categories, bringing things into being, organizing the world rather
than simply representing what is.” (Culller, 1997, p 102). The
danger of constative language is that it reflects the world as we see
it rather than the world as it actually might be. Clearly medical
science invests its heuristic endeavour far more in a constative
language and the representation of things as they seem, which is
supported by the external reference of empirical evidence. The
Gold Standard Evidence of the scientific method in Random
Controlled Trials [7] typifies this constative objective from the
description of diseases, for example, but it is also implicit in most
nosological endeavour, including the more contentious pain
syndromes such as Firbomyalgia [8] (Quintner et al, 2003). At this
point the constative language of diagnosis becomes a verdict,
which can, far from reflecting what is actually going on in people
with pain, eschews interpretations outside the confines of its
pronouncement and judgment that would necessarily entail
emergent phenomena from the self-referential brain.

In contrast, performative language engenders rather than reflects
the world and, as it title suggests, its language brings a world into
being and not the other way around. The language of literature
sings the world into existence, and, creatively does. This is
exemplified in J.L. Austin’s claim that performative language takes
part in a world without either right or wrong in the same way
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someone getting married says “I do”. (Austin, 1975, p 153).
Constative language in this context seems hamstrung by its own
endeavour as its nearest equivalent “I am getting married now.” is
incapable of performing the action necessary to constate it, as in “I
do”. When one cannot describe something, one must do in the
instant, as one is doing or living the experience (Austin, 1975, p 5).

Like all binary positions explored in this thesis, however, the
inseparability of constative and performative language is what is at
stake. Can they even be separated? Are these ‘opposites’
necessarily in opposition? Here we reach an aporia, that space to
which we are denied access around which an oscillation develops.
As Culler points out:
The only way to claim that language functions performatively to
shape the world is through a constative utterance, such as
‘Language shapes the world’; but contrariwise, there is no way the
constative transparency of language can be performed except by a
speech act. The propositions which perform the act of stating
necessarily claim to do nothing but merely display things as they
are; yet if you want to show the contrary – that claims to represent
things as they are in fact impose their categories on the world – you
have no way to do this except through claims about what is or is not
the case. The argument that the act of stating or describing is in fact
performative must take the form of constative statements. (Culler,
1997, p 102)
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In other words, this oscillation between the two determines both as
inseparable from, and embedded in, the other. We are back at
Caruth’s problem of reference and why de Man is so interested in
the stakes between those discourses that invest in one and shun
the other, or in short, engage in the resistance to (self-referential)
theory. While both arenas of language undoubtedly exist, it is the
performative aspects to any constative utterance, statement
(written or spoken) or diagnosis which requires our attention and, in
any claim to be purely constative, our suspicion. For here the
stakes are high as to what constitutes a sense of history and the
invasion of the universal problematic: does a constative view of
history deny us access to the history of pain? In other words is the
allegation made against self-referentiality by the classical tradition
equally applicable against classical theory?

The answer to that has its traces within the performative language
of dualism and the degree to which the classical specificity theory
owed its seeming constative qualities to a ‘story’ that passed itself
off as purely constative natural law. The same can of course be
said for the equally Cartesian classical reflex principle of neurology.
Here, constative language that portends to describe natural law in a
kind of objective scientific reflection is in fact, deeply performative in
its desire for a universal rationality with a referenced certitude. Is
classical theory even more prone to the abstraction of history than
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self-referential theory because as Caruth argues, “far from denying
access to history, (self-referential theory) is a way… of precisely
keeping history from being swallowed up by the power of
abstraction.” (Caruth, 1996, p 74). For ‘abstraction’ in this context,
read the abstraction of desire for certitude that, as de Man was to
argue in his essay The Resistance to Theory, takes on the graceful
movements of the puppets of the Marionette theatre in the ways
classical theory can seem so real but is in fact highly manipulated
(Caruth, 1996, p 79).

De Man considers Kleist’s story On the Marionette Theatre in the
light of Kant’s “philosophical attempt to distinguish language from
empirical law by making theory into a self-reflexive system” (Caruth,
1996, p 77). This distinction between language and empirical law
anticipated theory’s concern that language engenders rather than
reflects and therefore mediates experience and our perception of
experience. De Man’s interest lies in the text that is woven between
the structures of both the puppets and the puppeteer “…that
lifelessly transforms the laws of force and motion into superhuman
grace” (Caruth, 1996, p 80). Caruth’s interest in De Man’s argument
is in the moments the puppets of the Marionette seem to take on
their “perfect curving motions of a dance, without the clumsiness of
the human dancer, because in the puppets, the limbs are what they
should be: dead, mere pendula, governed only by the law of
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gravity” that this text begins to weave between the structures of the
puppets and the puppeteers involved and the puppets begin to
perform something that does more than it knows (Caruth, 1996, p
80).
Classical theory depends upon third party removed objectivity: we
observe, we learn, we know, and then, we practice from such
reference. At stake here though, is what if the reference can not
referenced objectively because the perception of a manipulated
dance is mistaken for objective reference?

Of intrinsic importance to the question of reference is the literal and
figurative use of Newton’s first natural law of motion: gravity.
Gravity as both a literal and figurative event confounds the
references of our world of apparent empirical fixity and transforms
the problem of reference into a problem of falling. As Caruth points
out:
Newton, in the story of his discovery of gravitation, sees an apple
fall, and understands in a flash that the objects of the universe are
all falling toward each other by the same force that pulls this apple,
invisibly, toward the ground. (Caruth, 1996, p 81).

That is, if every object is falling, which despite the empirical evidence
of fixity to the contrary, means we are all doing more than we know.
That is, we are always already falling towards some aspect of the
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other and otherness in general. It follows from this general state of
falling that the other may also fall towards us as we fall, in what
Derrida calls ‘the coming of the other’ within the context of l’avenir
(Derrida, 2002). In the French there are two kinds of future: futur and
l’avenir. Futur concerns the predictable future we would wish to
secure and entails securing a job, having superannuation and
insurance policies. L’avenir in contrast, concerns the unforeseen
events of the other coming into our lives in completely unpredictable
ways and having unpredictable effects that really effect and change
our lives. A Bell in the Storm apprehends l’avenir through Andrew’s
character when he and Sally are meeting in Café L’avenir and she
asks whether the café’s name means café of the future:

Andrew

Sort of… It’s more the unpredictable future… In French
there are two kinds of futures – the one we secure against
– you plan for – it’s why we have jobs, bank accounts,
superannuation, insurance policies etc and then there’s
l’avenir… (Pause) Those totally unpredictable things that
truly shape our lives… (Buchanan, 2005, p 200).

In the discourse of persistent pain, Descartes’ bell represents the
kind of future we would wish to secure. That is, pain will only persist
if there is tissue damage or lesion in the instant and it cannot persist
unless this lesion is ongoing. Pain here becomes a confined
prediction and so too, is its ability to continue into the future. The
l’avenir of persistent pain is its uncanny unpredictability of severity
and chronicity especially in the absence of obvious lesion in the
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instant. Quoting from Schelling, Freud says of the uncanny in his
essay ‘Das Unheimliche’: ‘The uncanny is what should have
remained a secret and hidden but has come to light.’ (Freud, cited
Payne and Schad, 2004, p 33). Under the Cartesian based
specificity theory, the secret of persistent pain without lesion should
have remained confined to that of phenomena of the mind
(phantom, psychoneurosis, somatisisation) and in this sense, it
should have remained hidden within the structures of Descartes’ res
cogitans and Freud’s structure of the unconscious.

The meaning of ‘uncanny’ stems from the German das Unheimliche
meaning ‘two opposite things’ (Payne and Schad, 2004, p 34). In
the self-referential brain and the emergence of pain, the two
opposite things of body and mind in the classical theory, have not
been able to contain or hide the secret of pain’s uncanniness,
because, the necessity of the body and the mind to be separate
was unable to keep them in opposition. That is, as for constative
and performative language, both the body and the mind are
inseparable from, and embedded in, each other. In this sense the
process of decentring in science: from Copernicus to Newton, from
Newton to Szentagothai, Erdi and Maturana, has always involved
the revelation of the uncanny. What these individuals found was a
succession of complexities that decentred the stories upon which
our perceptions mistook for reference.
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Thus, Copernicus found the earth is not the centre of the universe;
Newton found the whole universe is falling; and, Szentagothai, Erdi
and Maturana found the brain is self-referential. What we thought
were opposites in natural law: earth and universe, fixed and falling,
and reflexive and unpredictable, were never actually in the
opposition we imposed upon them and, their inseparability and
embeddedness is revealed through the emergent phenomena of
the uncanny. Uncanniness then, is the revelation of that which
should have stayed a secret but is revealed when the binary
opposition of our heuristic theories collapse under their own
metaphysical weight.

So too though has been the uncanny history of philosophy from
Kant to Nietzsche, Nietzsche to Husserl and Heidegger, and
Husserl and Heidegger to Derrida. As Caruth suggests:
…the history of philosophy after Newton could be thought of as a
series of confrontations with the question of how to talk about falling.
And similarly, the problem of reference… is: how to refer to falling.
(Caruth, 1996, p 76).

Caruth’s ‘how to refer to falling’ is the problem of reference. The
world is not as we have thought it to be, that is the centre of a
stable universe. In To Fall Without Landing, Cathy refers to this
problem:
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Cathy

How is it that I’m the one seeing a
psychiatrist when it’s the whole universe
that’s crazy…?
(Buchanan, 2005, p 263)

Now with the confirmation of the self-referential neurophenomenal
world, we are not as we have thought ourselves to be, that is
predictable organs of reflexivity to a stable and pre-existent
phenomenal world with a separate and enigmatic mind. The text of
western epistemology, what Derrida termed the episteme, has
always been a Marionette text between the puppet dancing its
knowledge in exhilarating and graceful ways that appear most
human, and, most as it were, empirically referenced by natural law.
But it is when this dance seems most natural, that it is actually at its
most mechanical, and, most manipulated, by the text between the
puppet, which for example may be the bell of pain and the
puppeteer of Descartes’ L’Homme.

Neither de Man nor Caruth argue that there is not an external
reference, but rather that this external reference is the universal fall
against which the resistance to theory has sought to rise. In de
Man’s reading of the Marionette theatre, theory itself recognises
that the fall is both a literal and figurative falling. The oppositions of
‘literal’ versus ‘figurative’ have collapsed as the uncanny again
emerges in this universal falling. De Man points out this
uncanniness when he refers to the fall as being, “…in all senses of
the term, including the theological Fall” (de Man, 1982, p 285). This
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does not mean the “empirical” reference is irrelevant. Replicate
Descartes’ L’Homme and put your toe too close to a fire and a bell
of pain does indeed seem to ring in the instant, just as we do seem
to be ever fixed in our chairs as we read these words, rather than
the global reality of hurtling through space on the third rock from a
small sun. The problem is if this perception is mistaken for a fixed
universal reference, against which all phenomenology is measured
and fixed into a classical doctrine, and, this same mistaken
perception becomes inculcated into the discourse of common
sense, and, in the case of pain, the discourse of medical practice.
Derrida repeatedly pointed out that within the perceptions of
classical doctrine some secret, some spectre or ghost haunts its
ideas of fixity and certitude. The spectre deconstructing the
classical doctrine is the uncanny, revealing secrets that could no
longer be confined, hidden, or remains a secret. In this sense for
Derrida, ‘…everything refers to this uncanniness.’ (Derrida cited in
Payne and Schad, 2004, p 34).

What we have thought to be fixity is befallen, but, had always
already been. The overall problem of reference is how to come to
terms with this falling, pulling as it does any seeming fixity and/or
reflex with it, whether this falling be signified by Kant’s defiance of
empirical perception as reference, or Derridean play in the
“Nietzschean affirmation”, or Erdi’s poststructural brain, or by
Chapman’s step two miracle.
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The other point here, which is by no means minor, is that this
vantage necessarily views the aporia that exists between constative
and performative language, especially in terms of the textual
knowledge that is spun between any attempt we make to determine
reference within the overall falling. If everything is falling then surely
the only reference we have is the fall itself? Caruth argues:
In de Man’s text, as in Kant’s, the impact of reference is felt in
falling: in the resistance of the example of falling to a phenomenal or
perceptual analogy that would turn it into the mere figure of an
abstract principle. In naming a befalling, de Man’s text no longer
simply knows what it says, but indeed does more than it knows, and
it is in this that we can read the referential significance of his own
theory… What theory does, de Man tells us repeatedly, is fall; and in
falling, it refers. (Caruth, 1996, p 89 – 90).

In other words, the constative desire for objective observation has
had to give way to the instance of a deeper and literal involvement
in the vantage of Merleau-Ponty’s lived experience that always
does more than we know and defies dualisms’ requirement for
oppositions (Merleu-Ponty, 1964, p 87). Merleau-Ponty insisted it is
fundamental to our identity as beings that we are physical objects
and “not a psyche joined to an organism, but the movement to and
fro of existence, which at one time allows itself to take corporeal
form and at others moves towards personal acts” (Merleau-Ponty,
1962, p 88). This is the same sense of J. L. Austin’s iterable
process of being married because the ceremony can not be
completed by the constative utterance “I am getting married” or the
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verdictive “I am married” but demands an “I do” to actually get
married. (Austin, 1975, p 5)
Here lies a space for a co-operation between this performative
knowledge that does more than it knows and Szentagothai’s
downwards causation, autopoiesis, negentropy; that is to say the
miraculous falling of the complexity preserving, self referential brain
(Erdi, 1993, p 146). In pain the historically recent neurophenomenal
understandings have exposed us to a phenomenal world that is
bigger and more complex then we thought. This revelation has
necessarily spawned new signifiers to cope with the play of the selfreferential brain’s significance. Of particular interest here are the
terms wind-up, long-term-potentiation, and recruitment and the new
diagnoses these terms have created from pain medicine taxonomy
committees: allodynia, hyperalgesia (primary and secondary) and
hyperpathia. These diagnoses in turn, seek to deal with the
autopoiesis, the miracle of what is growingly referred to as
neurosensitisation (Miller, 1996). We ought to pay close attention to
the new language that is used to cope with this expansion of our
neurophenomenal world, but also, the lack of language that is
currently available to cope with this new phenomenal context. The
French neurobiologist, Le Van Quyen highlights this concern:
Despite a growing body of evidence… our understanding of these
large scale brain processes remains hampered by the lack of
theoretical language for expressing these complex behaviours in
dynamical terms. (Le Van Quyen, 2004, p 67)
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Just because the miracle cannot remain hidden, doesn’t mean we
understand the nature of its space, since like any aporia, we are
denied access to its mechanisms even if we did have the language
outside of dualism to contemplate them. As Faingold points out:
The complexity of the brain has placed a seemingly insurmountable
constraint on our ability to understand with any degree of precision
how the functional mechanisms of the brain are organized to
perform even the simplest tasks. (Faingold, 2004, p 57)

Wind-up refers to when a non-noxious stimulus (a gentle tapping on
the neck for example) is constantly repeated on a subject for a
period time until the instances of the stimuli – although of
themselves non-noxious – eventually elicit pain and if continued for
a prolonged period, unbearable pain:

Andrew

Do you remember when I first examined you, how I
tapped you on the shoulder? Well, if I were to tap
someone who doesn’t have your pain state, initially
it wouldn’t bother them. But after ten minutes it
would start to feel dull and heavy. After thirty
minutes it would begin to ache. After an hour they
would hurt. And after two hours they would be
begging me to stop. (Slight Pause) It’s called
“wind-up” and it’s the brain’s response to a stimulus
that builds up over time…

Simon

So why did the tapping hurt me straight away?

Andrew

Because your brain’s already built up the pain… like
a …memory
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Simon

Let me get this straight… You’re saying I received
the equivalent of…like a fortnight’s tapping in the
moment the truck hit me? (Buchanan, 2005, p 218)

There remains the moot point that this term, wind up, is an attempt
by medicine to deal with pain phenomena that emerge uncannily
from the unpredictable self-referentiality of the brain. This attempt
therefore, takes place from a vantage beyond the predictable
common sense of the hardwired brain and its specificity theory
driven medico-legal discourse. In so doing though, this same
attempt invites more questions than it answers: principally
concerning the nature of the miracle.
Implicit in any interpretative practice here is the oscillation of the
aporia, this space to which we are denied access, and, a space that
is always open to an active interpretation, if only because, its nature
is, and always has been, self-organising, noncentred and given to
negentropy: that is to say, a self-referential play within de Man’s
fall. Pain is inseparable from self-referentiality and is irreducible to
any objective assessment predicated on a predictable reflex from a
recognizable and detectable stimulus. Pain is therefore necessarily
always subjective, and, is always communicated and observed
intersubjectively, because it is given to, and emerges from, this
aporia.
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The International Association for the Study of Pain recognized this
subjectivity as early as 1994 with the following definition of pain:
Pain is an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated
with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such
damage. (IASP, 1994).

This definition has generally been interpreted as meaning that pain
is always subjective (Chapman, 2004). The importance of this
subjectivity is that pain can no longer be objectively extricated from
the epistemological and ontological bio-medical complexity of what
is really going on in its experience. It is in the intersubjective realm
however, that pain and its subjectivity takes on three peculiarly
unique characteristics, which Elaine Scarry found in her
groundbreaking book The Body in Pain – The Making and
Unmaking of the World (Scarry, 1985, p 3). Scarry divides physical
pain into three different subjects:
first, the difficulty of expressing physical pain; second, the
political and perceptual complications that arise as a result of
that difficulty; and third, the nature of both material and
verbal expressibility or, more simply, the nature of human
creation. When at last pain does find a voice it begins to tell
a story… (Scarry, 1985, p 3).

My reading of Scarry’s contention is that there is no “pure”
constative language for the experience of pain. It is therefore
always performative, inherently engaged in metaphor, metonym
and musicality (pre-linguistic grunts and groans) and in de Man’s
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performance of doing more than we know (Kristeva, 1986, p 82). In
short, pain tells a story because language is unable to cope with
the experience, just as language is (currently) unable to cope with
the self-referential brain. Whether this is causally linked to the selfreferentiality of both the brain and language is a moot point, one
that I relayed to both Dr John Quintner and Associate Professor
Milton Cohen in an email of August, 2003, sent during the
completion of a paper we had all co-written that had just been
accepted in the Journal for Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
(Qunintner et al, 2003),
Dear John/Milton,
We have stumbled upon something – both language and the brain are
plastic/playful and, our common reference for the lived experience of
this plasticity, is pain.

Milton emailed me back almost immediately highlighting the above
and added, “Nice point. Perhaps this could be expanded?”
(Personal correspondence, 2003). With the completion of this
sentence, perhaps a ground has been prepared where at the very
least, it could and should be expanded within the exciting
confluence of the literal and figurative miracle, for as the French
poet Rene Char noted,
In the explosion of the universe we are witnessing, a miracle
happens: the fragments falling down are alive! (Char, cited
Rothenburg and Joris, 1995, p 706)
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Chapter 5
Imaginary creations - language, neurophenomenology and the
unstable self…

Scarry’s implications for language and the inexpressibility of pain
are that when physical pain at last finds a voice, it begins to tell a
story. The story that pain tells is about the inseparability of first, the
difficulty of expressing physical pain; second, the political and
perceptual complications that arise as a result of that difficulty; and
third, the nature of both material and verbal expressibility or, more
simply, the nature of human creation, and their embeddedness in
one another (Scarry, 1985, p 3). While undoubtedly Scarry’s
insights into the suffering and ontology of pain, were, and are to an
extent, still groundbreaking, Scarry seems not to apprehend an
inherent tautology or pleonasm in the nomenclature of “physical
pain”.

At first glance Scarry’s use of the signifier physical passes as a
simple adjective: physical pain. For on one level it is adjectival, as it
seems empirically, that physical pain is a type of pain. If we ponder
physical pain as a tautology though, then we expose its adjectival
quality as being a captive to the somatic-psychogenic or body-mind
binary. That is, the postulated existence of physical pain implies
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that there is also a wholly non-physical pain and that the two are
quite distinct things, apropos of the binary of Descartes’ res extensres cogitans.

In French the nearest equivalent signifier for pain is ‘douleur’, and
its signifieds cut up the phenomenal world of not only that which
English terms physical pain but sorrow as well, and ‘douleur’ does
so without distinction between physical pain and sorrow. While on
one level this signified merely reiterates the differences and
arbitrary nature of the signified on the conceptual level across
different cultures, it may also co-operate with the ontology and
inherent subjectivity of the self-referential brain and its pain (Carr,
2001, p 47). That is, what is the extent to the experience of pain?
Does it entail merely physical symptoms, and inherit with that
questions the self-referential problems of the body-mind
oppositions, or, does it always entail inseparable emotions as
‘douleur’ would suggest? If one were to consider the results of the
McGill Pain Questionnaire in a French Clinic, what would be at
stake is not so much what the results of the questionnaire would be
in France but, just what the McGill Pain Questionnaire is in French,
since the extent of what pain is thought to be differs under each
language?
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Pain is like de Man’s falling, and does more than we know. Scarry
points out that precious little language exists to phenomenally cope
with pain, but in English at least, the language that does exist, is
almost entirely negative in connotation. Professor Rory Sussex’s
University of Queensland’s (linguistic) study of pain found that 99%
of the English language available to cope with pain had negative
connotations (Sussex, 2001). He concluded, “The English language
view of pain is almost wholly negative and the sufferer finds
themselves trapped within the available negative language system.”
(Sussex, 2001, p 55) Scarry had already concluded, “Pain actively
destroys language” and effectively reduces the sufferer to a prelinguistic state of grunts and groans (Scarry, 1984, p 14). Clearly,
the ontology and neurophenomenology of pain predisposes people
in pain, but particularly persistent pain (because it so defies simple
explanation), into a peculiarly vulnerable lived experience between
public and private life. The philosopher Hannah Arendt discusses
this lack of language for pain and its sequelae:
Indeed, the most intense feeling we know of, intense to the point of
blotting out all other experiences, namely, the experience of great
pain, is at the same time the most private and least communicable
of all. Not only is it perhaps the only experience which we are
unable to transform into a shape fit for public appearance, it actually
deprives us of our feeling for reality to such an extent that we can
forget it more quickly and easily than anything else. There seems to
be no bridge from the most radical subjectivity, in which I am no
longer “recognizable” to the outer world of life. Pain, in other words,
truly a borderline experience between life as “being among men”
(inter homines esse) and death, is so subjective and removed from
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the world of things and men that it cannot assume an appearance at
all. (Arendt, 1998, p 50 – 51).

The American Rheumatologist James Katz sums up Arendt’s position
in the Journal of Medical Ethics,
This is a lack that is attached to pain. Specifically, it is a lack of
language… A deeper analysis of this concept is accessible through the
writings of Jacques Lacan… (wherein) not only is the unconscious
structured like language but in truth the unconscious resides in language.
(Katz, 2004, p 60, p 62).

Katz’s signpost to the ‘writings of Jacques Lacan’, relates to the
ongoing importance of Lacan’s the other in an understanding of
radical subjectivity and language’s role in this otherness (Payne and
Schad, 2003, p12 - 23). The concept of the other emerged from
Lacan’s mirror phase when the infant, aged between six to eighteen
months, experiences manqué (a lack of or loss) at apprehending its
own image in the mirror (Lacan, 1977). The infant sees and
recognises the self in the mirror but also recognises in a flash, like
Newton with his apple, that the image it sees is not only the self,
because the self is doing the seeing, but, it is also the other. The
ideal concept of the self has been split (Lacan, 1977).

Lacan thought the Ideal I had, upto this mirror phase, experienced
itself as indissociable from its mother (le Désire de la Mère) (Lacan,
1977). At this mirror phase, the images and fantasies what Lacan
called the Imaginary order, are irrevocably split and the child
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experiences the two main features of Symbolic Order: manqué (lack
of or loss) and besoin (need) (Lacan, 1977). The emergence of the
Symbolic Order from this otherness led to the formation of the
unconscious, together with le Nom-du-Pére, which was similar to
Freud’s Oedipal complex (Lacan, 1977). The emergence of the
Symbolic Order fed an unending cycle of loss and desire (desir) to
bridge the gap between this desire to reclaim the imaginary order’s
ideal and the Symbolic order’s main tool with which to reclaim it:
language (Lacan, 1977).

For Lacan, language only served to further compound this lack
(manqué), because language’s inherent self-referentiality and lack of
fixity, problematises the very nature of this besoin (need) and its
ensuing desire. In short, language is unable to bridge this gap of that
which causes the cycle of desire and loss. The subject’s desire for
reclamation of the Ideal I, is constantly re-negotiated through a
language system of differences it cannot master, secure, or fix
(Culler, 1997, p 158).

Lacan anticipated both de Man and Caruth’s concerns with the
problem of reference, because the linguistic system amounts to the
problem of reference in the universal fall, of self referentiality. It is
little wonder Lacan’s importance in this intrinsic sense of otherness
has endured and grown. The French douleur then has added
importance in this context, as it pertains to pain as the
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indistinguishable symptom that cuts up the phenomenal world in
terms of being unable to distinguish between bodily pain and sorrow.
This is because language’s role in engendering pain is more a
symptom of Lacan’s manqué, as any language to cope with pain will
cycle between pain’s lack or loss and the desire to reclaim the painfree state we have lost. This engenderment of the symptom through
language was pointed out by Lacan in Ecrit:
the symptom resolves itself entirely in the analysis of language,
because the symptom is itself structured like language. (Lacan,
1977, p 59).

At this point, Jim Katz, like so many in the medical discourse,
voices a familiar concern about what amounts to classical theory’s
problem with self-referentiality:
This becomes philosophically problematic because if the
deconstructionist premise is true that language is unstable, then the
unconscious, let alone the self, may be fundamentally unstable as
well. (Katz, 2004, p 62).

Lacan’s radical interrogation of subject formation concerns
language’s metaphoricity, metonymy, and musicality, because if
language could indeed bridge the gap of our manqué and reclaim
our Ideal I, then there would be little need for metaphors, metonyms
or the musicality in language, to translate what amounts to an
inability to claim fixed meanings and essential truths. Language is
unable to claim fixed meanings and essential truths because it
inherently unstable as we have seen in J.L. Austin’s performative
language, and Derrida’s universal problematic. The instability or
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self-referentiality of language is fundamental to the creation and
engenderment of the self.

The other of Lacan’s discourse is not only the literal other of
Arendt’s inter homines esse, but, the other of and intrinsic to the
self-referential self: intra homines esse. Here, Katz’s clause ‘the
self may be fundamentally unstable’, is worthy of iteration because
whatever the adjective, the fundament of the self is other than
stable, because the self-referential language that engenders our
ontology is also engendered by it in autopoietic ways. Could it be
that Lacan’s argument that ‘the symptom is itself structured like
language’ can be now augmented to be, ‘the symptom is itself
structured not only like language, but also like the brain’? (Lacan,
1977, p 59). That is to say, like Szentaogothai’s ‘schemas that
themselves act like metaphors’ (Szentagothai, 1993, p 101). The
confluence between the self-referentiality of language and
neurophenomenology, and, the other of a radical subjectivity, is
now compelling. This instability (in Katz’s language) is not so much
existentialist but ontological, linguistic and also intrinsically
neurophenomenal.

This co-operative interplay between language, neurobiology and the
self, could also cooperate with Scarry’s creative frame and Julia
Kristeva’s ‘imaginary creations’ to augment Lacan’s unstable subject,
because both Scarry’s ‘creative frame’ and Kristeva’s ‘imaginary
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creations’ may offer a powerful affirmation, not despite but because
of, the lack ascribed to pain and otherness in general. In short, the
creativity that is spawned by the loss of pain may constitute a gain.

Kristeva’s re-interpretation of Lacan’s Imaginary order is of most
pressing interest here in terms of this creative gain. She is heavily
influenced by Lacan’s theories. Just as Lacan re-read Freud, so has
Kristeva re-read Lacan. For Kristeva, language is again vital in the
development of the subject but it’s a language that not only attempts
to interpret the world through the symbolic, but a language that
examines states at the limits of language itself:
…where language breaks up in psychosis…or the moments where
language doesn’t yet exist.” (Kristeva, 1986, p 19).

This breakdown of language is redolent of Scarry’s pre-linguistic
grunts for the subject in pain (Scarry, 1985, p 12). Kristeva
investigates language’s role in subject formation more as a process,
which she termed the ‘subject-in-process’:
Process in the sense of process but also in the sense of a legal
proceeding where the subject is committed to trial, because our
identities in life are constantly called into question, brought to trial,
over-ruled. (Kristeva, 1986, p 19)

For Kristeva, Lacan’s mirror phase is vital to this process, because its
metaphorical chaotic interpretation of the unstable self is formed in
terms of difference and otherness (Abraham, 1996, p 123). She rereads the mirror phase’s role through her investigation of the process
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of subject formation: from the non-differentiated infant to speaking
subject, by postulating a distinction between the semiotic and the
symbolic. What she terms ‘the semiotic’:
…takes us back to the pre-linguistic states of childhood where the
child babbles the sounds s/he hears, or where s/he articulates
rhythms, alliterations, or stresses, trying to imitate her/his
surroundings. In this state the child doesn’t yet possess the
necessary linguistic signs and thus there is no meaning in the strict
sense of the term. (Kristeva, 1986, p 20).

Kristeva points out that the semiotic does not represent the unity of
presence of the imaginary. Rather, the semiotic is a modality
“constantly called into question…a state of disintegration in which
patterns appear but which do not have any stable identity.” (Kristeva,
1986, p 20).

More closely aligned with Lacan’s ‘Idea I’ in the imaginary order is
what Kristeva terms the ‘Chora’. She states:
The word ‘chora’ means receptacle in Greek, which refers us to
Winnicott’s idea of ‘holding’: mother and child are in permanent
stricture in which one holds the other, there’s a double entrance, the
child is held but so is the mother. (Kristeva, 1986, p 21)

The Chora then, is a more archaic semiotic modality again, wherein
the infant gains the most archaic memories of the maternal body.
Such memories may even go back as far as the infant in uterine. The
Chora embodies those moments when archaic libidinal pleasures are
indistinguishable from the mother, and, before the maternal body
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becomes understood as the (m)other. During the mirror phase, when
identification and the development of language casts the child into
the symbolic realm and into the Oedipal complex, the experiences of
the chora, are repressed. For Kristeva, the repression of such
beautiful and libidinous memories may have dramatic consequences
for creativity. She argues:
At that point we witness the possibility of creation, of sublimation. I
think every type of creation… is due to this possibility of opening the
norms, towards pleasure, which refers to an archaic experience with
a maternal pre-object. … What is obvious is that this experience of
the semiotic chora in language produces poetry. (Kristeva, 1986, p
20).

Paradoxically, Kristeva focuses her interest on depression or
melancholia and the loss it represents for the subject’s experience.
She argues that when this loss is acknowledged, it creates a
powerful interplay with creativity and the experience of the semiotic
chora. In depression and melancholia we experience the loss of, yet
paradoxically, the desire for, the experience for the semiotic chora.
Kristeva argues that imaginary creations are sublimations of this loss
by the self for the other, wherein, momentarily, the subject-in-process
can both hold and be held within the imaginary creation. For Kristeva
this experience ‘produces poetry’ which amounts, to a creation-ness,
which amounts to a gain. From this gain, Kristeva argued that:
‘Imaginary creations are a powerful antidepressant. Provided we are
able to create them…’ (Kristeva, 1986, p 21).
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It is however, Kristeva’s anticipation in the mid 1980s of the
neurophenomenal operation that seems uncanny, almost as if she
had already read Szentagothai’s writings on the self-referential brain
of 1993 and the impact this self-referentiality may have on our
understanding of subject formation and psychoanalysis. In1986 she
spoke of such anticipation:
…it’s a problem situated at the cross-over point between biological
and psychological research. A few years ago psychoanalysis was
confronted by the science of language, now there is a new challenge:
neuro-biology. (Kristeva, 1986, p 22)

What seems even more uncanny is that there is now so much more
known about a neurophenomenal association between pain and
depression. Kristeva’s focus on depression could have ramifications
and relevance for pain as well, because there appears to be a
neurophenomenal association between depression and pain
(Greenfield, 2002, p 92). Could it be that if pain and depression are
closely associated, then Kristeva’s imaginary creations may not only
alleviate depression but soothe pain as well? This association
between depression and pain concerns Susan Greenfield’s research
into the plasticity of the brain forming assemblies of neurones that
actually reflect subjective experience:
It is interesting, that in depression, pain is perceived more acutely
(Affleck et al, 1987) whereas in schizophrenia (a small assembly
mode) the thresholds are higher (Guieu eta al , 1994). It may be the
case, therefore, that the erstwhile mysterious subjective element to
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pain perception… may be attributable to fluctuating size in a transient
neuronal assembly. (Greenfield, 2002, p 92).

Miller also observes this close neurophenomenal association
between pain and depression:
A common diagnostic association occurs between depression and
chronic pain (Benjamin et al, 1998; Fishbain et al, 1986; Kramlinger
et al, 1983; Krishnan et al, 1985; Miller, 1993a). Coderre, Katz,
Vaccarino, and Melzack (1993) have proposed a central
neuroplasticity model of chronic pain that appears to meet the
present criteria for a neurosensitisation syndrome. (Miller, 1996, p

13)
Miller defined neurosensitisation as the ‘development of
progressively enhanced sensitivity or reactivity of central nervous
system (CNS) mechanisms at the neurophysiological, biochemical
and intracellular levels.’ (Miller, 1996, p 12). He further observed that
pain and depression ‘often appears excessive in duration and
severity with respect to the identified initiating injury or event.’ (Miller,
1996, p 12) Of relevance here is the way antidepressant medication
is proposed to affect these same neuronal assemblies that
Greenfield refers to, as she restates the actions of antidepressants
on these neuronal assemblies:
in particular the actions of ‘certain very well known transmitters…
serotonin, histamine, dopamine and noradrenaline’ (Greenfield, 2002,
p 92)

While this is the accepted logic of antidepressant medication
intervention, the secrets of just how they may alter these neuronal
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assemblies and go about their antidepressant ways is still unknown.
As Greenfield states:
Just how the water is turned into wine – how the bump and grind of
the neurons and the shrinking and expanding of assemblies actually
translate into subjective experience – is, of course, another story
completely. (Greenfield, 2002, p 92).

Enter here, yet again, Chapman’s step two, then a miracle occurs.
Although Kristeva’s postulation that ‘Imaginary creations are a
powerful antidepressant…’, was based on her work as a
psychoanalyst, and, perhaps, her deeply refined theoretical intuition,
it is highly poignant to look at the functional MRI scans of Catherine
Bushnell’s (2000 and 2002) study of the nexus between pain and
creativity:

(Bushnell, 2000)
Scan 3A (left) is a functional MRI of a patient in severe pain. The
area on the right forebrain circled, represents blood perfusion relating
to pain on a varying scale of intensity. Red is the most intense, then
yellow, then green, then blue in lessening intensity. Scan 3B (right)
shows the same patient with the same pain but they have been given
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music of their choice to listen to. The perfusion in the forebrain
circled has diminished or been modulated to a blue, as indeed an
area of blue in the auditory cortex (right temporal) also activates the
same intensity of blood flow, presumably associated with listening to
music. The character of Andrew in the play, describes it to the court
that presides over the authenticity of Simon’s case, thus:

Andrew

The first scan on the left is of a subject in severe pain… The
red to yellow and green areas circled are areas of perfusion
that signal pain… See how the second one, taken after the
person has heard soothing music of their choice has come up
as blue in the auditory cortex here… but has modulated –
yeah ok - turned down the pain on the forebrain - circled
here... As a traumatic experience may precipitate pain – a
creative one may soothe it. (Buchanan, 2005, p 230).
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The subjective experience of Bushnell’s patient reported a reduction
in pain, congruent with the perfusion in the scans. Greenfield’s
caution persists however, because just how the water is turned into
wine is still not clear. It is possible to suggest though, that perfusion
relates to the brain activity, that, in turn, relates to Greenfield’s
neuronal assemblies, which shrink and expand into subjective
experience of pain. Kristeva’s assertion that imaginary creations are
a powerful antidepressant may well translate to a powerful analgesic
as well, only we know there now exists firmer neurological evidence
to back it up.

If imaginary creations can be powerfully anti-depressant and it would
seem analgesic too, then Kristeva pointed out that a paradox ensues
for this efficacy to be engendered. That is, the subject needs to
acknowledge such “loss – of ties, of meaning – in order to write
[create].” (Kristeva, 1986, p 21). Depression and pain represents the
acknowledgement of loss and facilitates access to the chora, and
such access may facilitate the experience of the chora from which
ensues the stuff of art. If Lacan reinterpreted Freud to incorporate the
self-referentiality of language, then Julia Kristeva has reinterpreted
Lacan, and it is her reflection upon the role of creativity in this
reinterpretation, that is potentially of profound importance for the
subject in persistent pain. The self-referentiality of the brain,
language and the self is crucial in the light of imaginary creations
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which are always engaged in a process that is doing more than it
knows. This role of imaginary creations as an efficacious gain for the
subject in pain may go some way to understanding the role of the
photographic creations, in the life of Nick Djordjevic. A life without
whom, the play A Bell in the Storm, could never have been written.
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Chapter 6
I am alive!!
The other and the storm in the photography of Nick Djordjevic

In the noted neuro-pharmacologist Carl Faingold’s paper ‘Emergent
properties of CNS neuronal networks as targets for pharmacology:
application to anticonvulsant drug action’, Faingold contemplates
the secrets of ‘complexity theory, when the multitude of elements in
a complex system interact, [then] new and unexpected properties
can emerge due, in part, to self-organisation.‘ (Faingold, 2004, p
57). Of great interest for Faingold here was this complexity theory’s
origin in meteorology. He states:
The complexity approach was originally applied in meteorology to
explain how small sporadic changes in wind currents in one part of
the global weather system via a cascading series of interactions
could trigger the development of a highly organised and powerful
storm thousands of miles away…Ideas that originated in the study
of weather systems may be of use in understanding how drugs act
on the brain. (Faingold, 2004, p 57).
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This complexity theory seems redolent of the notion in chaos theory
that an insect’s wing, beating on one side of the world, can cause a
catastrophe, on the other side of the world through self-organising
complexities that are in no way predictable or measurable.

So the story goes, in March 1988, Nick Djordjevic stood on Trigg
Beach to photograph a sunset. Since 1983, his life had changed
irrevocably due to a persistent pain state, secondary to a nonspecific viral infection that was thought to be an insect bite.
Whatever the initial cause, Nick’s pain became persistent and three
and a half years later, he was diagnosed with psoriatic arthritis. In
deference to chaos theory, rather than an insect’s wing beating on
one side of the world causing catastrophe on the other side, in
Nick’s case it seemed that a miniscule insect’s bite may have set
off a complex self-organising state that precipitated his world into
catastrophe.

Nick’s pain was not only persistent but grew in severity. It also
defied all predictions made about its course and duration, and, after
a few years, Nick had to resign from his professional career as a
public servant. He remained home, within a state of alienation all
too familiar to severe persistent pain sufferers across the world
(Merskey and Teassel, 2000). His condition deteriorated and he
became depressed. In 1987, he took an unsuccessful overdose to
end a life that he felt had become unliveable. He survived. He was,
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though, referred to see a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist would only
see Nick if it was conjointly with his wife, Anne. Nick was disturbed
by the ‘treatment’ he received from the psychiatrist. Nick told me:
This guy believed I was behaving like an infant and my wife like the
parent. All he wanted to do was draw Parent/Adult/Child diagrams
and suggested that my wife and I date in and date out. He didn’t
acknowledge my pain. It was so humiliating. My pain was ignored.
For him, it didn’t exist. (Personal Correspondence, Djordjevic,
2005)

Not surprisingly Nick declined to see this psychiatrist again. After
the despair of suffering both the pain and the disparagement of his
pain, Nick began participating in workshops offered by the Arthritis
Foundation in pain management and distraction techniques. Anne
saw an advertisement for Arthritis Self Help Workshops: Learn how
to manage your arthritis. The course lasted for six weeks. Nick told
me:
I never gave it a chance to work cos I’m a cynical prick by nature but
the seed of guided imagery and creative distraction techniques had
been sown, because I saw some of the others in that course
relieved and uplifted, and, I wondered what that was about.
(Personal correspondence, Djordjevic, 2005)

Through a chance meeting with another pain suffer, Glen, Nick
began an inquiry into photography. Glen was a member of the
Wanneroo Photographic Society and he suggested that he join the
club as he knew that I was interested in photography. Nick was
immediately taken and excited by the prospect of what a
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photograph could do in capturing a creative moment. This quickly
led to his own creative attempts, as he told me:
What I saw there blew me away. I couldn’t believe photographs that
good could be taken. I wanted to do this – to take shots that good.
My friend Glen was interested in photographing all manner of
landscapes especially lightning but all my efforts were rank amateur
crap. Then the club hosted the 1998 Western Australian
Photographic Federation Annual Convention at the Hillarys Boat
Harbour over the labour day long weekend in March. One of the
tasks was to photograph a sunset. On the Saturday evening I went
off by myself to Shag Rock at Trigg. I rigged up my tripod and
camera and there it was - this storm… on the horizon. (Personal
correspondence, Djordjevic, 2005)

The ‘pics’ Nick ‘took’ that dusk became his first serious storm
photographs. When the photographs were developed, he named
them Genesis. Something, very deeply felt, had indeed begun for
Nick. The photographs created a sense of well being and wonder in
the creation of them that has driven not only the passion and love
for his professional career, but, the creativity he credits with saving
his life. He told one journalist during the season of the play A Bell in
the Storm:
If I didn’t have my photography, I wouldn’t be alive today.
(Djordjevic, cited McNeill, 2005, p 53).

Nick attests to a deeply intuitive connection between the storm’s
dynamic being, and his own being. He has confided to me, that this
connection with the storms he photographs can not be described in
too much detail, because it feels like a secret between him and the
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storm. He told me: “I let the photographs speak for me.” (Personal
correspondence, Djordjevic, 2005.). Each time he developed a new
storm photograph, it was like glimpsing the pain he had been told
was not there by the psychiatrist. In this sense, Roland Barthes in
Camera Lucida, describes the photograph as a wound. Barthes
states:
I wanted to explore [the photograph] not as a question (a theme) but
as a wound: I see, I feel, hence I notice, I observe, and I think.
(Barthes, cited in Padfield, 2003, p 20)

Deborah Padfield cites Barthes in just this context, in her
groundbreaking book perceptions of pain (Padfield, 2003). The
book explores the creative utility of the photograph for a number of
people living with persistent unexplained pain. She picks up on
Barthes’ notion that:
…attributes similar qualities to photography as to medicine. At times
(…as with fibre optics and X-rays etc) both practices attempt to
make visible what has hitherto been invisible – to peel back the skin
revealing what is usually concealed, and often painful. (Padfield,
2003, p 20).

In other words Nick’s photography was involved, like Padfield’s
photography, in not only contemplating the secret of his wound, but,
in revealing the wound that was hidden and a secret, as for Freud
and Derrida’s interest in das unheimliche or the uncanny. What was
uncanny for Nick at the time and remains so to this day, is that
every time he photographs storms, his pain is relieved. With the
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benefit of the self-referential perspective, the uncanniness of his
pain relief in storms is apparent when considered in the light of
Bushnell’s MRI scans and Kristeva’s imaginary creations combine
in the creative moment becoming a powerful (neurophenomenal)
antidepressant and/or analgesic. The idea of Nick experiencing
pain relief in the storm is even more uncanny, when it is intersected
with Faingold’s meteorological parable to account for how both
literally and figuratively the storm and the brain maybe selforganising.

Of these complex neurophenomenal and ontological intersections
however, Nick was entirely unaware. What he knew, having seen
many different doctors for his pain, was that to openly discuss his
pain relief in the storm was very difficult. In part, this difficulty was
due to the paucity of language available to cope with his pain, but
also, because doctors’ doubts about the physicality of his pain left
him feeling peculiarly vulnerable. This doubt and vulnerability is
explored between Simon and Andrew in the play, A Bell in the
Storm:

Andrew

You felt your pain go into the storm?

Simon

I hope yr not mocking me? (Pause) Let’s just say
that what was outside of me was inside me and
what was inside me was outside of me (Slight
pause) but they always had been and it all just…

Andrew

Went away… The pain?

(Buchanan, 2005, p 219).
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After his initial photographs of Genesis, nearly every storm that
developed off the coast between Trigg Beach and Ocean reef Nick
went to photograph. By 1990 he had photographed many of his
most widely known and best selling photographs, including Ten
Billion Volts:

It was however, the creative uncanniness of the process in
photographing the storms, that Nick became more and more
interested in. His experiences of this process seemed to
reinvigorate his life and reduce his pain, or at least, increase his
ability to live with it. His best photographs were taken after dark, on
long exposures, without any clue what was really out there to be
photographed. He found the contents of his photographs came to
him and not the other way around, as the play explores:
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Simon

…your CT Scans and MRIs and X-rays and whatnot.
They just go ‘click’ and in a fraction of a second,
expect to capture what’s going on. (Pause) But to
photograph a storm you gotta be open to the world…
patient… and only when yr in the dark the most,
leave yr shutter open with the lens set to infinity…
Then, what’s really out there comes to you – not the
other way around. (Buchanan, 2005, p 218)

Sometimes for Nick, what ‘comes to you’, was much more than he
ever dreamt would be out there. His award winning photograph
Atlantis attests to this uncanniness:

On first seeing this photograph, I assumed as most do, that Nick
had used photoshop to digitally enhance the colours and dynamics
of this shot. I was however, quite wrong, as the play points out in
the following direct address:
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Simon

(Direct address) This one was taken an hour after
dark. You’re thinking I used photoshop, right? To get
all these greens and sunset colours – especially as it
was so dark I couldn’t see a thing. But you’d be
wrong. It was a forty-five minute exposure, that’s all.
(Buchanan, 2005, p 192)

Nick had also grown to understand the way the subjects and
objects of the photograph played within the photograph, contingent
as they were, upon the length of exposure over which the
photograph was taken. The longer the exposure, the greater the
play on the lens, and the more likely that uncanny things hidden to
the normal eye, may emerge through it. It was also the feelings he
developed that seemed more and more vital to this creative
process, as Simon’s character explains to Sally in the play:
Simon

As it grew dark the storm seemed to come for me…
So I just stood back and something said leave the
shutter open and see what it sees out there. Just
leave it open… it’s a feeling… a creation-ness that’s all… It’s not something you can see – it’s
something you feel… (Buchanan, 2005, p 213 -14)

Indeed Atlantis was taken an hour after dark on an evening when
no storms were forecast, but when Nick sensed there just might be
one about. It seemed to the naked eye that there were no colours
of the sunset left to shoot, the rocks were dark, and, there was but
one tiny flash of lightning during the whole shoot. Indeed the night’s
exploration had seemed a photographic failure to Nick, even if the
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process of being and doing all this had again modulated his pain.
He packed up his gear, like a fisherman goes home having enjoyed
the outing, but caught nothing.

Instead, when he developed the photograph, he found all those
colours playing in the hidden, but very present, afterglow of the
sunset, mixing with the mercury vapour’s green (that is produced
from the local street lights) splashing all over the rocks, and, in the
most interesting part of the frame, a single lightning strike
elucidating the whole of the picture’s complexity through its very
playfulness. The lost city of his pain, and his joy, was there, in the
dark all along. What had seemed initially to me a banal title to
accompany an obviously photoshopped photograph, suddenly
struck me with its sheer ingeniousness. I was, and remain deeply
moved, every time I see this shot. Andrew in the play tries to
explain to Sally his feelings about these photographs more
generally:

Andrew

Merde. Jesus these people just don’t realise this is
something that can help tell the brain’s story. DNA
has the double helix – the solar system has the
atom… but pain – it only has Descartes’ bell…

Sally

It’s late Andrew…

Andrew

This guy stuck away in Perth so burdened with his
own pain has found the metaphor: Complex systems
theory, self-organisation, neuroplasticity and lightning
- it all fits! Eureka!!! And all two minutes from his
house on his local beach. And what really gets me is
he had to lose nearly everything to find it. And he
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finds it in his only reason left to live… (Buchanan,
2005, p 223)

Nick became, as many storm-chasers do, highly engaged with the
tracking and prediction of these storms, and found the following
maxim to be useful: many are forecast but few come, but it is the
ones not forecast that come best and most fiercely. Perth is not
known for its high frequency of electrical storms, and during
summer, there is a protracted period of meteorological quiescence.
In winter, the thunderstorms are often too difficult to photograph as
they are associated with fast moving low level cold fronts. Nick’s
most preferred storms remain the slow-moving, mid-level
disturbances that occur sporadically and unpredictably, in the Perth
spring, summer and autumn.

The mystery associated with the storm’s forecast however, is even
more apparent, when it comes to understanding just what lightning
actually is, in order to forecast it. Like pain, we know lightning
exists, but we have little idea what it is or how it is produced
(Gosline, 2005, p 30). This was first discussed in the prestigious
scientific journal Nature in November 2003, which was the same
month we began to workshop the play that would become A Bell in
the Storm. Then in May 2005, which was the same month A Bell in
the Storm was produced, the journal New Scientist’s cover article
ran with ‘Thunderbolts from Space – What triggers lightning.’ by
Anna Gosline (Gosline, 2005.)
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The article discussed the latest research on the impasse
concerning what lightning is:
Nobody understands what’s going on here. You have a lot of people
guessing but we are really clueless. After a couple of hundred
years, it’s actually embarrassing. (Dwyer, cited in Gosline, 2005, p
30).

Gosline first discusses the classical theory concerning lightning,
involves ice crystals rubbing together in the storm’s up drafts,
creating a negative ionisation and electrical charge that leaves a
positive charge building in the earth that in turn, eventually leads to
the discharge of this polarity as lightning (Gosline, 2005, p 31 - 34).
Gosline then points out though that this theory is theoretically
insupportable as she states:
But there is a flaw in this explanation. Air only ionises spontaneously
in electrical fields of around 2500 kilovolts per metre. Centuries of
often dangerous measurement with kites, balloons and aircraft have
produced many measurements of fields in thunderstorms. But noone has ever found an electrical field in a storm cloud that is any
where near strong enough to ionise air molecules. The fields found
are typically between 100 and 400 kilovolts per metre, less than a
tenth of what is needed [to produce lightning]. (Gosline, 2005, p 30
– 31).

The long held and widely accepted theory for the causation of
lightning, was suddenly, inadequate. The elements available within
the earth’s atmosphere simply could not generate enough volts for
lightning to occur. If this is the case, then what might be going on?
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The new evidence concerns an involvement of other elements in
the creation of lightning, namely ‘cosmic rays in a process termed
runaway breakdown’, as Gosline suggests:
These are highly energetic particles that zip through space at close
to the speed of light. When a cosmic ray strikes Earth’s atmosphere,
it could hit an air molecule, ionising it and producing an extremely
energetic electron. In the electrical field near a storm cloud, such an
electron could be accelerated to near the speed of light, then hit and
ionise other air molecules, producing more and more electrons in a
chain reaction. The ensuing avalanche of electrons would ionise the
air, allowing charge to flow. (Gosline, 2005, p 32).

Lightning, that was once held to be phenomena produced through a
simple cause and effect closed system of earth-only atmospheric
givens, has been found to lack reference to scientific actuality. The
growing evidence confirms a greater mystery and complexity, in
contrast to the Ockham’s razor approach of the most obvious and
simple answer is usually true. At stake here is that Ockham’s razor
may too often mistake our perception for reference that often
serves only to reinforce Zeno’s paradox in a quest for knowledge of
such mysteries. That is Ockham’s razor, like Descartes’ bell may
halve the distance without ever bridging the gap. The greater
mystery and complexity of lightning has a correlative with pain and
the medical model as the James Katz points out:
This medical model is not unlike the Western belief in hermeneutics
as a path to certainty… Unfortunately (or fortunately), the flaw with
this belief is that successive iterations of a medical model may just
as likely adhere to Zeno’ paradox. (Katz, 2004, p 61).
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This is at the heart of the director Angela Chaplin’s favourite line in
the play (Chaplin, 2005, p 5) when Sally asks Andrew:

Sally

(A silence – lightning and thunder) Tell me… By
pointing out where they’re wrong – does it make
you right?

(Buchanan, 2005, p 240)

There seems an irrefutable theoretical parallel at play between the
neurobiological mystery of pain and the meteorological mystery of
storms and lightning. There is even a commonality between the
metaphors used to cope with this complexity: the cascade of pain in
the brain’s downwards causation of neuronal assemblies and the
avalanche of lightning in the storm’s runaway breakdown of
electrons. The very metaphoricity of this language parallels both the
sciences of neurobiology and meteorology’s inability to bridge
Zeno’s paradox. The mystery endures as entities we thought to be
predictable and stable defy both states not only through their very
complexity but through the phenomena that emerge uncannily from
their falling.

This mystery is highlighted by the study of recent meteorological
evidence concerning phenomena called sprites. Sprites are “…faint
flashes of light [that] dance above the clouds at an altitude of
between 40 – 90 kilometres (storm clouds are 10 – 16 kilometres
above the ground)” (Gosline, 2005, p 34).
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It is now thought that gamma rays from space are involved
somehow in their dance, perhaps in similar ways to the emergence
of lightning but it is simply not known how or why or in what way
Gamma rays may contribute to either the avalanche of the lightning
strike and/or the dance of a sprite. The mystery of their origin still
endures as Joe Dwyer points out, “We know that runaway
breakdown is occurring, and we know that lightning is occurring.”
(Dwyer, cited Gosline, 2005, p 34). The mysteries of lightning and
sprites in storms parallels neurobiology’s discoveries that the selfreferential brain is involved in the creative act and that these
imaginary creations may modulate pain, but just how they do this
remains unknown.

Simon points out the aporia of this mystery to Andrew in the play:

Andrew

When you’re photographing your lightning does
your pain diminish? (Pause) I think I know why!
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Simon

The Saviour! They don’t even know what lightning
is! They used to think it was an electrical discharge
caused by ice crystals being rubbed together in
updrafts… But now they only know it can’t be that!
And that’s just the lightning – you ever heard of
sprites?

Andrew

Sprites?

Simon

There are things in storms we can’t even imagine –
as for what causes them - they don’t have a clue?
(Buchanan, 2005, p 137)

Simon’s point here perhaps, is that there are also things in our
brains that defy if not our imagination then certainly our common
sense that are at the heart of Chapman’s step two miracle and
manifest in the uncanny emergence of both pain and the creative
act as we catch up with the self-referentiality of our ontoneurophenomenal fall.

The parallels between meteorology and neurobiology here are
indeed uncanny. What has been considered to be opposite and
separate in terms of the self and the world, the world and the
cosmos (separated by their compartmentalized arenas of study)
now seem so highly related and interconnected as to be
inseparable. What seems compelling is that one lone and discreet
pain sufferer has stumbled upon this connection within a
photographic practice that traverses such a territory beyond the
aleatory artistic epiphany. Just as Newton in seeing the apple fall
on his head knew the universe was falling, so too does Nick

138

139
Djordjevic’s photography, in the act of its own creation, know that
what is happening onto-neurophenomenally within him is related to
the world he glimpses through his lens in ways that always do more
than they know. Atlantis is but one striking example of this process.
Both literally and figuratively, as Nick’s pain and creations fall, he
refers.

What is also compelling here is Nick’s gradual refocus from
photographing lightning to things of joy and play. Taken by the
process of his photography from planning, to shooting, to
developing his creations, Nick wondered if subjects other than the
storm would be as efficacious. He remembered Little Island three
kilometers off the Hillarys Boat Harbour in the Marmion Marine Park
that offers reefs for surfing but also a gathering place for Australian
Sea Lions. Nick wondered if an area he surfed before his pain
became persistent would have anything to offer this creative and
efficacious process.

He purchased some underwater camera housing and off he set in a
dinghy and a wet suit. He found that both he and the seals could
dance with in a neutral buoyancy environment of the sea. His pain
was again modulated but he also felt a sense of well-being with and
for the seals as sprites of the ocean. If the storms offered an
affirmation of his pain-of-the-cosmos as a kind of weltsmertz, then
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photographing the seals offered a buoyant affirmation of joy and
dance as Nick explains:
It’s like flying! It’s an affirmation of reinventing the self beyond pain
and moving onwards. I was still bedeviled by pain but I could cry out
I am alive! The seals play with you, blow bubbles when you blow
bubbles, dance when you dance – they play like kids in the surf!
(Personal correspondence, Djordjevic, 2005)

The photographs, he noticed, were gentler in composition and effect.
He was delighted and again surprised. There was a photographic
world beyond the storm like there was a life beyond his pain. This
was not to excise joy from the pain or the pain from the joy but to
know both as inseparable and deeply involved in the other or as he
explained, “You get lightning and you get sprites. You don’t get one
without the other. Joy and pain: it’s impossible to tease them apart.”
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If in Barthes’ sense of the photograph was like a wound then Nick’s
seals were Kristeva’s jouissence: powerful, healing, and restorative
as for Paul Celan’s,
it knows you
come the Sabbath.
(Celan, 2001, p 377)

As for Celan, this is the anticipation of rest, refreshment, redemption.
(Felstiner, cited in Celan, 2001, p xxxvi).

Nick’s core photographic passion remains with the storms but he has
broadened his palate from the off-shore Little Island break to include
one of his favourite and perennial of locations near the small town of
Cervantes on the central west coast of Western Australia: The
Pinnacles. Twice a year in April and August, he takes other
professionals and/or enthusiasts up to photograph the full moon
rising in the dusk and setting into the sea at dawn at ‘this most
spiritual and mystical place’.
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Photographer Dale Neil photographing Nick Djordjevic in the dawn at the
The Pinnacles , Late August Full (Blue) Moon, 2004. Photo by the Author.

He finds these limestone formations set in their own confined desert
overlooking the Indian Ocean, to be somehow deeply connected with
a spirit of play and cosmological dance. I have accompanied him
three times on these trips and each time found to my surprise and joy
his delight in something which is undoubtedly mystical. “All you get
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up here are questions – and once I got the mother of all storms. It
was just fantastic!!” So was the photograph:

I recall a phone call from John Quintner suggesting he take me up to
meet this photographer who uses photography to deal with his pain.
It was July, 2001. My pain was awful, persistent and very debilitating.
By then I had joined the academic pain-medicine collaboration John
had with Associate Professor Milton Cohen at the University of New
South Wales. We had already completed the first few drafts of the
paper that would be later published in the Journal of Theoretical
Medicine.

On the journey up to Nick’s place that day in 2001, John spoke to me
about a paper he had just read by the eminent psychiatrist Milton
Freeman. The self-referential brain lacked a metaphor to help tell its
story: DNA has the double helix, the solar system has the atom but
what did the brain have, especially given its uncanny and
unpredictable self-organisation in the subjective experience of pain?
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It seemed quite unlikely anything would ever be found, but, I offered,
there’s always hope of an apple dropping on someone’s head. We
got out of the car at an average house in an average suburb about
half a kilometre from the coast. After greeting this six foot five
mountain of a man, Nick took us to a studio he called his bunker, to
show us his lightning photography. In a flash, I saw the selfreferential apple falling onto Nick’s head.
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Chapter 7
Monochords, feeler words and Celan’s ‘Never’

That Saturday afternoon in July 2001, I sat quietly as John drove
back from Nick’s bunker. Two ideas echoed again and again in my
thoughts. The first idea concerned the photograph as a glimpse of
something far greater than it can ever capture and the second idea,
was a possible solution for Freeman’s requirement for something that
could be the-hoped-for translator of the brain’s story. Could there be
something already out there that speaks for our ontoneurophenomenal fallings in their self-referential, unpredictable, and
uncanny ways?

The first idea concerned the metonymic nature of photography,
where photography’s object d’art is a part indicating a far more
complex and interesting whole. The metonym of photography works
like the Maori word iwi, which literally means bone, but iwi is also the
term used to indicate the complexity of a whole people, a whole tribe,
a whole Maori nation (Reed, 1965, p 25). The second idea concerns
the metaphoric project, which is already problematised within its own
quest for complete translation within a system of linguistic differences
over any fixity of meaning or sense-making, as in my monochord:

-the metaphor in the poem – I never quite make up the difference—

145

146
(Buchanan, 2005, p 289)

It seems metaphors exist because language cannot essentially
express the phenomenal and metaphysical world and so seeks to
translate through figurative substitutions. That is, in the case of the
complexity of our brain and pain, can lightning and its mystery ever
really help to translate such self-referential complexity?

After seeing for the first time the uncanny moments of self-referential
possibility in Nick’s photography, there came fast on its heels this
anticlimax of the bathetic impasse. That oscillation that ensues
between the general revelation of a secret but not the intrinsic nature
of its secrets. Nick’s photos are highly contingent in their
apprehension on the above two ideas and, as such, the bathos of the
aporia and its impasse seems inevitable. In this context of this
bathetic impasse I recalled J.D. Caputo’s point that,
...like Derrida, who is so much taken with aporias and impasses,
who thinks you are really getting somewhere only when you are
paralysed and it is impossible to advance… the apophatic, the
unnameable, unknowable secret is a subject Derrida does not know
how to avoid. (Caputo, 1997, p xxvii)

Pain’s very aporia means no train of knowledge goes to the territory
of its secrets, at least, not yet. Given the onto-neurophenomenal selfreferenntial complexity of its being, it is more likely that a totality for
the explanation of pain will remain impossible and this alone
accounts for the bathos after the uncanny revelation. This bathos
seems redolent of Lacan’s desir and manqué and Kristeva’s
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jouissence: after the glimpse of union with the chora and or the
imaginary order’s Ideal I, comes the loss of that very glimpse and the
perpetual impasse to access it more permanently. I then recalled
Derrida’s own epithet “Only write what is impossible, that ought to be
the impossible rule.” (Derrida, 1993, p 27). One impossible poem of
Paul Celan’s from Lightduress apprehends this impossible context of
revelation and bathos
I CAN STILL HEAR YOU: an echo,
palpable with feelerwords, at farewellridge.

Your face shies quietly,
when suddenly
light brightens lamplike
inside me, at that place
where most painfully one says Never. (Celan, 2005, p 99, Tr. Jorris).

I have often recited the last two lines to myself as if they were only
one line. Sitting in that car on that day, my pain was still there, as was
by then, the crisis in my marriage, but the pain was something other
than I had felt it to be. Pain no longer blocked out my sun. I went
home and wrote my first one line poem:
--white lines of the highway, her face in the sky –
(Buchanan, 2005, p 289).

I have, ever since I began to read poetry as a boy, been especially
taken by the last line of any poem. Perhaps that is why in my youth, I
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preferred the confessional lyric poets like Robert Lowell whose very
powerful last lines seemed to have more power in them than the rest
of the poem combined. Or rather, the preceding confessional lyric of
his poetry had been there mostly as a runway from which the last
lines took off and made the poetry soar. Poems like Lowell’s For
Sale, Man and Wife, and For the Union Dead, are particular
favourites but the final lines of Soft Wood convey for mine, both the
inability of language to cope with, and the affirmation of the ontoneurophenomenal reference [9] of, pain:
each drug that numbs alerts another nerve to pain.
(Lowell, 1981, p 62)

The above last line, as well as completing the lyrical quotient of the
poem’s narrative, about his friend Harriet Winslow who was dying of
cancer in far off Washington, also stands and works alone. Not only
that but it takes on the form of the photographic metonym and begins
to, like any part indicating a much bigger whole, possess the
yearning of a gestalt. Any photograph yearns for the diachronic
movement, that is the movie it cannot be, but, it always invites the
viewer, like the reader of literature, to interpret this movement, to
imagine the movie it is not. In short, the photograph never has what it
is but always yearns for what it is not, and that is their attraction and
their power. As for the Maori ‘iwi’, the bone becomes a whole nation
of people, and a flash of lightning becomes a testament to a universal
mysterium tremendum. I the viewer, I the interpreter, I make up the
difference.
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The object of the photograph’s frame is always searching for its
subjecthood that only we as the interpreter, the viewer, can give it. In
this sense it is very much like Roland Barthes’ reader taking pleasure
in the text (Barthes, 1977, p 3) and, like Prospero in his epilogue, the
photographer asks for our indulgence to set the captured object free.
(Shakespeare, 1979, p 1345)

Given the combination of pain’s neurophenomenal aporia and the
linguistic paucity which amounts to an ontological impasse (that
generates Scarry’s notion that when pain finally does find a voice is it
through the creative frame), then the case for the monochord poem
to be both a powerful antidepressant/analgesic and a legitimate
imaginary creation seems as compelling as it is for Nick’s
photography to both reveal and modulate the wound. (Padfield,
2004). I began to both research the monochord’s poetics and
practice their form.

I was then unaware of the Greek poet Yannis Ritsos’s Monochords
(Ritsos, 2005). My own term for the monochord poem was twofold in
its meaning for my writing practice. Firstly, like the photograph, it
gave me a single chordal phrase, as for the post bop jazz I also play
and which seems redolent of Joni Mitchell’s simile like a warm chord
(Mitchell, 1981). Secondly it was also literally metonymic as the
lowest twelve notes on a piano are produced through single bound
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strings that are actually called monochords. Thereafter the strings
become bichordal until in the highest range they become polychordal.

These literal and figurative elements mimicked my experience of pain
in-so-far-as there was very limited language (as for Scarry’s
prelinguistic grunts not unlike the tones of the lowest twelve notes on
the piano) and, so, when I did find something to say about my pain,
especially to doctors, it was by definition, both through this creative
frame and laconic. A good example of this laconic creative frame was
when a doctor asked me ‘How was my pain today?” I replied, “I have
five bags of wheat hanging from my neck.”

The McGill Pain Questionnaires I answered for several of my doctors
and one psychologist, were another example of this linguistic
impasse, as I had to tick the category that best described my pain –
stabbing, burning, pulsating, etc. Each of these participles were not
only masquerading as adjectives but were hopelessly inadequate in
conveying the state of my pain. Yet all these words were used to
measure the type and the extent of my pain, as if such a thing could
be done through language. Since such an exercise was doomed, the
ceding of this endeavour (at least in myself) opened up the same
possibility of Nick’s photography: one line, one glimpse. The hope in
this monochordal exercise is that maybe, just maybe, the pain which
is hidden and a secret can be revealed, in uncanny creative ways.
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As more monochords were written I also noticed the way they lay on
the page. Each monochord stood alone yet each touched the other,
not in any lyrical narrative sense but through a linguistic contiguity
deeply involved in Derrida’s linguistic ‘system of differences’ (Derrida,
1978, p 352). The way the monochords touched were redolent of
Celan’s feeler words in that each monochord touched and thereby
felt the other, just as every chord in music feels the next chord and
indeed needs the next chord, to make an overall musical presence
felt. On the page, the monochords’ presence expanded to be
elsewhere to standing and being a lone singular entity.

In this sense I asked Nick Djordjevic if I might write some
monochords to accompany his photographs. This request was not
made out of any wish to caption any essence to his photographs but
that the two different works may simply touch within the aporia of
pain and depression, but also within the joy of the imaginary creation.
He generously agreed and I proceeded cautiously so as to avoid the
destruction of both in the forced marriage of the other.
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--the earth is lichen, the sky a skeleton dancing with black hair—

--what knowledge our locks keep out, enters without knocking—
When we saw the first few I asked him how he would feel if I wrote a
play about all this. I reassured him that I would take care not to use
his photography in a way that biographed him. His eyes squinted in
caution but he agreed so long as it was made plain that the play was
not about him and then he added, “But we will never capture the
secret.” There was something about the way he said never that was
again redolent of Celan’s lightduress:
Your face shies quietly,
when suddenly
light brightens lamplike
inside me, at that place
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where most painfully one says Never.

(Celan, 2005, p 99)

-the ogre will come in any case – more god-like than they thought
—
Recently, I read how Yannis Ritsos wrote many of his monochords in
secret, often while imprisoned on a remote island by one of the right
wing dictatorships that suppressed his work in Greece (Ritsos, 2005).
He would scrawl his monochords on torn off pieces of paper, roll
them up, slide them into a bottle and bury them. What was too radical
to be said could stay buried, like a hidden secret, until the play and
complexity of things political and ontological; the affirmation of
wonderment over disparagement; and, in the fullness of time, the
inability of dualistic constructs to stay in the opposition they enforce;
was revealed through the das unheimliche. Ritsos’ art, so long
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thought to be the ogre, emerged from its hidden secret in the earth,
more god-like than they thought.

In Derrida’s sense of the impossible, Ritsos had written the
impossible, Nick had photographed it and, I now had a vantage point
from which to begin a poetic course chartered by Derrida’s
impossible rule:
Only write the impossible. That ought to be the impossible rule.
(Derrida, 1993, p 27).

154

155

Endnotes
1. A letter entitled, Pain beyond monism and dualism by the
collaboration of Williamson, Buchanan (myself), Quintner and
Cohen was published in Pain 5754 05, 04, 2005 19:22. The
letter’s tenet was essentially that as pain was an aporia that also
had a lack of language available to express it, then: ‘absence of
evidence for pain was no longer evidence for absence of pain.’
The letter pointed out that: ‘That the recognition that pain is an
aporia and is beyond language should not engender a sense of
clinical nihilism, but remind us that the use of language to denote
and analyse the pain experience is imprecise and uncertain.’
2. Curatolo et al 2001, point out that despite the neurobiological
evidence to the contrary, the syllogism of the specificity theory
that fires cause pain and without fire there can be no physical
pain, remains the dominant theoretical and practical apprehension
of medical practice in the treatment of pain.
3. Lucire argues persistent unexplained pain states are explainable
through the belief and desire of the both the patient to have them
and the doctors, who believe these patients, to treat them. This is
despite the growing neurobiological evidence for this persistent
pain and a continuing lack of such evidence for the actuality of
somatisisation. In other words, Lucire’s accusation of belief and
desire for pain in the patient and, for the clinician to believe in the
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patient’s pain, seems a tautological projection of her own belief
and desire.
4. Belsey (1982, p 7) argued:
common sense urges that ‘man’ is the origin and source
of meaning, of action and of history (humanism). Our
concepts and our knowledge are held to be the product of
experience (empiricism), and this experience is preceded
and interrupted by the mind, reason or thought, the
property of a transcendent human nature whose essence
is the attribute of each individual (idealism).
5. I have taken the term dark continent from Freud in this instance,
which he originally employed to describe the psyche of women.
The irony of this is unintended other than to connote that the
acceptance of a mystery can invite the undoing of entrenched
positions – in this case – that the brain was merely a reflex driven
hardwired mechanism. The undoing of this long held classical
theory continues to cause fear and uncertainty in the holders of
such theories to be valid. The disparagement of sufferers of
persistent unexplainable pain is, in this context, not dissimilar to
the disparagement of women by the patriarchy.
6. The essentialist difficulty New Critical discourse had was to assert
that one true and correct reading of a text was achievable, when
the means by which this position could be proved could only ever
be subjectively asserted through an imposed pseudo-objectivism.
7. Gold Standard Evidence is the term used by science to both
denote and connote the very highest level of evidence has been
achieved through the use of double blind random control trials
(RCTs). This methodology attempts to obviate any possible bias
by the conductors of the experiments. The metaphor of Gold
Standard insists on a pure translation or reflection of the world as
the way it is. This endeavour seems redolent of the attributes and
pitfalls of the New Critical heuristic endeavours.
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8. The diagnoses of Fibromyalgia was critiqued in the paper
Signification and Pain: A Semiotic Reading of Fibromyalgia by
Qunintner et al, as a nosological and linguistic construct that
lacked medical utility and any reference to the neurodynamics of
pain syndromes it claimed to present.
9. Recent evidence has shown that opiates when used over a long
period time may actually be interpreted by the brain to enhance
pain rather than to reduce it. In this sense Lowell’s line is quite
uncanny in its wisdom.
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Introduction
A Bell in the Storm
and
To Fall without Landing…

At the time of A Bell in the Storm’s production in May 2005, there had
been fifteen drafts of the play completed since the commencement of
these studies in 2002. The play was initially titled “Like Snow on Mt
Everest” after John R Searle’s reference to brute facts and
speculative philosophy.

The first few drafts involved three different motifs in place and time.
The first motif was set in Perth in the contemporary and involved
three characters: Simon, a persistent pain sufferer as a result of a
serious car accident, who was in his 40s fighting a compensation
claim; Sally, his psychologist who was in her late thirties; and
Andrew, a pain medicine physician who was also in his late thirties.
Andrew had recently returned from living in France where he had
lived with his wife Jacqui for the last sixteen years but, from whom,
he had recently separated. The second motif was set in Arcachon,
France, during World War One and involved Andrew’s grandfather
Bob, as a twenty-one year old, who was there to fight with the AIF.
Sheell shocked but coping Bob meets Gabrielle on his R & R in
Arcachon. Gabrielle is a local widower in her late twenties who
became Bob’s lover during his leave in Arcachon. The third motif was
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set again in Arcachon but in the early 1980s and involved Andrew as
a twenty-one year old retracing the steps of his recently deceased
grandfather (Bob), who, as a result of his action in the Great War had
sustained a shell-shock injury that caused a life-long pain that had
been diagnosed as psychoneurotic. Andrew, in this motif would faint
outside a café only to be cared for by Jacqui, a local divorcee, and
they would, despite the language difficulties, fall in love.

Andrew Ross, the then Artistic Director of Black Swan Theatre
Company expressed interest in the piece and an initial reading was
conducted in September 2002. He suggested major rewrites to
streamline the three different motifs into a single cotemporary motif
with either flashbacks and/or the narratives of the French motifs
spliced into that action. The action would therefore be confined to
Simon, Sally and Andrew – with Old Bob, Gabrielle and Jacqui (who
was renamed Cecile in later drafts) confined to memories and
telephone conversations within the single motif.

Within the next month however, it was clear that Andrew would be
leaving Black Swan Theatre and more than likely would be going to
Brisbane to continue his career. With Andrew’s departure by
Christmas of 2002, the local theatre scene became quite turbulent
and after seeking advice from theatre colleagues I decided to
proceed with the play in the independent sector. Ingle Knight
professed interest to direct and help dramaturge the play to a
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workshop level and Bill McCluskey agreed to play the part of Simon.
A fourth draft was read in November, 2002. While Ingle was happy to
proceed with the piece and help apply for funding from the
Department of Culture and the Arts, there was much criticism of the
overly-complex nature of the piece and I was left in a very
despondent frame. Between Christmas and the late February (in part
in order to meet the next funding application deadline), I re-wrote the
play twice more under the title “The Lightning and the Bell” and
added the character of Counsel for the Commission. I then applied
successfully for funding to workshop the play independently.

A total of $7,700 was granted to me by the Arts Development Panel
of the Department of Culture and the Arts to workshop the piece in
November, 2003. Between June and October, 2003, another three
drafts were completed and by November, 2003 I had the interest of
two theatre companies. The piece was workshopped at the Western
Australian Academy of Performing Arts from December 1 until
December 14, 2003 and a moved reading performed at Victoria Hall
(the base of deckchair theatre) on Saturday December 14 between
2.00pm and 4.30pm before an invited audience. It was directed by
Ingle Knight and the actors involved were:
Bill McCluskey played Simon
Jacqueline Low played Sally
Peter Web played Andrew
Michael Loney played Counsel for the Commission
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After the moved reading, both the Artistic Director and General
Manager of deckchair theatre expressed their formal wish to
produce the piece professionally in their 2004 season, to which I
agreed.

I submitted another completed workshop draft still under the title of
“The Lightning and The Bell” to deckchair theatre in January, 2004.
This draft deleted the Counsel for the Commission as the accent of
the play concentrated more on the creative affirmation of the creative
brain and less on the court-room drama. Due to unforeseen
circumstances and the vicissitudes of professional theatre practice
the play was delayed until deckchair’s 2005 season and even then it
proceeded only with the unprecedented financial backing of Alcoa
Australia. Four more drafts were completed in the interim period up
until the production commenced formal rehearsals in April 2005
under the revised title of A Bell in the Storm.

Scitech had also graciously allowed the production be staged in its
planetarium dome in the City West Complex in West Perth. Although
Scitech had already agreed to the staging of the production in the
dome the real coup de theatre (Banks, The West Australian, May 16,
2005) of the dome had come about after I met with the Professor of
Neurobiology Stuart Bunt in November 2004. We had initially met to
discuss the neurobiology behind the play and its nexus with creativity,
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language and the narrative. We then discussed how the brain’s three
newly discovered qualities of self-organisation, noncentredness and
negentropy were irreducible to Descartes’ Bell. It was though the
storm/lightning photography of Nick Djordjevic that proved to be the
most fruitful topic of the meeting. Professor Bunt listened quietly as I
put the case that Nick’s photography wasn’t just an amazing personal
narrative of someone coping with their pain but that the storms
themselves shared uncannily complex characteristics of how both
lightning and pain emerge unpredictably from self-referential systems.
We discussed how the creative act can modulate pain through
inhibitory neuronal activity and how the main character of the play felt
his pain go into the storm whenever he photographed lightning.
Professor Bunt pondered what I had said and then told me he knew of
some members of SIGGRAPH (a computer specialists organisation
and forum) who could three-dimensionally render a storm sequence for
the dome to engender this context for the play. I went home and rang
Nick excitedly. After only a few emails and meetings between us with
Martin Sawtell, Simon Rudland and Brendan Ragan and the director of
deckchair theatre, Angela Chaplin, the idea of having a three
dimensional storm was born and included into the play. No-one – not
even the three young programmers knew what was going to be
achieved, but, achieved it was and with stunning effect for the
penultimate scene of the play, which Angela Chaplin christened the
Jesus moment:
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Meanwhile another play had been gestating in my thoughts. It
broadly concerned Caruth’s self-referential fall. I was asked to attend
an Australian Playwrights’ Conference in December 2004, conducted
at Yanchep, north of Perth. Many playwrights and theatre
practitioners across the country, including Tim Daly, attended and led
workshops. I was asked to contribute a new six page play and a
synopsis. It was read at the conference under the working title of To
Fall without Landing and Gillian Berry of the Australian Broadcasting
Commission’s Radio National Drama Unit approached me to expand
it into a full length radio play. The initial full length draft was offered to
Gillian Berry in March, 2005 and accepted for production in April,
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2005 with further drafts submitted in May, 2005 and July 2005.
Production and recording occurred from 22nd to the 24th August and
the radio play To Fall Without Landing went to air on Radio National,
on the Sunday 2nd and Friday 7th October, 2005.
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In the explosion of the universe we are witnessing, a miracle happens:
the fragments falling down are

aliv e!
Rene Char

I CAN STILL HEAR YOU: an echo,
palpable with feelerwords, at farewellridge.

Your face shies quietly,
when suddenly
light brightens lamplike
inside me, at that place
where most painfully one says Never.

Paul Celan ‘Lightduress’

Like ghosts amid your palaces
Thoughts of poor men force their way

Ernest Jones, ‘We are Silent’, 1851.
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Setting

Contemporary Perth, Western
Australia. The stage should be
open yet able to represent an
office, the Café L’avenir, a
bedroom, and the District Court –
as well as the beach or land’s
edge.

Characters
Simon Sharrin

40 something… He is a car
accident victim suffering from
persistent and severe pain.

Dr Andrew McLeod

Mid to late 30s. He is a Pain
Medicine specialist, recently
separated from his French wife
and children of sixteen years and
only just returned to Perth.

Sally

Mid 30s. She is a clinical
psychologist. Andrew and Sally
were first loves before he left for
France 17 years ago. Sally is also
doubles as Stephanie, Sprite and
the voice of Cecile.

Musician(s)…
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Scene 1

Dark stage – then a red light comes up.

Music “The Beauty in the Breakage” up… Enter Simon.

Simon

(Direct Address) Hi… I’m Simon Sharrin… or
at least I have been. We get so used to a name
that we think we’re beyond the game. Like I
was this guy, Simon Sharrin: happily married to
Stephanie Dodds (she didn’t take my name) –
two gorgeous kids Jemima and Ann, a house in
Solomon Street on the hill with sea views, two
cars - Saab and MemSaab - dependable job
teaching English… yearly holidays O.S.
…everything rang like a bell… you get the
picture of Simon Sharrin… But you know
what’s coming next, right? What’s in a name,
right? That’s why I reckon we all have mobile
phones – not just cos we can - but because we
know deep down - that without warning,
everything in our name could change in a big
bang and (Simon straps himself in his car)
instead of strapping on a seatbelt to protect us
from an explosive universe, we might get to say
our name one last time to the person we loved
the most… like that guy on Mt Everest rang his
wife and kids to say goodbye… or those poor
fucks on the 9/11 planes… their last words
hurtled invisible and thin as gas through space
to reach that ear to echo in…

He looks up at the red light and dialling his mobile
phone…
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Simon

(To himself) Come the Sabbath??? (Long
Pause… then into the mobile) Steph? It’s
me… (Pause) Yes I’m driving, but it’s Ok… I’m
stationary at a red light… (Pause) Yes…
(Pause) About a minute and half away… Tell
her I’m sorry I’m late…I’ll watch the movie with
her just as soon as I get home… (Pause) How
was the reading? (Truck headlights are
incoming like munitions. Music up to effect
this) The poetry was Ok but she’s got this big
name now and…

The lights explode into Simon… Stage effects to effect
The thinning… (Horizontal lighting, and
mist/smoke effects, with a turbulence to
effect a storm building. Subdued and
putative lightning effects begin. Simon is
picked up (via his ‘seat belt’) and thinned…

Screen; The Big Bang (birth of the universe), The Earth
from Space, thunderstorm from space, then
brain MRIs, before World War 1 scenes from
Passchendaele…

Screen randomly the words in no particular order: ‘the
sky’… ‘skeleton’… ‘dancing’… ‘black hair’…
‘behind their eyes’… ‘lichen’ … ‘the earth’…

‘C’est le Guerre’… ‘Am Sabbath’… ‘is a’… ‘Carry the
stone’… ‘open ones’

Enter Andrew reading papers.
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Enter Sally who moves between Simon and Andrew.

Screen deliberately bad portraits of ‘wife and kids’ in the
backdrop of ‘the family home’. Then the same ‘family
home’ – empty… Screen Genesis series of photographs
– Simon stands in pain - mid-stage and picks up a
postcard which he studies. He sits in great pain, midstage staring up at the photo. He reads the postcard to
himself again, then slowly, painfully gets up and walks
towards the screen… as he nears the screen the
photograph whites out.

Sally

Simon Sharrin?

Simon

I used to be…

Sally

Tell me about your pain

Simon

It was a four wheel drive…

Sally

He was drunk.

Simon

I got so… thinned… like I was becoming a gas

Sally

Tell me about your pain.

Simon

It’s the price I pay

Sally

For not dying? What is it – your pain?

Simon

There aren’t the words

Sally

Never?

Simon

There are no words

Sally

There’s always hope…

Sally moves through to Scene 2 as Simon addresses the
audience before moving among them…

Simon

Look I hope you don’t mind this but… Hands up
those, who are right now, right here, in pain?
(Silence) Any kind of pain from a twinge to
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arrgh! It’s Ok I’m not going to bite… I’m in
agony myself. Thank you… Most likely,
everyone else here wants to help you…. Right?
Reach for the Panadol, soothe the brow…To
relieve pain is divine, right? (Pause) Keep your
hands up if this pain has lasted longer than 3
months…? (Pause) Six months…?
(Pause)Years…??? Thank you… you can pop
yr hands down now… Do we still wanna reach
for the Panadol and soothe the brow though…?
No point, right? Its Ok…relax… relax… you’re
here to have a good time, right? Oh… just one
more thing – hands up please those among us
here who are in love? Keep your hands up if
this love has lasted longer than 3 months? Six
months? Years…? (Pause) Tell me, if you had
to – could you prove this love? Oh and just one
more thing… (Yeah I know… but this time it’s
the last time, I swear) Hands up all of you here
who are alive!? (Silence) Well then – it’s like
Sal said – there’s always hope…

Segue into Scene 2…

Scene 2

Music fades…
Lights up – Andrew’s office. He reads referral
documents at his office desk. There is a large framed
photo of his Grandfather as a World War 1 soldier
hanging on the wall next to his Bachelor of Medicine and
Surgery, and Faculty of Pain Medicine awards. A Large
print of Narcissus and Echo also adorns the wall.
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Andrew stares at the letter he holds before he looks up
and throws it on to the desktop. He gets up and walks to
the doorway just as Sally enters…

Sally

Andrew… are you the Dr McLeod?

Andrew

(Pulls back) Sally?! (Peels off back behind
his desk) Hi…

Sally

(Pause) I have… a meeting with…

Andrew

Yes… I’m the pain specialist… for my sins…
(Pause) It’s been a while…

Sally

Yes… How long have you been back?

Andrew

Ah… a few months… maybe six. I’ve been
busy getting this practice up and running…

Sally

You were recommended, by the University.

Andrew

Please, take a seat. (She sits)

Sally

I’d like to talk with you about a patient of
mine…

Andrew

A patient?

Sally

Simon Sharrin…

Andrew

Are you a doctor?

Sally

Yes… a PhD in clinical psychology…

Andrew

Oh… A Clinical Psychologist… You gave up
law?

Sally

I did…just after you left… for France… as fast
as your feet would carry you…

Andrew

Right… How can I help you, Sal?

Sally

(Pause) It’s to do with Neuropathic pain.

Andrew

I’m amazed you’re even interested.

Sally

Sorry…

Andrew

Well, as a clin psych you would consider the
pain was all in his mind, surely? That’s your
province isn’t it? The mind!

Sally

My province… is helping people cope with their
pain… (Pause) Would you see him for me?
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Review him – and the reports that have been
done by the Commission.
Andrew

The Commission? Car accident? (Sally nods)
Is it going to court?

Sally

I hope not… I don’t think he could cope and
they know it. He was smashed up.

Andrew

How long ago?

Sally

Three years – a bit more. Trouble is, there
aren’t any broken bones or anything on his
scans to evidence injury…

Andrew

Ah yes… Evidence…

Sally

He’s fallen apart. Lost his job, his wife walked
out on him with the kids. It’s a mess. I’ve been
seeing him for nearly two years…

Andrew

Have you found any evidence – in his mind?

Sally

(Ignores him) Now, it’s time to settle with the
Commission.

Andrew

Or he could just get on with his life… All the
evidence says people do better outside
compensation claims.

Sally

That’s easy for you to say on a doctor’s
income. What makes you think he has a
choice? They’ve filmed him for hours…you
know what the Commission’s like? They lean
on you – have him followed and spied on –

Andrew

In France we don’t… I’ve been away for such a
long… time.

Sally

I noticed… (Tense pause) Will you ummm,
please just see him for me?

Andrew

Sure…

Sally

Oh about those films taken by the Commission,
some of them are of him taking photographs…

Andrew

So?
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Sally

In the middle of lightning storms… In the
middle of the night… for hours on end… carting
tripods and stuff…

Andrew

Oh…

Sally

It’s his only passion… it’s what he does…

Andrew

Lightning?

A silence…

Sally

When could you see him?

Andrew

Actually, I have a cancellation…Tomorrow…
morning… ten? I could see him then?

Sally

Thanks… He’ll be here…

Sally stands… and is taken by the photo of the soldier…

Sally

Ol’ Bob eh? (Turns as if to consider the
resemblance) He had pain, didn’t he?

Andrew

(Steels himself) Yes…

Sally

I remember he used to sleep in his chair at the
kitchen table with his head in his hands…

Andrew

From the first night he got back to the day he
died.It wouldn’t let him lie down… Had to keep
on the move… like in the trenches… some
things just won’t let go…

Sally

Simon can’t sleep any other way either. Thanks
for seeing him.

Sally moves to exit…but stops… She pulls out a photo…
Screen photo of a teenaged boy smiling…

Segue into Scene 3…
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Scene 3

Screen Blood Red Sky… Enter Simon into ‘The bunker’.
His pain has increased and he is pacing in despair…
Then slowly he looks up at the screen.

Simon

(Direct address)This one was taken an hour
after dark. You’re thinking I used photoshop
right? To get all these greens and sunset
colours- especially as it was so dark I couldn’t
see a thing. But you’d be wrong. It was a forty
five minute exposure, that’s all. You’d be
amazed at what’s out there if you just let things
come to you…Anyhow… Welcome to my
bunker… Where I close the door on the world’s
commissions and develop my storms that find
me on Trigg beach… Trigg beach… where I
surfed everyday as a kid… Its my church and
its waves my faith. You know, those childhood
places that fill your head as you drift into sleep,
like that old pepper tree in the backyard –
familiar and recognisable as a school bell or a
ring on a finger. Specific as a key but they open
the universe. In here and out there… My
bunker and Trigg… that’s where you’ll find
me… To me, they’re the same place really…
But occasionally I have to go to doctor’s rooms
– and Sal’s of course… Sally, my clin psych… I
try to tell her –She wants to understand - the
sun drowns every night in the sea… its blood
spills across the sky… the planets laugh out
loud bright as stars… But, its like I say – there
really aren’t the words… Try saying this?
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He looks back at the photo… Blood Red Sky time-lapse
dissolves (10 frames).

The briefest glimpse (like lightning itself) of Ten Billion
Volts is seen, followed by the three second footage of a
sprite phenomenon from a thunderstorm…

Change lighting… Simon stands and literally walks into
Scene 4…

Scene 4

Lights up – Andrew sits in his office looking at scans
and x-rays. Enter Simon.

Andrew

Please, take a seat. (Simon turns around
awkwardly – in pain)

Simon sits with great care. Andrew walks to his desk
and sits.

Andrew

I understand from Sally…

Simon stands from his pain and moves (as if it were his
excuse to stand) up to the awards on the wall.

Simon

Faculty of Pain Medicine.

Andrew

Yes… Simon, your claim…

Simon

Can’t be good… playing a game where ya can’t
kick any goals? (Simon turns, hands Andrew
his reports and sits awkwardly back in his
chair)
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Andrew

I’m sorry…?

Simon

Pain… there’s no goal posts…

Andrew

Quite. It’s tough (He opens the reports and
begins reading) I’ll just see what your scans
tell me.

Simon

Nuthen… Nothing will come of nuthin!

Andrew

(Slight pause) Sometimes something does
come of nothing… Or what we think is
nothing… On TV once, I saw this racing car
pull out too early from its refuelling stop… The
pit crew were suddenly covered in methanol
fuel… One spark and they were all rolling
around in agony. But no one around them
helped… because methanol’s flame can’t be
seen by the naked eye. No one helped –
because no one believed they were in pain
because they couldn’t see any flames.

A silence…

Simon

Invisible flames?

Andrew

Lets have a look at you. Sit up on the bed,
please. (Andrew ushers Simon gently on to
the examination bed)

Simon

Yeah, right… (Pain) Arrh shit.

Andrew

(Moves quickly to Simon’s neck and back)
Tell me about your pain?

Simon

(Gestures from his neck down his arms,
then to his back, lower back and legs and
finally all around his head) All over…

Andrew

And the pins and needles you get – down both
arms?

Simon

And legs…
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Andrew

Any pain over the top of your legs?

Simon

This one.

Andrew

(Presses a spot on Simon’s lower back)
Does it get worse if I…

Simon

(Winces in pain) Fuck y…!

Andrew

Sorry… Sorry… (Starts tapping on Simon’s
shoulder) What if I do this?

Simon, after five seconds, closes his eyes and arches
his shoulders back. Screen Ten Billion Volts…)

Simon

(Opens his eyes – fade Ten Billion Volts)
Piss off!

Andrew

(Pulls his hand away) Sorry, sorry. (Simon is
wriggling his fingers and staring at them) Is
the tingling worse in your fingers after my
tapping? (Simon nods) Mmmm. Are you
getting any sleep? (Simon shakes his head)
Headaches? (Simon nods) Any trouble with
your vision? (Simon nods) How much?

Simon

Enough...

Andrew

I’m sorry I have to ask these…

Fade Stephanie and the children from a family photo
leaving him alone.

Simon

I don’t know why I’m like this!

He turns back to find himself pacing Andrew’s office
with Andrew looking on, concerned…

Andrew

I know what this must be like for you…

Simon

You have no idea what it must be like for me –
pain medicine man!!
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Tense pause.

Andrew

What about your photography?

Simon

What about it!

Andrew

Some Commission detectives have filmed you
while you were out all night in storms. (Tense
pause) With nothing showing up on your
scans, the Commission’s doctors have written
reports to the effect that you’re malingering.

Simon

Those scans… But when I’m photographing
lightning… I…

Lighting change/storm FX up – music up… Simon
stands drawn to the stage edge. As he walks his pain
diminishes beautifully… Cease FX/music…

Simon

Never mind.

Andrew

(Intrigued) Are your hands still tingling?
(Simon nods) How soon after the accident did
the pain start up?

Simon

I woke up with it and it hasn’t left me…

Andrew

You were knocked out? (Simon nods) Was the
car a write-off?

Simon

Again with the ‘write-off’ thing! Every doctor I
see wants to know how bad the car was?
(Pause) Yes! It was a write-off… and so am I!
Fucken whiplash!

Andrew

Simon, I don’t think you suffer from whiplash…

Simon

Gee! Thanks Sal for referring me to this one!

Andrew

No you don’t understand! What I mean is
Whiplash is just a name like shell-shock in
World War 1. I don’t think whiplash does justice
to what you have…

Simon

Justice, eh?
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Andrew

I think what you have is because of the way
your brain and nervous system, has responded
to the accident.

Simon

Waddya mean?

Andrew

It’s hard to (Pause) I think (Pause) your
accident provoked a response by your brain
that has created your pain… similar to the way
the big-bang created the universe.

Simon

Yeah, right!

Andrew

(Pause) The big bang took only a few seconds
but it’s still unfolding. We now know that you
can also have pain long after an accident like
yours.

Simon stares at him silently thinking this through.

Simon

A big bang pain(?Slight pause) From the
madness of the stars we are born.

Simon

(Pause) What’s it called?

Andrew

What do you mean?

Simon

(Picks up a pen and paper from the desk)
Well there must be some fancy word you
doctors all use to name this universal brain of
ours?

Andrew

Not a lot of doctors are aware of it yet…
(Smiles) Neuroplasticity… Why?

Simon

As in plastic bag?

Andrew

Yes – but as in plastic: to change, be
creative…

Simon

Yeah yeah… Brain creativity…

Andrew

Why?

Simon

Internet… (Pause, reads from his writing)
Neuroplasticity… Pain’s your game medicine
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man, but it’s a game played out on the field of
my body.
Andrew

(Pause) I’d like you to try some medication to
calm yours down a bit.

Simon

My neuroplasticity? (Andrew nods) What
medication?

Andrew

Opiates…

Simon

Like heroin? Oh yeah right!

Andrew

They will ease your pain… There’s some new
and very sophisticated anticonvulsant ones that
can also stop the pain building up.

Simon

(Writing) Anti-convulsants, eh…

Andrew

And some antidepressants we could try…
amitriptyline.

Simon

(Writing) Ami-trip-tyl-ine… And these
opiates…

Andrew

There’s quite a few…

Simon stands and walks up to and studies the Narcissus
and Echo print, as if to distract the situation.

Andrew

It’s Narcissus and Echo… (Simon examines
him) I don’t think Narcissus was the selfish
monster he’s been made out to be. He was a
dreamer… that’s all… who didn’t realise…

Simon

Realise what?

Andrew

That what we think is real can be no more than
a phantom of our own making… When what is
real, has been right before us all along…

Simon

Like Echo here?

Andrew

I’d like to see you often until your case goes to
court … or the Commission will have a field day
with you.

Simon

So long as I got my bunker – I don’t care…
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Andrew

Simon – they will allege that your injuries are
nothing more than phantom… Sal would have
told you that you’re up against the most
efficient insurance company in Australia. It’s a
war, Simon!

Simon

And what’s in it for you?

Andrew

The good fight! (Looks at the portrait of his
Grandfather)

Simon

(Moves over to the portrait) A war, eh? Your
grandfather? (Andrew nods)

Andrew

He won the Military Medal and the Military
Medal with Bar and survived the whole stunt…
(Andrew hands Simon a script) Take two of
these at night. Please no alcohol…

Simon

I don’t drink…

Andrew

Don’t drive either.

Simon

You reckon this’s all in my mind?

Andrew

Just because something’s invisible doesn’t
mean it’s not real.

Simon

Like God!

Andrew

I’m not sure I’d go that far?

Simon

Runs in the blood then… the good fight?
(Reluctantly takes the script) Can I go?

Andrew

I’d like to see you the day after tomorrow?

Simon

We’ll see…

Andrew

Do you listen to music?

Simon

So?

Andrew

See if it soothes your pain?

Exit Simon. Haunting music up… Segue into Scene 5…

Scene 5
199

200

Café L’avenir – a café by the beach… Sunset photograph
is screened… Sally sits at a table drinking from a nearly
finished bottle of wine. Enter Andrew…

Andrew

(Seats herself) Hi… Sorry I’m so late…I ran
over a patient…I mean I ran over with a
patient...

Sally

Have you been drinking?

Simon

No, Ah, I’d forgotten how beautiful these
sunsets are. I used to come here every Friday
night when I was kid… It was called The Steak
Cave then…

Sally

Café L’avenir now…

Andrew

L’avenir?

Sally

Café of the future! Isn’t that right?

Andrew

Sort of… It’s more the unpredictable future… In
French there are two kinds of futures – the one
we secure against – you plan for – it’s why we
have jobs, bank accounts, superannuation,
insurance policies etc and then there’s
l’avenir… (Pause) Those totally unpredictable
things that truly shape our lives…

Sally

Simon’s accident?

Andrew

Sure… but I was thinking more along the lines
of falling in love… (Pause) How have you
been?

Sally

(She stiffens) Would you come here with your
grandparents? When you were a kid?

Andrew

Na. With mum… Tell me about you?

Sally

Really…Your Mum?

Andrew

I’d see her every Friday night…

Sally

What was that like for you?

Andrew

Do you still feel anything for me?
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Sally

How much have you had to drink?

Andrew

(Sighs) Do you think Simon has any chance –
if it goes to court?

Sally

It won’t go to court… Why – how did it go?

Andrew

Prick-ly…

Sally

He wasn’t always like this. I’ve spoken to
Stephanie - his ex-wife. She said he was…
gentle, smart… lovely… A respected English
teacher… Had his moments of course, like the
rest of us…

Enter Simon grinning… he runs up to an imaginary child
and wraps her in his arms, picks her up and swings her
around and plays with her – jumping over her as she
‘runs’ under his jumps. Then as suddenly he grimaces
and opens his arms up to the air to reveal nothing–
ness… loss/pain.

Andrew

How long were they together?

Sally

Sixteen years.

Andrew

That’s a long time… to just disappear…

Sally

(Conceals her hurt) How long were you
married?

Andrew

(French accent) To Cecile?

Sally

Why, have you been married more than once?

Andrew

Six-teen years…

Sally

How did it happen?

Andrew

(Distant – as if talking about a patient.
Lights up on Simon and they speak
together…) She… told me last October, in bed
one morning… she started to cry… said that
she thought she didn’t love me enough to
stay…

Sally

No, no… How did you meet her?
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Andrew

Oh – I fainted…

Sally

You fainted?

Andrew

I had been riding a motorbike for too long. I
forgot to eat enough… I guess…

Sally

Jesus Drew…

Andrew

I rode all the way from the Somme to Arcachon
in a day… through a Biscay storm… I got off
my bike at a café… and fainted. (A moment
between them Angela…) I woke wet with her
hair raining on my face. Ummm… she took me
home… Or to what I thought was… my home…
Arcachon.

Sally

(Pause) Were you ever going to contact me?

Andrew

I… I arrh… thought… about it. Why does he
take photos of lightning?

Sally

What? I don’t think he’d be alive without
them… (Pause) He once told me when he’s
photographing lightning – he’s photographing
his own pain.

Andrew

Really! (To himself) Lightning and Pain…?

Sally

Did you finish your training in France?

Andrew

Ah, no… In London. Cecile came with me.
Then we moved back to France… where the
children were born and I began to specialise in
pain.

Sally

Children…The Commission has expedited
Simon’s mediated conference…

Andrew

Are you worried?

Sally

Oh maybe it’s nothing… every now and then
the Commission makes an example of
someone… A test case.

Andrew

That doesn’t sound good.

Sally

I’m worried about what he might do.

Andrew

(Slight pause) Really?
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Sally

And the Commission justifies everything on the
grounds that society can’t afford these claims…
But it’s the Simon’s of this world that get caught
in that no-mans-land…

Andrew

Le terrain vagues… They do it because it’s the
only way they understand pain - Descartes’ bell
tolling loudly through the body.

Sally

You’ve lost me…

Andrew

Come on! Descartes’ bell…

Sally

(Sings) What Rene Descartes was a drunken
fart I drink therefore I am.

Andrew

Oh very droll. Rene Descartes! The
philosopher who said the mind was a thing?
He’s the great granddaddy of psychology – not
Freud! (Pause)

Sally

What?

Andrew

I still can’t believe they don’t teach this!
(Pause) In 1644, he drew a little bloke with his
toe getting burnt by fire… which pulled on a
bloody rope that was attached to a bell in the
brain! Fire, pulls the rope, rings the bell – pain!
(He goes through the routine) Descartes’
bell. And the moral of Simon’s story is… if
there’s no fire – there can be no pain. But if he
complains of pain – then (he taps his head) it
must be a ‘phantom’ pain and he’s referred to
someone like you who deals with the mind and
he won’t get a brass razoo cos his pain’s not
real!

Sally

Someone like me… (Pause) So what does
someone like you say?

Andrew

That pain is all in the brain… and the brain is
as complex as… the whole universe. It’s
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amazing … each one of us carries inside us,
our own universe! I’m doing it aren’t I?
Sally

Oh yeah!

Simon

What if he doesn’t come to his next
appointment…?

Sally

He will…

Andrew

When can I see his photos? I thought you
might have some at your place, after dinner
over a coffee?

Sally

Wanker… (She takes her mobile phone out
of her bag) I’ll ring him – we’re working on
something together so he lets me come up to
his bunker… (Dials) Studio…

They get up to leave…

Andrew

Just how involved are you with your patient,
Doctor…

Sally

Of philosophy…

Andrew

Touchè…

They exit. Fade lighting and segue into Scene 6…

Scene 6

Simon’s studio in semi darkness… Music (subtle) up.
Simon is already present… sitting at his computer on a
chat line. His computer chimes on an incoming
message…

Simon

Mary from California! Yes…

Screen

Hi Simon… I have some news…
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Simon

(Types) Man, have I got some news for you
too! Maybe they’ve found why we’re in so much
pain! It’s our brains, Mary!!! They’re playful…

Enter Sally and Andrew. Sally goes to knock on the front
door but hesitates.

Sally

So, not two weeks after you’d left me behind in
Australia, without so much as a goodbye Sal,
it’s been good to know ya… Oh and lets not
mention that drunken proposal of marriage at
your grandfather’s wake! You fainted in France
and woke to find (Mock French accent) Cecile
reigning over you?

Andrew

(Authentic French accent) Pardon…

Sally

(Mocks his accent) Pardon (Pause) So…
you’re back in Perth seventeen years later –
licking the same wounds I had. And don’t you
dare say oui…

Andrew

(pause) Yes.

Sally

Mphh… I hope for Simon’s sake you’re not
going to run away again!

Andrew

Where have I to go?

Sally

Come on…

They enter… Screen the photograph Cataclysm.
Immediately Andrew is captivated by and drawn to it.
He walks into it…

Screen

Billy has gone to his seals…

Simon

Oh fuck… (Types) When?

Screen

Yesterday… He’d organised everything…
pre-paid the funeral, paid his rent in
advance, even Christmas presents for his
kids… Organised for the police to come to
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his apartment – enclosed a key… He left a
long letter… You’re in it… He wants me to
send you a copy…
Simon

(types) I…

Sally

Do you still want that coffee?

Andrew

Where…Your place?

Sally

No yours

Andrew

Oui…

Sally

Are… you… crying?

Andrew

No…

Sally moves to Andrew. He tilts his head and they touch
very gently… Lights up and Simon gets up. Sally moves
away from Andrew and walks towards Simon.

Sally

Simon!

Andrew

Your photography…

Simon

(To Andrew) So, how do you know Sal?

Andrew

Sal? We ah, went out for quite a while when we
were younger…

Sally

First real love…

Andrew

Yes, I’m afraid… (pause)

Sally

Your afraid!

Andrew

Sal was telling me that when you photograph
lightning… That, it’s like you’re photographing
your pain …

Simon

Did she just!!

Andrew

Simon… I’m on your side.

Simon

And what side is that?

Andrew

I think there may be something to your
photography!

Simon

That’s nice…
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Andrew

No… I think you may have stumbled on to
something really important! (Simon mock
snores) I have found some evidence neurobiological evidence – about pain…

Simon

I’ll let you discuss it with Sal shall I – and on the
way out! - she can tell you how she already
thinks that!!!

Andrew

What?

Sally

A programme Simon and I are working on
together…

Andrew

Hang on…

Sally

Not now

Andrew

When you’re photographing your lightning does
your pain diminish? (Pause) I think I know why!

Simon

The Saviour! They don’t even know what
lightning is! They used to think it was an
electrical discharge caused by ice crystals
being rubbed together in updrafts… But now
they only know it can’t be that! And that’s just
the lightning – you ever heard of sprites?

Andrew

Sprites?

Simon

There are things in storms we can’t even
imagine – as for what causes them - they don’t
have a clue?

Andrew

Yes – but we’re finding out so much more!

Simon

Just tell me when it’s all going to end for me?
For me!! Me!!!

Sally

Si – what is it?

Simon

(Holds his head in his hands then looks at
her…) Good night...

Simon exits.
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Sally

(Calls to Si as he exits) I’ll see you in the
morning, yeah? I’ll pick you up about nine.

Andrew

Pick him up?

Sally

His pre-trial conference… tomorrow morning…

Andrew

About this programme?

Sally

Not now, look, maybe it’s a bit late for that
coffee, after all…

Exit Andrew and Sally.

Change (darken) lighting – intense yearning music up…

Fade up Cataclysm. Very gradually fade cataclysm from
the screen… then screen over the photograph in a
scrawled very fast writing…

the earth is lichen, the sky is a skeleton dancing with
black hair

Fade monochord. Continue music…
Segue into Scene 7…

Scene 7

Sally’s office… Enter Simon, agitated… Sally enters
behind him…

Simon

(Quotes) No less than three medical specialist
opinions regarding three hours of film taken of
the plaintiff that demonstrates activities
inconsistent with the injuries alleged. Alleged!!!
Those fucks!
208

209
Sally

You have to divorce yourself from this …

Simon

So long as I don’t have to divorce myself from
my bunker?

Sally

You are still you… they can’t take that…

Simon

Look at me…

Sally

You know the power of your photographs
Especially for people in pain! They see it – they
see and just know! You know this… Simon.
When we set up the programme…

Simon

My photographs are just a glimpse…

Sally

Glimpses are all any of us get, Si… In the
history of language, they’ve found one word to
directly voice pain – Ancient Greek – roughly
translated its arrrrrgh!

Simon

Arrrrrrggh!! This order 24A is a bit more than a
glimpse… What twisted fuck thought up that?

Sally

I don’t know… It’s meant to make people think
twice before they take the commission to
court…

Simon

Yeah but this time it’s the Commission that
wants to take me to court?! (Pause) So was my
lawyer right? Have people lost their houses
over this?

Sally

Well… I have known people who have had to
sell their houses to keep their heads above
water but…

Simon

But in the end they lost their house? (Tense
pause – Sal doesn’t answer) See, I just don’t
get that… A drunk driver wrecks my life and I
end up at the pointy end of a war I’m
conscripted into just to keep my house – my
bunker – from the very body responsible for
compensating me?
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Sally

Only if their offer is higher than the amount of
money the judge ends up awarding to you…
You’ll still get some compensation…

Simon

Whatever that means. How much’ll be left over
after I’m up for all the court costs – theirs and
my lawyers… That’s how this thing works,
right?

Sally

Yeah…and the difference between their offer
and the amount the judge awards?

Simon

(Incredulous) Fuck…You know the worst thing
about being in a fight like this? Knowing you
can’t be anywhere else, doing anything else,
just to preserve what you took for granted.

Screen Pinnacles Dawn.

Simon

And blood seeps into the world and the world
into blood!

Sally

Simon…

Simon

Bla bla bla!!! You don’t know what to say – do
you? Cos there is nothing to say.

Sally

I know enough to know that I’m really worried
about you.

Screen the footage of Simon taking photos on the beach
at night…
Simon

The straw man is a scarecrow... (Long pause)
You’re thinking I might top myself! (Pause) I am
not mad. Stop trying to help me.

Sally

Why…

Simon

Cos ya can’t. And all this just makes me worse!
You can’t stop the storms I have in me... even if
you did believe them, Sal…

Sally

I do believe you…
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Simon

(He holds his head) Storms…

Sally

If… I can’t… help you… then at least help me …?

Simon pulls out a postcard…

Simon

You know when I first developed my
photographs, right…? But I’ve never been able
to describe the beauty of my photographs
anymore than I can my breakage! (Slight
pause) I’ve tried to find a way to tell you this so
many times… I don’t see a storm anymore Sal,
I feel it!

Screen Atlantis -

Simon

It was all an accident. I knew Steph was
leaving before she left… Nearly every door in
the house had fist holes in ‘em… (Silence)
Even then I was conscripted to a foreign land…
I was still in the same house but in no-man’sland.

Sally

Le terrain vagues…

Simon

In the end, she was scared… so were the
kids… I knew it couldn’t go on… So I did
something dumb and bought the Nikon…

Sally

Dumb?

Simon

I’d lost my job – didn’t have any money… But I
thought I’d photograph them before they left
me.

Sally

You were sure they would?

Simon

You know those moments only a family
shares? And I’m not talking about the Friday
night movie…You know…Those smiles…just a
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finger running down a shoulder as you wait for
them to get the milk out of the fridge? I wasn’t
able to share them…So I thought I’d
photograph them…To capture them
Sally

And did you?

Simon

(Nods) Sham amateur crap…

Sally

Can I see them?

Screen bad portraits… then the empty house… then
fade.

Simon

Nar… I destroyed them. When they left… (He
pulls out the postcard) You remember me
talking about my old mad uni mate, Tim
McPherson?

Sally

Yeah?

Simon

Every time he’d get manic you knew the crash
had to come… I saw him the night before he
died… He said to me everything ever created
in the universe was inside him. I thought it was
just manic bullshit.
All I could think was thank Christ I’m not like
him! Then two days after he’d hurled himself
under that truck… (Points to the postcard) I
got that in the mail… It was like getting a
postcard from the other side…

Sally

No one saw a thing as the Seine swept Celan
under its wheels like a truck…

Simon

It’s one of his one line poems: Monochords …
Read the other one.

Sally

Come the Sabbath - Mr Celan – he dead…

Simon

I got hold of Paul Celan’s Selected Poems. So
beautiful… stark as lightning yet broken…
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(Pause) Beauty and pain woven in every word.
Four weeks later, I’m sitting on the dunny, and I
read the last lines Celan ever wrote before he
threw himself in the river Seine: come the
Sabbath… Sabbath – rest, refreshment,
redemption.
Simon

That was the very night I was hit by my drunk
driver. At the time I was talking to Steph on my
mobile but I was thinking about what Tim
meant, fuck, what Celan meant by come the
Sabbath - when bang!! My own big bang
happened and my new universe started to
unfold.

Sally

And…

Simon

The beauty in the breakage, Sal. We’re all
broken. Even God is broken… Especially
God…

Sally

And that’s why you chose to photograph
lightning.

Simon

What is it with you psychologists and choice?

Screen photograph and monochord:
It found me – it has never been about what I find…
(Pause) After I destroyed all those mug shots
of Steph and the kids, I was about to throw the
camera away…But I kept getting this strange
calling from the sea…you know, my beach I
surfed as a kid… I thought I’d go down and try
to photograph the sunset… The sea’s
Sabbath… instead there was this storm on the
horizon… As it grew dark the storm seemed to
come for me… So I just stood back and
something said leave the shutter open and see
what it sees out there. Just leave it open… it’s
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a feeling… a creation-ness - that’s all… It’s not
something you can see – it’s something you
feel..

Simon looks puzzled…

Sally

You’re seeing Andrew again tomorrow, aren’t you?
(Pause) Simon… we will get through this…
Promise me… promise me, Simon … you will
keep this appointment tomorrow? (Pause…
exiting) I’ll talk to Andrew tonight, OK? OK?
What Tim did – what Celan did – was suicide
Simon! It wasn’t beautiful. But your
photography is.

Simon

And I can’t do it without my bunker… (Slight
pause) It’s my world… it’s my country…

Segue into Scene 8…

Scene 8

Andrew is at his office desk studying from a journal and
writing notes furiously. He suddenly stops writing –
deep in thought. He sighs… then begins to reach for the
phone. He stops himself and looks at his watch. Then he
picks up the phone regardless and dials…

Andrew

Bonjour… C’est moi… (Slight pause) Oui… moi…
(Looks perturbed) Oh! C’est toi Luc? (Slight
pause) Oui, c'est papa, en Australie… Oui… Sa
va!? (Slight pause) In English? Ok… Is your Mum
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there? (Slight pause – he nods) She’s gone out?
Who with? Oh… Oui. Oui. Yes, I miss you too…
(Slight pause) Is that a storm, I can hear? Oh…
(Slight pause) Je t'aime aussi… I love you too…
and Gabby – how is she? Give her a big hug from
me… and a kiss, aussi… (Slight pause) I better
get off the phone then… Oui…I love you, Luc.
(Slight pause.) Ok… Oui… Oui… A’voir…
He hangs up…
The phone rings. He answers.
Andrew

(In French) Cecile, Salut… (Slight pause – he’s
confused) I’m sorry, you must have the wrong
number. (Becomes angry) Who is this? (Slight
pause) Who are you? (Slight pause) Simon
Sharrin… (Slight pause) Yeah, well… (Slight
pause) You… are… not… on my side!

Andrew looks at the receiver and hangs it up. The phone
starts to ring again. He appears anxious and checks his
watch. He stands and turns the answering service on...
Phone

(Answering Service) Hello, you have reached
Doctor Andrew Mcleod, please leave a message…
Thankyou…

He stands as if paralysed…
Cecile

(Through the answering service speaker)
Hello… Andrew… Hello! Andrew, est – tu là?
C’est moi, Cecile... Et l’echo répondis, mèrde! (In
English) Ok, I will say this for you in English! What
I have done is not a crime! I am sorry if I have hurt
you… Ma douleur… Celui qui vous aime, parle de
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mon coeur… Remember Gabrielle’s letter…
remember what she said: Celui qui vous aime,
parle de mon coeur: Celui qui vous aime, parle de
mon coeur.
Andrew moves towards the phone… Lighting change…
Segue into Scene 9…

Scene 9

Andrew’s office… Andrew is deep in thought… Screen
World War 1 photos of Passchendaele etc…
Explosions/thunderclaps are heard emerging out of the
music. Enter Simon moving awkwardly through a noman’s-land … Fragments and Lightning is falling all
about him… Fade music and change lighting back to
office. Simon picks himself up and moves in pain to
Andrew’s office… knocks…

Andrew

Simon… please come in… take a seat…

Simon

Sitting hurts…

Andrew

Sure…

Simon sits down but is in too much discomfort and
stands again…

Andrew

Sally phoned me yesterday and told me things
didn’t go well at the pre-trial conference.

Simon

They didn’t wanna conference.

Andrew

I agree…

Simon

What?

Andrew

I agree. They want a test case Simon.
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Simon

A test case?

Andrew

How’s your pain?

Simon

Nuthin’s changed…

Andrew

Did you take those pills?

Simon

Opiates? Oh yeah…

Andrew

And?

Simon

Do you like the heat here? In summer?

Andrew

No – I hate it… Much prefer France’s
weather…

Simon

You know those heatwaves we get in
February? Being in constant pain is sorta like a
February that never ends… and there’s no air
conditioning… and…

Andrew

And the opiates gave you air conditioning…?

Simon

You’re the sorta bloke who interrupts a lot
aren’t ya? (Pause) And the sun never sets into
a blood red sky – there’s no colours or cool at
the end of the day… It’s always high noon. No
Sabbath…Those opiates were like the best
sunset I’ve ever known in my life…

Andrew

Your not taking too many, are you? Opiates
can enable you to get on with your life or they
can take it over - but they’re not the magic
bullet. They’re just another bullet (Slight
Pause)… but very useful when you’re in the
trenches… (Pause) That sunset story of yours
is interesting…

Simon

It’s not my favourite…

Andrew

Story?

Simon

I think that’s all we really have?

Andrew

No! We have evidence – real evidence…

Simon

Yeah, well I looked up what you call evidence
and it sounds like a story to me.
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Andrew

Do you remember when I first examined you,
how I tapped you on the shoulder? Well, if I
were to tap someone who doesn’t have your
pain state, initially it wouldn’t bother them. But
after ten minutes it would start to feel dull and
heavy. After thirty minutes it would begin to
ache. After an hour they would hurt. And after
two hours they would be begging me to stop.
(Slight Pause) It’s called “wind-up” and it’s the
brain’s response to a stimulus that builds up
over time…

Simon

So why did the tapping hurt me straight away?

Andrew

Because your brain’s already built up the
pain… like a …memory

Simon

Let me get this straight… You’re saying I
received the equivalent of…like a fortnight’s
tapping in the moment the truck hit me?

Andrew

Very probably, and it’s still building up in
incredibly complex ways that intensify and flux
unpredictably.

Simon

(Pause) So the story goes, right.

Andrew

Do you have favourite story then? (Pause)

Simon

Storms…

Andrew

Storms?

Simon

There’s a storm raging inside me. Like all
storms it gets a life of its own and it’s difficult to
predict how strong it will grow and for how long
it’ll last but inside me there is thunder and
lightning going off everywhere. And they’re
looking for strained fucking muscles in my neck
and back with the equivalent of polaroid
snapshots.

A silence…
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Simon

That’s what I call your CT Scans and MRIs and
X-rays and whatnot. They just go ‘click’ and in
a fraction of a second, expect to capture what’s
going on. (Pause) But to photograph a storm
you gotta be open to the world… patient… and
only when yr in the dark the most, leave yr
shutter open with the lens set to infinity… Then,
what’s really out there comes to you – not the
other way around. Trouble with all your
evidence – it’s gotta be the hunter… But what
yr searching for gets frightened off by ‘the
hunt’. You should wonder more than you
hunt… then, it’ll come to you.

Andrew

How the accident came to you?

Simon

No! The storm! God for a bright guy…

Andrew

So when your portraits of your family failed you
thought you’d conjure up a storm?

Simon

Sal has been telling you some stuff hasn’t
she…?

Andrew

Like I said – we’re all on the same side.

Simon

Yr having trouble with this story, aren’t you?

Andrew

So the storm came to you?

Simon

Mmm.

Andrew

And?

Simon

And what?

Andrew

You felt your pain go into the storm?

Simon

I hope yr not mocking me? (Pause) Lets just
say that what was outside of me was inside me
and what was inside me was outside of me
(Slight pause) but they always had been and it
all just…

Andrew

Went away… The pain?

Simon

Pain’s just a word… But what happened to me
in that storm… I dunno… Lets just say it was
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better than the sunset those pills gave me.
Then the storm passed overhead and…
Andrew

And what…? What!

Simon

I took some photos…

Andrew

Is that all… (Pause) I mean, how long before
the pain came back…

Simon

I don’t think it went away exactly… Even when
yr not in pain it’s still there – lurking in all of
us… (Pause). Yr looking for the neurochemical
that causes pain aren’t you? So you can find
the nut to put on the bolt that kills pain once
and for all? (Pause) Now that would be the war
to end all wars. (He stands and moves to the
portrait) Let me know what God looks like
when you find him. But pain and God are alike
like that – you don’t find them – they find you,
eh.

Andrew

Do you think it’s that simple?

Simon

Do you think that is simple…?

There’s a distant rumble of thunder…

Exit Simon… Andrew, perplexed, stands and moves to
the portrait… Turns and replays Cecile’s message:

Message

Ok, I will say this for you in English! What I
have done is not a crime! I am sorry if I have
hurt you… Ma douleur… Celui qui vous aime,
parle de mon coeur… Remember Gabrielle’s
letter… remember what she said: Celui qui
vous aime, parle de mon coeur: Celui qui vous
aime, parle de mon coeur.
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Andrew

Whoever loves you speaks from my heart…
Whoever loves you… speaks… from my
heart…

Music up… Segue into Scene 10…

Scene 10

Screen Weather radar with an intense storm
approaching. Continue music…

Simon moves through to his computer… Andrew reads
through papers then gathers some up while Sally tosses
and turns in her bed…

Simon’s computer chimes with an incoming message…

Screen

Hi Simon… Sorry I’ve been offline…

Simon

(Types) How ya doin’, Mary…

Screen

Billy’s funeral was beautiful… The pastor
read out his letter… Billy’d been out with
his seals again last week… The last time he
dived with them for hours and hours. He
said they had been calling to him for
months and he could no longer ignore the
things in our lives that call to us so strongly
from that other world that is in this one…

Andrew is calling at Sally’s door. He carries some
papers and his Grandfather’s war letters… Fade music…

Andrew

Sally! Sal! It’s me – Andrew! Sally!
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Sally

Oh God I remember this…Are you drunk??
Hang on… (Goes back inside –) It’s Ok…Its
only a collegue, … OK… OK… (Back out to
Andrew) What is it?

Andrew

Oh (Pause) Am I interrupting something

Sally

(Blocks his entrance) Sorry… What is it?
Actually I’m glad your here

Andrew

Look, I got this phone call…spooky... (She
cocks her head) He seemed to have
information about Simon’s trial. He said the
Commission will be going for the jugular…

Sally

Slow down…

Andrew

He said that I would never be taken seriously
because I wasn’t a member of the circle…

Sally

Andrew…

Andrew

What circle?

Sally

Andrew!

Andrew

He said that I should watch my back!

Andrew

He also said he was on my side… Prick.

Sally

He said he was on your side?

Andrew

Yes… But naturally, I didn’t believe him.

Sally

Oh… I think you can, actually. Just how good is
this evidence of yours?

Andrew

It’s huge… In every reputable journal across
the world. It will rewrite what we know about
the brain, and not just pain, but memories,
music, everything – maybe even love!

Sally

You’re sure?

Andrew

I’d stake my life on it.

Sally

(With a worried smile) You may have to…

Lightning and thunder is seen and heard.
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Sally

Is it true you’ve been referred to the Medical
Board for administering inappropriate opiates to
your patients?

A louder and closer strike and thunderclap…

Andrew

It’s bullshit… It’ll never stick… This storm’s
getting closer?

Sally

Is it true?

Andrew

Yes, it’s true…

Sally

And you know Simon is one of the cases that
has been referred to them?

Andrew

What?!!

Sally

Didn’t you know! I too got a phone call - this
morning…The Commission’s refusing to pay
for any further consults Si has to see either of
us.

Andrew

Oh fuck! I’ll either get struck off or driven out.

Sally

Thanks for your concern… We could all lose
our bunkers in this.
Andrew

Well the commission knows we

have to win this or we’re fucked… Jesus.
Merde. These people just don’t realise this is
something that can help tell the brain’s story.
DNA has the double helix – the solar system
has the atom… but pain – it only has
Descartes’ bell…
Sally

It’s late Andrew…

Andrew

Until this guy stuck away in Perth, so burdened
with his own pain has found the metaphor:
Complex systems theory, self-organisation,
neuroplasticity and lightning - it all fits!
Eureka!!! And all two minutes from his house
on his local beach. And what really gets me is
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he had to lose nearly everything to find it. And
he finds it in his only reason left to live!
Sally

Well I just hope it keeps him alive…

Andrew

Do you really think he would…? I’m doing it
again aren’t I?

Sally

Yeah

Andrew

And you’re doing it too. I remember your eyes –
getting to the heart of a thing – not just the
idea, holding on to a thought warm until it was
hatched…Thinking about who it was for and
giving it to them, newborn…A warm beating
heart

Andrew moves to her.

Sally

You know when you asked me if I still had any
feelings for you… Well… I’ve thought about…
how to… tell you…for the longest time…
It’s been like walking a beach that backs onto a
desert… And any rain that came always fell
out-to-sea? But now this strange freshness fills
the air… again…

Music I miss you like the deserts miss the rain

They kiss…

Introduce an intense blue lighting.

Simon

(Types) Mary…

Screen

Billy said he’d had a dream about my bad
arm… I was on his beach looking at the
seals playing in the waves… He was
standing behind me and playing my arm as
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a violin. The seals danced in the waves…
Afterwards, he wrote, he gently lowered my
arm and then walked into the sea and sank
into his beloved music…

Wave wash up… Enter Simon who walks into Scene 11…

Scene 11

Music up…

The beach… Enter Simon, transfixed by the storm that
has built up off the coast. Thunder is plainly heard.
Video footage of him in real time is screened… He stares
up out over the audience… He is in great pain. He takes
some pills… Simon shakes his head and smiles
ironically…

Simon

So this is it, eh! Mmph… No last words…? Oh
well… (He takes some more pills and stares
at his image on the screen… he waves to
the camera) I wonder… who it was… they’ve
been filming… all this time…? (He takes a few
drugged steps towards his screened
image… He squints and studies his own
image on the screen… He waves to his
other…) The Phantom… Phuck the Phantom!
(Direct address) What – just cos I talk to you
guys like this you think I can’t walk into the
sea? Take at look at the person next to you –
go on! You think for one tiny moment just cos
you can talk with them, touch them, they can’t
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disappear! (Takes out his mobile) If ya love
‘em - keep ‘em close… That’s why we carry
these things, right? (Throws his mobile into
the sea/audience)

The storm answers with Lightning and thunder…

Simon

Yeah yeah… (He turns and walks to the
stage edge…) I’m coming…

The video footage stills, which captures Simon on the
screen like a photograph. Simon stands centre stage he
takes some more pills and walks towards the stage
edge… Introduce horizontal blue lighting to connote
Simon walking into water, which rises as he goes. As it
gets to his chest he dives into it … Music up. End Act 1.

Act 2

Scene 12

Music up …

Screen Sprite phenomenon (real footage from a storm,
with commentary from a scientist about such
phenomena which is played during the Sprite’s
emergence)

Commentary

Sprites are things we had no idea
existed in storms. We have still very little
idea about how or why they happen…
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other than they seem to be emergent
phenomena… Storms are
unpredictable… their complexity builds
very quickly from what seem very simple
systems… from which emergent
properties like lightning and these
sprites emerge… We need to
understand why this is so…

Enter a surreal sea/storm Sprite…

Screen Sprite circling him in a dance… Then slowly as
her dance nears him the music intensifies and light
flickers from above. She ushers him back to shore…
Reduce lighting as she does. Fade music… Simon is on
the shore…. He tries to get up but can’t and he sits
holding his head in his hands…

Intense dark blue lighting up… Music up (Come on baby
light my fire)… Cease Video footage… Screen Sorrento
series…
Screen the photograph Seal in freefall for three seconds
only. Simon struggles to get to his hands and knees.
Then another photograph of the same series (of an
individual seal) is screened for six seconds. Simon
looks up at it and gets to his feet. He takes a step,
staggers, but doesn’t fall. He takes another step,
staggers even more but resists the fall.

The first light of the dawn appears on the screen behind
him... Dawn at Sugarloaf Rock.

Simon turns and surveys the sea/audience. He staggers
but steadies himself again… Simon walks to
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the stage edge and starts playing ‘Arm as
Violin’…Music up…

Simon

(Recitative) Argh Billy… Billy boy… Why did
the seals take you… and send me back…?
Dancers in the waves… that beloved music
saves… Billy… they took you but sent me in…
Billy… Play that arm as violin….

Segue into Scene 13…

Scene 13

Multivalent scene…Sally is in her office… Enter Simon…
dishevelled…

Sally

Simon what is it? What’s happened?

Simon

Nothing… everything…

Sally

What do you mean?

Simon

I wanted to walk into the sea… Wanted to swim
in to the storm… Wilder than Celan’s Seine but
gentler than Tim’s truck… I did walk into the
sea… Like Billy… Sal…

Enter Andrew in Court… he enters the witness box…

Andrew

May I show the court a drawing completed by
Renes Descartes in 1644?

Simon

How do you think it’ll go…? The court case…

Sally

I’m sure Andrew will give it everything he’s
got…
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Simon

Will you come to court with me?

Sally

Yes

Simon

Are you going to tell Andrew about him

Sally

I don’t know

Simon

You should tell him

Sally

I know, but I’m…

Simon

(making chicken noises)

Sally

Yeah chicken (She hits him) you asked for that!
I’m worried he might get hurt.

Simon

He might not

The following image is projected on to the screen:

The Hard-Wired Nervous System
“If for example fire comes near the
foot, the minute particles of this
fire, which as you know move with
great velocity, have the power to set
in motion the spot of the skin of the
foot which they touch, and by this
means pulling upon the delicate
thread which is attached to the
spot of the skin, they open up at the
instant the pore against which the
delicate thread ends, just as by pulling
at one end of a rope makes to strike
at the same instant a bell which hangs

Rene Descartes (1644), L’Homme

at the other end.”

Andrew

Descartes’ bell… is the basis for all the medical
opinions heard so far in this court. It requires
though, the brain to be a machine – like a
computer. But if the brain was a machine then
it had a ghost haunting it – the mind. If then,
there was pain but no fire, then this pain must
be all in the mind – like a phantom. But we now
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know the brain cannot be separated from the
body…
Simon

(Pinches Sally on the arm) Is that your brain
or your body?

Andrew

All his scans and x-rays are normal. But all the
recent evidence says there is a severe pain the
brain itself creates. The plaintiff has suffered an
enormous physical impact.

Sally

They will need to show the court the
photographs of the car. Will you be Ok with
that? (The photographs of the damaged car
are screened, Simon winces) You know
they’re going to have problems with your loss
of consciousness.

Andrew

We can clearly see how destructive the impact
was… He lost consciousness. But I am not
convinced that he was knocked unconscious –
in that his head was hit by or knocked against
any object.

Simon

Wait til he brings up the shell-shock stuff!

Screen photos of Passchendaele series…

Andrew

In World War 1 soldiers were subject to high
explosive blasts that caused no obvious injuries
yet they fell either unconscious or were killed
instantly.

Sally

I still can’t work out why some were killed and
some weren’t!

Andrew

It was a mystery. It was termed commotio
cerebri: meaning a commoted brain or shell
shock. But the many soldiers who survived
these blasts, woke up in pain, sometimes not
being able to talk – they even lost the use of
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limbs. Many of them, including the ones who
were killed, had any obvious injuries. So, their
symptoms were diagnosed as being “all in the
mind”, when it was a brain and nervous system
disturbance all along.
Sally

And that will take him to Andrew’s…

Simon & Sally
Andrew

Playful brain…

High explosive blasts and car accidents cause
high-impact traumas upon the brain and
nervous system, which, for want of a better
language cause the brain to wire up pain
states. Gold standard evidence exists from the
most credible universities and medical journals
across the world… its momentum builds like an
incoming tide. Sometimes called Neuropathic
Pain Syndrome where persistent and severe
pain rages without obvious tissue damage.
Neuropathic pain is far more complex and
dynamic than merely tugging on a rope to ring
a bell and… gets a life of it own… like lightning
in a storm… A much better metaphor than a
little bell that’s been ringing unchecked since
1644!!

Simon

(Sings) The time to hesitate is through… No
time to wallow in the mire… Girl we could only
lose… and our love become a funeral pyre…

Change lighting, music (slow powerful wistful rendition
of Come on baby light my fire) up.

Lighting change, music up and cue very distant
lightning with thunder.

Segue into Scene 14…
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Scene 14

Café Lavenir – screen Sunset Lightning photos…Sally
and Andrew sit at their table drinking wine. There are
distant rumbles and flickers of lightning (not flashes or
strikes) of a receding storm throughout – but widely
spaced.

Andrew

I’m glad you were able to make it

Sally

How do you think it went today?

Andrew

I think it went well. I want to talk to you about
last night.

Sally

You don’t have to…

Andrew

No I do. Not have to, want to. Are you involved
with someone? Is it serious?

Sally

What difference would it make. You and
Cecile…

Andrew

Cecile…She rang the other night…

Sally

Is she missing you?

Andrew

Anything but!

Sally

Do you miss her?

Andrew

Not now…

Sally

What did she say?

Andrew

Her message told me to read Gabrielle’s
letter…

Sally

(Cocks her head) Who’s Gabrielle?

Andrew

O’l Bob’s French lover…. They met in
Arcachon, , during World War One. Bob
returned to Australia promising he would send
for her but he never did… In her letter Gabrielle
scolded him for not honouring his promise.
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Cecile’s last words on the answering service
the other night were Gabrielle’s last words to
Ol’ Bob: Celui qui vous aime, parle de mon
coeur. (A long pause) Whoever loves you
speaks from my heart…

A silence…

Sally

Whoever loves you speaks from my heart…
(Pause) Cecile is asking you to love her…

Andrew

To love her?

Sally

Enough to let her go…

Andrew

I think I have.

Sally

We’ll see. O’l Bob’s pain... stayed with him for
the rest of his life… (Andrew nods) But what
became of Gabrielle…? Did she just disappear
like Echo?

Musician gives a loud breath which echoes on a delay
effect…
Continue echo effect which builds into the music
Narcissus and Echo…

Segue into Scene 15…

Scene 15

Multivalent scene… Andrew in court – Sally and Simon
up stage…
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Andrew

The mind is just a word that echoes in us… like
Aristotle’s heart. We use it all the time –
broken heart, heavy heart, soft heart, light
heart… but none of us think this has anything
to do with the cardiac system. Soon Descartes’
mind will be excluded from how the brain
actually works. The idea that the human heart
is the locus of our soul is just a story… but so is
the mind…

Sally

So tell me about Billy?

Simon

I was searching the net to see if anyone apart
from Tim wrote monochords… I came across
Billy in California - he wrote monochords about
his pain…

Sally

Do you have any?

Andrew

May I show the court an MRI scan?

Insert Katherine Bushnell’s scans here…

It defies common sense but our common sense
has often misled us… Phantom Limb Pain.
Pain in a limb that has been amputated is
another one that defies all common sense.
Simon

The phantom haunting the machines’ ghost is
pain…

Andrew

This pain cannot be caused by the limb – it’s
gone – so there’s nothing to ring the bell… but
the pain is real and shows up on MRI scans.

Sally

Wow…

Andrew

No credible medical practitioner doubts
phantom limb pain now.

Simon

Yeah… Billy found what I found with my
photos… We got talking on this chat line and
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decided he would write some monochords to
go with my photos…
Sally

Will you show me?”

Andrew

The first scan on the left is of a subject in
severe pain… The red to yellow and green
areas circled are areas of perfusion that signal
pain… See how the second one, taken after
the person has heard soothing music of their
choice has come up as blue in the auditory
cortex here… but has modulated – yeah ok turned down the pain on the forebrain - circled
here... As a traumatic experience may
precipitate pain – a creative one may soothe it.

Simon

We were just starting to get them together…

Sally

Did they help with his pain too?

Simon

Yeah…

Andrew

Like turning down a volume knob on a hifi. May
I show the court another Scan?

Screen MRI (scan #2)…

Andrew

This scan is of a patient in persistent pain like
the Plaintiff…

Sally

Yeah…and?

Andrew

There’s no bell in the brain… no one place
where the pain is centred – rather the neural
activity is noncentred – the brain’s going off all
over the place!

Exit Andrew…

Simon

It helped… him – but what’s going on is too… it
comes back…

Sally

So what happened with Billy?
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Simon

They were great… His monochords with my…

Sally

Yeah I got that bit… But you said you walked
into the sea, like Billy… and met his seals??

Simon

Did I?

Sally

Yes!

Simon

Storms… You can’t conquer ‘em… Ya gotta
wait for the bastards to come to you – get used
to living in the dark, waiting… Otherwise you’ll
scare ‘em off!

Sally

Scare off what, Si?

Simon

The things that emerge… The miracles…
things… You gotta learn how to keep the
companionship of sprites…

Sally

Sprites?

Simon

That’s what Mary’s been saying all along…

Sally

Mary? OK… You have to let me in on what’s
going on. Either we’re a team or we’re not. I’ll
stop being your clin psych if you stop being…

Simon

What!

Sally

OK… the King of Fucking Pain. (Pause) Simon
…please… We’re all in this together…

Simon

I can’t lose my bunker Sal... I just, can’t.

She nears him and he leans his head on her shoulder.
Lighting change transition to Scene 16…

Scene 16

Simon is at his computer on the chat line with Mary….

Screen

Hi Si…How’s the storms?

Simon

(Types) Met Billy’s seals in the last one…
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Screen

What happened?

Simon

They sent me back… I think…

Screen

You think?

Simon

They’re calling me back tho…

Screen

That could be a good thing?

Simon

Like Billy?

Screen

You’re NOT Billy… the future’s not that
predictable. Maybe you need to photograph
something other than lightning?

Simon

What locks our knowledge keeps out, enters
without knocking…

Screen

☺ Your monochord or Billy’s?

Simon

Mine…

Screen

Got anymore?!

Simon

Maybe…

Screen

Lovely…

Simon

Are you still coming out if Sal and I get this
programme up?

Screen

Wild horses couldn’t stop me or should I
say seals! Gotta go… xx

Simon

Me too… (pause – a moment here) x (pause)
x

Segue into Scene 17…

Scene 17

Andrew’s office… He sits at his desk, working on his
laptop and with some papers. He picks up and looks at
various WW1 photographs including the Passchendaele
series. Flash these photos together with high explosive
flashes of light and rumbles that are only just
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distinguishable from the lightning and thunder of the
storm outside. Enter Sally after knocking. Fade the
photographs… Andrew looks at Sally and sees
something is wrong…

Andrew

Salut… Are you OK?

Sally

(Nods) You were dynamic today. The witness
box suits you …

Andrew

Are you mocking me? (A silence) I know that
look…

Sally

What look?

Andrew

That come here, go away look.

Sally

Oh maybe just sniffing around for a little
more… I don’t know… proof? Do you have to
give anymore evidence?

Andrew

Tomorrow morning…

Sally

What are these?

She picks up and views some photos which are
screened and faded respectively, as she views them.

Andrew

Some of Ol’ Bob’s photos…

Sally

I didn’t know he was a war photographer?

Andrew

He wasn’t. He was a linesman – but he carried
a box-brownie disguised in his gear. (Pause)
War...

Sally

Men and their big bangs! Jesus - there’s your it.

Andrew

What?

Sally

War. Remember. You said to me that you went
back to France to see where it all began for Ol’
Bob.

Andrew

So… (She doesn’t respond – instead she
moves on to his papers, but he places his
right hand to protect them)
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Sally

Are these his letters?

Andrew

Yes…

Sally

Is Gabrielle’s letter here, too? (Andrew nods)
What does it say?

Andrew

She just echoes the promises he didn’t keep.

Sally

What is the sentence just before… Whoever
loves you speaks from my heart…?

Andrew

(Picks up the letter and reads) Je vous verrai
en Australie… I will see you in Australia…

Sally

I will see you in Australia…

Sally takes it off him and tries to read it… but can’t…

Sally

Je… vous… verr…ai… (Pause) Shit Drew!
That’s just what you wrote to me – in the only
postcard you ever sent me… I will see you in
Australia…

Andrew

Hey, hey… stop, stop, stop.

Sally

I think I know why your wife left you…

Andrew

What…

Sally

She didn’t feel loved…

She looks at him… Studies his face… touches his face
in the same way.

Sally

(Examines him) Narcissus…

Andrew

Sal…

Sally

That’s why you came back and left your kids
behind… Isn’t it?

Andrew

Steady!

Sally

You can’t bear pain! So when you can’t fight it
you run from it! You love this courtroom stuff –
don’t you! – cos it’s the big fight to conquer
pain - the war to win all wars!
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Andrew

(Confused) No…

She moves to kiss him on the lips but he turns his face
away enough for her to kiss him on his cheek.

Sally

(Takes his chin in her hand) Narcissus.

Andrew contemplates… Sally moves to the Narcissus
and Echo print.

Andrew

No it’s my colleagues who gaze into the pond…

Sally

And we’re back!

Andrew

Only the phantom isn’t a nymph – it’s the image
of themselves as all conquering medical
experts.

Sally

(Snores)

Andrew

The real echoes are like my grandfather… All
he could do when the pain was unbearable was
echo the last words of the diagnosis they gave
him: neurosis and one of the bravest men of
the war was reduced to the shame of a sick
mind… Something that doesn’t even exist!!

Sally

What and you don’t wanna be all knowing!
Look me in the eye and say you don’t wanna
beat pain?! You can’t fix everything… (She
takes his face in her hands

Andrew

Soulager la douleur est divin…

Sally

Whatever you’re saying in French...

Andrew

To relieve pain is divine… To relive pain is
divine!

Sally

Oh Drew… but what if God is broken… what if
God is in pain too? (A silence – lightning and
thunder) Tell me… By pointing out where
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they’re wrong – does it make you right?
(Pause) This is something you can’t win!
Andrew

(long pause) That’s just what Si’s lawyer told
me today – after my testimony… He reckons
they’re gonna carve him up and serve him on a
platter… Bad father, bad husband…

Sally

Bad person…

Andrew

Worse – a weak mind…

Haunting underwater music and lighting up… Exit
Andrew as Sally…

Segue into Scene 18…

Scene 18

Simon’s bunker... Screen Storm Radar scans….
Simon and Sal are at his computer.

Simon

Mary is a fellow pain sufferer I chat on-line
with… She and Billy were… we talk a lot…
How her arm became a violin…

Sally

Arm as violin… beautiful.

Simon

I dunno… Billy had this dream that he was
playing her arm out of pain like it was a
violin…. They were standing on his beach…
When her pain’s bad she shuts her eyes and
imagines Billy playing her arm outta pain…

Sally

So what’s Billy’s story.

Simon

Same old, same old. Billy was in an accident at
work… He fell off a ladder and hurt his back…
no one believed him. Years later he’s nothing
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left except his pain – same ol’ deal, right –
doesn’t matter where you are in the world,
Descartes’ bell keeps fucken tolling yeah.
Sally

Yeah…And the seals?

Simon

Like me, he found himself walking the beach
he’d surfed as a kid. And one time, he saw
these seals surfing so close he could have
touched them… So, against every piece of
medical advice, he swam out to them. And
voila! God’s a bastard!!

Sally

Billy swims with seals, so God’s a bastard?

Simon

For not letting us have joy without pain – yes!
He’s a bastard!!

Sally

Because pain and joy sometimes get mixed up
together?

Simon

Cos they are always mixed together - cos they
can never be separated cos they come outta
the same thing.

Sally

So God’s a bastard but he’s also beautiful?

Simon

Why is that so hard for people to get?

Sally

Maybe you gotta be in enough pain before you
can get it.

Simon

(A silence) Maybe that’s why Billy wanted to
be with his seals… He said they were calling
him… into ‘the green world… of colours and
play…’ One day he paid up all his bills and rent
and…

Sally

Drowned himself… Is that what happened to
you?

Simon

They sent me back…

Simon

Take a look at this. (Screen Atlantis).
Everyone wants to know how I got all the
colours, right?!
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Sally

Isn’t it something to do with the mercury vapour
coming from the streetlights.

Simon

Yeah – but why green? And why does green
make us feel it more. Take a look at this.

(Screen Storm Radar)

Simon

Notice how the colours are more intense in the
centre….

Enter Andrew with a CD rom… Simon checks his
watch…

Simon

That was quick…I need to clear a few things
up… these phantoms of the mind… you were
talking about? Are these the scans?

Andrew

Yes…

Simon puts the CD into the computer. Screen MRI Scan
2…

Simon

These are the same Scans you used in court
today…?

Andrew

Yes.

Simon

Scans of pain?

Andrew

In a round about way – perfusion - blood flow
related to pain… yes.

Simon

Look if you have eyes…
These are what – different moments in time –
like a cartoon flips from one frame to another?
(Andrew nods) And the colours represent pain
in all these different parts of the brain… right?

Andrew

Well yeah… Red’s the most perfuse, yellow the
next, then green and blue.
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Simon

But you said their scans didn’t pick up my pain?

Andrew

Because they’re using the equivalent of a box
brownie? But these are special scans more like
your Nikon – expensive – limited to research
projects in universities - the Commission won’t
pay for these…

Simon

Or these!

Simon plays the short film ‘Lightning from space’ which
is screened…

Simon

It’s a lightning storm filmed from space…

Lightning and thunder… Andrew slowly smiles…

Andrew

It’s amazing… How did you think of this?

Simon

Think of it? I live it everyday of my life…

Andrew

My God…

Sally

Maybe… just maybe…The beauty of the
universe in pain…

Simon

(Clicks a button the computer – Screen
Radar of storm approaching) And this little
beauty is heading right for us!!

Simon begins to gather all his photographic gear…

Simon

You’re gonna use this in court tomorrow, right?!

Andrew

It’s brilliant! But…

Simon

That doesn’t sound good!

Andrew

I’ll use it but, it may not… do it.

Simon

Whaddaya mean…?

Andrew

Unless your pain can be measured… the
court…
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Simon

Measure pain? Ya can’t! Even you said these
scans are just measuring blood flow - like this
radar is measuring water density – it’s not pain
– it’s not the storm – it doesn’t tell you what
lightning or the pain is!!! You just get pretty
colours!!

Sally

The court will want your specific brain
measuring your specific pain… And the
Commission won’t even pay for you to see us
anymore let alone perfusion scans. It will come
down to your word against theirs…

Simon

What, who tells the best story?

Simon examines Sally and then Andrew… He starts
breathing heavily…

Simon

Fuck… (Pause – incongruent laughter) …

Simon’s pain nearly overcomes him. He squeezes his
fists…

Simon

(To Sally) Did you know ?

Sally

Whatever happens, they can’t stop our
programme. They can’t stop what you’ve
found…

Simon

(Pause) What was that Ancient Greek word for
pain again? Oh yeah – Arrrrrrrgh!

Lightning and thunder… He continues to look upward
and breathes as if to inhale the whole storm…

Simon

Moments like these you need mobile phones…
Been putting this off too long. Sal, can I borrow
yours – I threw mine in the sea the other
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night… I’ll give it back to ya tomorrow
morning… (Pause – she hands him her
mobile) Ta…

He gathers his photography gear up…

Simon

(Points to the radar) Time for me to go into all
tha pretty colours again!

Andrew

They’ll film you…

Simon

I’ll be the belle of the storm, eh. Ring a fucken
ding! (Dials the phone) Steph! I wanna talk to
you about the house Chess Queen…It’s time to
castle… (To Sally) It’s cool …don’t worry.

Simon exits. Andrew looks at Sally…

Andrew

This programme of yours? You really think it
could…?

Sally

Oh yeah. It could be huge! What we want to do
is stop people blaming themselves for their
pain. If we could help them to not only
understand it better, but to actually harness it’s
creative power like Simon. What we can’t win in
court we could achieve in practice?

Andrew

They’d still need medications!

Sally

Of course! It’s not either or – it’s both and...

Andrew

That would be great, but I’m not giving up on
this!!

Sally

Who says we’re giving up!

Andrew exits…

Segue into Scene 19…
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Scene 19

Coutroom… Andrew into the Witness stand…

Simon walks obliquely through the multivalent space
reciting monochords which are screened…

Andrew

In addition to the MRI scans – I’d like to show
the court something that has just come to my
attention that tells the story of pain beyond the
bell?

Screen film of thunderstorm taken from space over
Argentina.

Andrew

(As the film is played) What we are watching
is a thunderstorm taken from space – but it is, I
believe, uncannily what the MRI scans of a
subject in severe neuropathic pain, would look
like if they could be taken over real time. I
believe we are looking at is a God’s eye view the universe’s equivalent of a brain producing
pain - and somewhere down there on a beach,
is Simon Sharrin photographing his own pain!

Simon

A PHOTOGRAPH NEVER HAS WHAT IT IS
BECAUSE IT YEARNS FOR WHAT IT ISN’T

First gentle chords of music up…

Andrew

What words will convince this court? Simon
Sharrin is no different to the shell shock victims
of World War One who were told its all in the
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mind… But it’s all in the brain and our brain is a
more complex and wondrous thing than we
ever imagined!! Credible evidence for this from
the most acclaimed universities and research
facilities across the world rises like an incoming
tide, while all the specific evidence presented
against the plaintiff in this court heralds straight
out of the Flat Earth Society in the hope the
plaintiff will drop off its edge…
Simon

A SEA GLIMPSED IS OF EVERY OCEAN

Andrew

That’s why he is harassed, filmed and
castigated in medical examinations and even
risks losing his house under an order 24A to
the very body responsible for compensating
him!

Simon

YOU OBSERVE ME, ALWAYS ASKING
SILENTLY, ‘PROVE IT’

Andrew

This court has been told that he is a weak man
– of body and mind – unable to look after his
children or himself – someone unable to cope
with a job or a marriage. But what he has found
in the midst of this loss and staggering pain - I
have only once before, in my Grandfather,
seen courage like it. The Commission has
made this a test case, conducted in the hope
that he and all the countless thousands of
others who suffer from the mystery pain, will
just… go away. But this case is a test I
personally, do not intend to fail!

Segue into Scene 20…
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Scene 20

Storm Scene on the Beach. Commence ‘Digital Sky 3D’
Storm video…

Music up…

Enter Simon struggling with a tripod and camera case.
He sets up the tripod and camera – in painful stages –
keeping a weather eye on things.

There is another brighter strike and louder thunderclap.

Enter Andrew behind Simon - conscious of his safety.
Simon looks up at the storm. Loud overhead lightning
and thunder crack. Simon suddenly becomes animated
and throws his fists at the storm.

Simon

So you want to take the house too do ya, ya
bastard! Well have it! Take everything!!

Slowly Simon becomes aware that his pain has abated…
Enter Andrew… Another lightning and thunder crack…

Simon continues to set up his camera…

Andrew

Jesus! That was close… You could feel it!!

Simon

Sure you wanna be here?

Lightning and thunder.

Andrew

How safe is this?!

Simon

Safe as houses…
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Andrew looks up at the storm.

Simon stands and grabs his hand-held control switch,
kneels, checks his camera one more time…

There is another much closer and intense strike and
clap. Andrew instinctively runs to Simon’s side, kneels
for protection and holds his arm. Simon looks sideways
at him and Andrew let’s go of his arm. Simon stands to
welcome the storm. Andrew stays hunkered by the
tripod.

An overhead strike and clap occurs – cueing the strike
to occur on stage (if possible with FX). Andrew throws
himself on the beach as if to avoid a high-explosive
detonation.

Simon

Yehaaa!

Another strike occurs, followed quickly by another.
Andrew is petrified but manages to look at Simon. Yet
another strike occurs…

Simon

(Turns to Andrew) You want to know what
happens to me in storms – well this is it, doc!!
No pretty colours, no fancy words… just this!!! I
betcha never felt so much alive!!!

Andrew realises that he still isn’t safe. As if avoiding
being shot at in a war, he moves to Simon…

Simon

From the madness of the stars we are born!!
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The crescendo of the video is reached with the loudest
and most dramatic strike and thunder clap. Then as
sudden the storm eases, then passes…

Andrew

This is madness! You are mad you bastard!

Simon

The only bastard I know around here is the
spitting image of you and he’s living at Sal’s
place!

Andrew

(Long pause) Of me?

Simon

Big bastard too. I’d say he was about sixteen.
(Long pause) Your grandfather’s medal was
for bravery right?

Andrew steels himself and walks towards Sally in Scene
21…

Scene 21

Enter Sally. Andrew walks to her…

Sally

Andrew…? Is the jury still out?

Andrew

Yeah…

Sally

And they’re likely to be for the next hundred
years…

Andrew

Were you ever going to tell me?

Sally

I… Arrh…?

Andrew

What’s his name? Our son?

Sally

(A silence) Nearly two decades ago you came
into my life like… a drunken accident… and I…
I have no idea what is happening but I am so
overwhelmed by something in my guts. Like
being in a storm… Then one day the storm’s
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gone but that thing inside - in my guts - is still
there… and its growing… its alive… it makes
you sick, it distorts you and everything about
you rebels, breasts start spraying milk at
delicate moments, and emotions that could
clutch the sun from the sky… makes you glow
as you vomit in the sheer bloody miracle of it –
and then the agony of its birth… is the end of
something that has only just begun… (Pause) I
didn’t see the point of telling you… at the
time… But I hoped he would… In some strange
space… speak with most miraculous organ…
the way a phantom limb haunts… (Slight
pause) Phantoms… (Simon nods – Sally
shakes her head) He’ll be… seventeen this
October… He’s gorgeous…My sprite!! And his
name is Robert…
Andrew

Robert…… Sal, I’m so sorry…

Sally

I was so afraid you wouldn’t want our sprite –
that you couldn’t give - him – us - the
togetherness that we needed. I left us all in noman’s land. I should have had more of ol’ Bob’s
courage. For all my talk about choice, I didn’t
give it to you. If I couldn’t be certain I didn’t
want to know. I’m the one who should be sorry.
L’avenir. You can’t protect yourself from the
unpredictable. - you faint in front of a café and
Cecile comes into your life with her raining
hair…

Andrew

Cecile’s gone.

Sally

Nothing’s secure that we can show… except
the hope that the things we love always…
always… do more than we know….
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Lighting to a light-blue wash… Continue slideshow but
the theme of lightning segues into Nick Djordjevic’s
underwater with seals, Pinnacles’ moon and landscape
photography…

Enter Simon who picks up the mobile phone and dials.

Andrew

Nothing’s secure?

Sally

(Puts two fingers on his lips) Shhhsh…

Simon

(Into the phone while walking slowly
towards the stage edge) Hi Steph… It’s me…
(Slight Pause) Did your lawyers think it could
be done? (Pause) At least the commission
won’t get my house that way – should the worst
happen. (Slight pause) But the main thing is,
whether they get it or not - it’s over…the war’s
over… (Slight pause) Look - the reason I’m
ringing is not about the house… (Pause) I’d
like to start seeing the kids again… take ‘em to
the beach – play in the surf… you know - just
play…

A silence…

Simon

Thank you… Thank you…

Andrew

(To Sally) Thank you…

Sally

For what…?

Andrew

For not disappearing…

They kiss… Simon walks centre stage and addresses
the audience… Music (opening to The Beauty in the
Breakage) pianissimo throughout…
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Simon

Now I am most weak and being at your mercy,
I ask, as you would of any jury, that I too may
soon have cause to thank you for sparing my
own disappearance. It’s true – all I can offer are
glimpses of that which we cannot know, yet it
goes, knowing as any of you do that touch
beauty, the touching does more than it knows.
Let sprites, seals and storms alike in most
miraculous organ reign, that which plays in joy
also plays in pain. Please… please as this
music toys with both your ears and this air,
don’t let this ending be one of despair….

As you from pain would pardoned be
Let your indulgence set me free…

Music up to end play. Play video footage of landscapes
to portraits: of Simon with his children; Andrew with his
children; Andrew and Sally with Robert, then to Andrew
with his arms around Sally holding up a newspaper
article PAIN PROGRAMME CREATES NEW LIFE; then
with all of them together on the beach smiling…

The End…
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I dedicate this play to all those who suffer from the phantom pain … and to those who
love them… and of course, to Nick and Dr John Quintner who have done it all… for so
long… Soulager la douleur est divin…
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Characters
Cathy

A woman in her late twenties, suffering
from ‘Vestibular Syndrome’

Searle

Cathy’s treating Consultant Psychiatrist
– mid 40s

Michelle

Searle’s wife

Music
Souvenir by Something for Kate

Endless by Keith Jarrett Trio

Scene 1
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MUSIC Q 1

BEGIN THE PLAY WITH MUSIC CATHY IS
HEARING IN HER HEADPHONES (SOMETHING
FOR KATE’S SOUVENIR)

Cathy

(dancing with complete abandon and singing
along with certain lines in the song).

Enter Searle…

Searle

(Muffled) Morning Cathy! (pause) Cathy!

Cathy

(continues dancing and singing along…)

Searle

(Shouting through the music) Cathy! (Pause)
Cathy!!

SFX

SWIRLING – AN INTRUSIVE IN-HEAD NOISE

WHICH SHE HEARS WHENEVER HER EYES ARE OPEN. IT COMES
AND GOES IN INTENSITY AND VARIES ACCORDING TO HER
ACTIVITIES AND MOOD. THE MUSIC SHE LISTENS TO ON HER
HEADPHONES MANAGES TO DROWN MOST OF THE SWIRLING
OUT.

Cathy

MUSIC

(pulls her head phones off).

STOPS

Searle

Cathy – I need to see you now…

SFX

THE SWIRLING BECOMES MORE
PRONOUNCED – EVEN AGITATED.
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Searle

You need to close your eyes and just follow my
voice?

Cathy

It won’t…

Searle

It worked last time…

Cathy

Nothing… works!!
(She is going around in very small circles,
which cause her to over-balance from time to
time.)

Searle

Cathy! Let me …

Cathy

Stay still! Stay still you bastard!

Searle

Close your eyes…

Cathy

I’m not blind – am I!
SFX

PEAK SWIRLING INTO A WHINE…

Searle

Cathy please let me help…

Cathy

Leave me alone! Leave me! (She puts her
headphones back on)

MUSIC UP.

(She recommences dancing and singing along and instantly
regains her adroitness).

Jump cut to next scene of a quiet office…
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Scene 2

Searle’s office where Cathy sits in a chair leaning back with her
eyes closed.
Searle

Cathy! Open your eyes.

SFX SWIRLING STARTS AS SHE OPENS HER EYES
MAINTAIN UNDER
Tell me what am I doing now?

Cathy

Hurtling through space… Like the rest of us…

Searle

And when your eyes are closed, do I slow down for
you?

Cathy

Yeah…

Searle

So, when you’re listening to fast music… what
happens?

Cathy

I close my eyes and I can dance… (Silence) It’s
like being in a car or on a fast train – but planes
are the best…

Searle

So, still objects – people sitting or standing near
you - are they worst then?

Cathy

Yes… They fall as the world falls.

Searle

So me sitting in my chair right now… I’m what…

Cathy

Flying around the room!

Searle

Which is why your head swirls so much – to try
and catch up with me? (Pause) Right. And the
things that are moving…?

Cathy

Resist the fall. Or struggle to…

Searle

Struggle?
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Cathy

I see the world as it is - falling through space,
Searle… or should I call you doctor?

Searle

Searle’s fine…I’m not clear on this? At all…

SFX

REDUCE SWIRLING

Why have you closed your eyes? Is that better?

Cathy

Ever since the apple fell on Newton’s head, we’ve
been coming to terms with the fact that everything
is falling.

Searle

So what is a scary thought for the rest of us is a
reality for you…

Cathy

Thanks to three tiny bones in my inner ears:
Vestibular Syndrome.

Searle

There’s no conclusive proof of that –
decompensating labyrinthitis has been ruled out
and so has any structural vestibular abnormality…
There are certain neurological conditions which
may engender your condition…

Cathy

Engender?

Searle

Bring it about… conjure it…

Cathy

Conjure?

Searle

But you have been referred to me because the
pathology may be in your mind…

Cathy

How old are you?

Searle

I don’t see what relevance…

Cathy

How old!

Searle

Forty-five…

Cathy

So is the fact that your face is slowly falling apart
pathological or is pathology reserved for people
like me? (Pause) Most middle-aged women I talk
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to find their men unrecognisable at forty-five from
the one they married in their twenties…
Searle

I can’t imagine how horrible it must be for you to
see everything as it hurtles in real time through
space.

Cathy

Everything’s falling Searle… even you… So let’s
not make me out to be too special.

SFX

SWIRLING UP.

Searle

What are you doing?

Cathy

I wanna see you!

Searle

Just let me fly off! Don’t try and find me Cathy! Let
me go!

FADE SLOWLY THE SWIRLING SFX…
Searle

No! Keep your eyes open…

RE-CUE SWIRLING SFX – HIS VOICE MOVES AS IF CIRCLING
THROUGH THE SPACE

Searle

But let me go… let me fly around… Don’t try to
follow me. … keep your eyes open – just let me
go…

Cathy

You’re flying around, everything’s flying!

Searle

Yes! … I’ll be all right… Let me fly…

Cathy

How can you be all right!! How can you be!! How
can any of us be all right!!??? This is crazy –
freakin crazy!!!

Searle

Don’t go there!

Cathy

I already am there!
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Searle

I’ll be fine – you’ll be fine! Let me go… Just let me
go…

SWIRLING SFX INCREASES IN INTENSITY AND ATTACK TO A
WHINE.

Cathy

How is it that I’m the one seeing a psychiatrist
when it’s the whole universe that’s crazy…?
(She stands)

Searle

Sit down Cathy…

Cathy

(She breathes rapidly, agitated)

Searle

(grabs her by the arms)
It’s Ok… I’m here… I’m here… I’m not going
anywhere…

Cathy

You are everywhere but here!!

SFX

DOVETAIL WHINING SFX INTO THE SLOW
GENTLE SIGHS OF A BEACH WAVEWASH…

Scene 3

Searle and Michelle at a beachside café table.

SFX

KNIVES AND FORKS AND CUPS AND
SAUCERS AND SUNDRY CAFÉ BACKGROUND
WHITE NOISE…

Searle

Are you sure you wouldn’t like something to eat –

Michelle

A coffee’s fine…

Awkward silence…

263

264
Searle

Well…

Michelle

Yes… well …

Searle

Just calm down…

(She hands him a letter… he opens it)

Searle

What’s this…??

Michelle

My terms… 70% of the matrimonial home, 50% of
all other assets including the beach house,
superannuation, stocks and bonds. I’ll leave your
private hospital alone if you agree to fourthousand-a-month maintenance… plus schools
fees. Otherwise I’ll let the lawyer off his leash!! I
may be doing many things to you right now – but
being unfair is not one of them.

Searle

Jesus… Michelle?

Michelle

Let me go, Searle… I’ll be fine… you’ll be fine…
(she stands and leaves)

SFX

SWIRLING SLOWLY AND PIANISSIMO AT
FIRST…

Searle

(Stands).

SFX

SWIRLING INCREASES IN PACE AND
INTENSITY AND VOLUME.

Searle

A Male Stranger

(overbalances)

Are you right there mate?

MUSIC UP… FADE SWIRLING…
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Segue into Scene 4…

Scene 4

Michelle

(Intensely intimate, close mic) I just want to
thank you for hearing me out…I know most of you
won’t touch a psychiatrist’s wife… especially a
soon-to-be-ex-psychiatrist’s-wife. At first I didn’t
care… Or I thought I didn’t. The dinner parties
weren’t enough to dent my love… yes… love… for
him. Once we were hitched I started to notice
things… Like how they all live in the same suburb
– there were three other psychiatrists living in our
street alone. Their private practices were in the
adjoining suburb next to the CBD. But by then
John had been born and then Walter and before I
knew it we had the nannies from Sweden and he
travelled more – he must have seen more than
twenty different countries through the singular eye
of the psychiatric conference. Still I managed to
get Searle to buy a few acres in the hills so I could
escape - but after only two years, ten months and
five days, he managed to get the thing sold.
Course he then bought the beach house at
Prevally but it wasn’t the same. It wasn’t mine. By
then my focus was little by little more and more
taken up by doing what was required.
One night I found myself in yet another fusion
cooking class as the spices fell into the bowl –
asking myself - why am I so stressed over this new
recipe? And it boiled down to this… so much
depended upon the way the first sip of red wine
went down at about 8.45 pm on any given
Saturday night’s dinner party. Was the dinner not
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only well cooked but hip to please them? Was my
hair right, my cleavage revealed without being
revealing - were the kids well behaved and
performing in an age appropriate way – were the
downlights refracting the stained glass as Searle
liked it? Would Searle’s first sip of red wine have
in the moment of its savouring that glance he
would give me – thumbs up or thumbs down …
My first panic attack came to me like a thief in the
night on a warm still Sunday morning – sudden,
fast and devastating…. It was prompted not by the
ignominy of a failed dinner in front of all Searle’s
guests – but by my son John’s perfect shining face
smiling at me through the clear blue waters of
Cottesloe beach. He ran out of the surf so happy
and beautiful and innocent and I saw everything I
treasure about him swept up in a wave of some
terrible expectation that flung me to the four
corners of nothingness…

Segue into Scene 5…

Scene 5

Searle’s office - Cathy sits in a chair opposite Searle.

Searle

Does the falling ever go away?

Cathy

We’ve been through this.

Searle

I mean apart from when you’re dancing or in a car
or plane or have your eyes closed…

Cathy

When I’m asleep… when I dream, I think.
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Searle

You think?

Cathy

I’m not sure… I just am. There’s no-one in my
sleep saying anything is wrong.

Searle

Wrong?

Cathy

Judging me.

Searle

You think I’m judging you.

Cathy

Of course.

Searle

How does that make you feel?

Cathy

How do you think it makes me feel?

Searle

I don’t know – it’s why I asked I guess.

Cathy

My guess about you Searle – is that you’ll never
die guessing.

Searle

Are you saying I do know how it makes you feel?

Cathy

I think we all know how I feel… because the bigger
reality is we’re all just… like… me.

Searle

How so?

Cathy

Falling through space on the third rock from a tiny
sun…

Searle

You make it sound so nihilistic?

Cathy

I get to see the way it is more than most. That’s all.

Searle

So what do you make of the chair you’re sitting in?

Cathy

A deceptive security - like your house, your wife,
and two point two children you must have.

Searle

I might be gay?

Cathy

Unlike you I’m guessing you’re married or have
been with two point two kids, oh and the big house
and convertible BMW – besides if you were gay
you’d look after yourself better…

Searle

Excuse me…

Cathy

Be thinner, better groomed, not so bloated.
Sorry…

Searle

No apology required…

Cathy

Are you sure…? I think that you think of yourself
as different enough – even collect the odd bit of art
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but the reality is you pathologise the rest of us for
a living, so the dominant can feel better about
being pathologically normal.
Searle

(Pause) How can you be pathologically normal?

Cathy

You tell me?

Searle

I have just told you that you can’t be pathologically
normal.

Cathy

Then what’s normopathy about?

Searle

Normopathy?

Cathy

It’s the latest psychiatric diagnosis.

Searle

I’m a senior consultant psychiatrist – I think I would
know of such a condition.

Cathy

Do a Google search – voila!

Searle

Google…

Cathy

Then while you’re at it do another search for the
DSM five… Diagnostic Statistical Manual volume
five – it’s been delayed until the year 2010 … Why!
(Pause) Because it’s over Searle!

Searle

What is…

Cathy

In 1952 there were 60 psychiatric diagnoses. By
1994 there were 410. You get it, right. Being
normal was getting harder and harder… The DSM
5 cannot be published…

Searle

Never?

Cathy

Your profession requires pathology to be distinct
from what is normal. But to find what is normal
was more difficult that you thought – so you only
know what is normal by diagnosing what is
abnormal – so you had to pathologise more and
more things until finally you lot pathologised
normal as well. But the moment you did that,
normal ceased to have any meaning because it
was pathological too... You can’t tell them apart
anymore.
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Searle

So we’re both pathological?

Cathy

Hey don’t worry - its normal…

Searle

So why are you sitting in this chair in this office?

SFX SWIRLING
Cathy

A much tougher question Searle, is why are you
flying around this fucking office?

Briefly increase swirling SFX then fade…
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Scene 6

Michelle

I met this couple at an art exhibition in an old
church. Searle figured collecting art would be a
good hobby for me to distract me from my
condition. I don’t remember the name of the gallery
– just that it was in an old church. I liked his
paintings – the wife managed his work. I thought I
wouldn’t like them but I came to love them. I
bought two of his nudes and they invited me to
their soirées. So I went. At first I just watched a lot.
Searle had no idea where I was, which was the
main reason I was there in their garden and
everywhere there are paintings and pottery and
sculptures and colour – colour is everywhere you
are and look. And there is this one far room made
completely of glass with a piano in the middle. This
one particular night happened to be a New Years
Eve. I was leaning against the table when
suddenly he was talking to me. I don’t remember if
we told each other our names. Everything was
effortless – nothing contrived. I don’t know how
long we were talking but suddenly I felt my head
want to touch his and I swear in that instant his
went to touch mine. When they touched it was not
a bit self-consciously… we spoke about music and
he told me he played double bass for a trio that
was neither jazz nor classical but engendered
both… Engendered both… I repeated those words
to myself for weeks afterwards almost ritualistically
– as if to invoke his re-appearance. He took me in
to the piano room made of glass and played me
something very slowly… (Cue wistful piano…)
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“Do you see what I mean?” “Piano too?” (I said
very quietly). “A bit” (he whispered). (Cease
piano) We went back outside and didn’t say a
word to each other just stayed side by side. Then
he said to me “Is this just me or is there something
really strong happening between us?” “No…” I
said, “It’s not just you…”

Scene 7

Searle

You seem to have an awful lot of knowledge about
psychiatry for someone who lists their occupation
as a puppeteer?

Cathy

Internet…

Searle

But… how do you manage to read the screen?

Cathy

Sometimes after I sleep… there’s this hiatus… So
I jump on the net… I look for causes, names,
cures… for my condition. Then little by little the
screen begins to move… then it begins to swirl
and then my neck gets sore and then my head is
turning and then the world flies off again and
resumes its falling…

Searle

Tell me about your puppetry?

Cathy

You and I aren’t so different in that regard.

Searle

Again we’re the same…?

Cathy

(Pause) We both resist falling for a living.

Searle

You’ll need to enlighten me?

Cathy

No I won’t, it’s so obvious – all you have to do is
see a show and you’ll get it straight away…

Searle

Get what?

Cathy

How the puppets come alive! How gracefully they
move – their arms, their legs, heads, torsos, how
effortlessly they leap and supply they bend and
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adroitly they spin and turn… Any dancer would
give their soul for such freedom of movement. It’s
irresistible to the eye and then voila! – it happens –
they become real…
Searle

Wonderful.

Cathy

Yes…

Searle

For you…

Cathy

For both of us…

Searle

Both…

Cathy

When the punters forget what they’re dealing with
is wooden or plastic – they forget that at the very
moment the puppets seem most real they are
being most manipulated… by us … Doctor
puppeteer.

Searle

You think I am a puppeteer?

Cathy

Yeah, an illusionist, just like me! You can x-ray a
broken leg, operate on appendicitis, MRI scan a
tumour. But your trade is my trade – nothing’s real
- only puppets with names… a contrivance of
strings being pulled so cleverly, skilfully that their
dance and grace is so lifelike the audience’s jaw
drops and their eyes widen… and magically they
forget about the puppeteer. The trick is not to let
go of the strings even though each movement can
only happen by allowing the thing to fall but they
must never land or they will crash into a terrible
lifelessness – into the thing we both fear the
most…

Searle

Loss of audience?

Cathy

Worse… nothingness.

Searle

(After a long silence) Your condition maybe
neurological…

Cathy

Meaning…?

Searle

It’s not in your mind.
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Cathy

Meaning it is caused by my body?

Searle

Your brain…

Cathy

Isn’t that my body and not my mind?

Searle

It engenders both…

Cathy

Engenders both…? (Pause) You mean it’s a
mystery?

Searle

Yes…

Cathy

Are you referring me on to a neurologist?

Searle

Would you like that?

Cathy

(A silence) No…
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Scene 8

Michelle

So I said to him “Come out and see me off.” We
just seemed to… I mean it was so gorgeous… I
use that word more and more these days –
gorgeous. Gorg-e-ous….Then he saw me get into
my car… It’s a convertible BMW. He flinched. He
definitely flinched at the car I drove… I noticed
that. Suddenly he was tall… and slender. Although
he wasn’t, in that light, he seemed beautiful…
fleetingly. So… diffident. It drew me in… I moved
towards him and then he came to me. Then I got
the softest kiss I think I’ve ever known. I let go. Not
him. Even when I had backed off, he lingered –
perfectly still. Next day he rang – later than I
thought he would. (Pause) I told him that I had to
take my son to a party and would be away for the
rest of the eveningI told him I couldn’t talk – that I
was too busy.
Three days went by… I couldn’t… not think about
him. I literally had my fingertips on the phone
numbers when he rang… His voice was so soft. I
admitted straight away I was just about to ring him.
I told him I thought it wasn’t a good idea to see
each other again. I told him I was too busy. There
was a silence.
. He then told me that what he had felt with me he
hadn’t felt in the longest time. That he would wait.
He would wait until I wasn’t busy. I gave him my
email address. He sent me two really
sanctimonious emails – setting himself up as an
impossible good guy and me being some notorious
A list social celebrity. (Pause) Is that true? Was I
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an A list socialite? (Pause) He said we could, no
matter how different our two worlds, engender
both… Engender both…

Segue into Scene 9…
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Scene 9

Searle’s office…

Searle

No?

Cathy

Would a neurologist want to know about my
dreams…?

Searle

No. But you can discuss your dreams with
someone who you are intimate with surely – you
don’t need a psychiatrist.

Cathy

Are we even talking about the same thing?
Dreams – as in what happens to you when you’re
asleep. Not the ones of a waking ambition… like
the house in Subiaco and the convertible BMW…

Searle

My point still holds – talk to your lover...

Cathy

Thoughts tending to ambition do plot unlikely
wonders…

Searle

What, don’t you talk with…?

Cathy

I don’t have a lover or any thing like a lover to talk
with… What makes you think anyone would put up
with… (Pause) You happy now?

Searle

(Begins to write out a referral) A neurologist has
the best chance of dealing with your condition…

Cathy

I keep having this dream… Instead of the world
falling I’ve let go like you said I should… and I’m in
sync with the things that are falling so they have
stopped swirling… just like when I’m on a plane or
in a car… I can just…. be. (Pause) I’m actually
doing what you asked me to do… I’ve let
everything go… Everything stops swirling and I
move gracefully like a dancer through the air…
effortlessly.

Searle

Cathy, I still think…
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Cathy

And then it happens…

Searle

(Stops writing) What happens?

Cathy

Arrgh – you are curious after all.

Searle

What happens?

Cathy

He’s there…

Searle

Who?

Cathy

It’s nothing grand or spectacular or romantic or
anything. It’s more like being on a plane and
suddenly there’s someone sitting next to you. You
don’t notice why or how they’re there. They’re just
there. And little by little this pull starts to happen.
And you know it’s the same force that makes you
fall… Only this time it’s pulling… Very very gently
at first – gentle enough to almost miss… then you
sense it growing – internally – you know… what’s
the word…

Searle

Visceral?

Cathy

That’ll do… No… Muscle and guts pulling! No –
like hunger. Yeah that’s better. And he’s nothing
like you thought he might be – not even your
type… Inexplicably you are talking, quietly, yet this
pull is irresistible... when you lean your head
towards each other and let them touch… and then
bang – you’re together.

Searle

And then!

Cathy

What?

Searle

What happens next?

Cathy

That’s what I need to talk to you about…

Segue into Scene 10…
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Scene 10

Michelle in her chair…

Michelle

For four weeks I heard nothing. Then another
email. It was an invite to a concert his trio was
performing at my favourite venue among the
Norfolk pines. Jesus… I mean I it read on a
computer screen but somehow it spoke to every
blood cell in my body. I didn’t answer it and I didn’t
go to the concert. But two days later I found myself
replying,

Re your e-mails.........nice to see you're one of the good
guys!!
I'm still focused on the work..... looking forward to some
time off soon.
With kind regards
M

He responded with too much haste. It was the
haste that … I don’t know… made me pull back. I
didn’t respond. Why should I? (Pause) Three
weeks later another email – but in between the first
of these dreams where I’m on a plane and I sit
down next to him… (Pause) His email said he had
posted me some CDs – of Keith Jarrett, Arvo Părt,
some others... names names, I don’t care about
names anymore… He said there was also a
DVD… of his trio’s concert. In a similar haste his
discs arrived - like they had fallen from the sky.
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(Pause) I listened to this music… (Cue music
Keith Jarrett Trio’s Endless)
God…I didn’t expect anything and half wanted to
hate it. But then… there it was… (A long pause
while the music plays…) I put the others on like a
diabetic with a secret lolly jar. Then I looked up at
my grandmother’s clock and at precisely two
minutes to midnight I put on the DVD… There he
was… playing this gorgeous music on Searle’s
widescreen television… and as if pulled I inched
towards the screen… It might have been a short
DVD cos suddenly I’m at the bit where he’s
patched in an ending of his own and there he is
before me again… He says one word only … and
walks slowly towards the lens and gently… very
gently… lets his head touch my own head now
leaning against the same screen. (Pause) I rang
him straight away. He was out. I got in the car. He
was lugging his double bass up his driveway in the
headlights when I arrived. He turned with his arms
held around his bass like a lover. I left the
headlights on with the driver’s door flapped and let
his eyeshine guide me in…

Music into Scene 11…
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Scene 11

Fade music… Searle’s Office

Searle

My guess, is that you’ll never know while you’re
living your life with your eyes closed...

Cathy

Ditto…

Searle

Touchè…

Cathy

Know what?

Searle

Isn’t that what you wanted to talk with me about?
(Silence) Are you playing dumb? (Silence) My
guess is you’re not that worried about the world
falling and everybody swirling around… That’s not
the tough question is it? (Pause) No, the tough
question is about you never being able to be with
someone… to love and be loved? Like the rest of
us! Isn’t it? (Silence) You are playing dumb?

SFX SWIRLING. MAINTAIN UNDER
Cathy

You think this is dumb!?

Searle

You talk better with your eyes closed young lady…

Cathy

Bastard!

Searle

That’s better – now you’re getting it!

Cathy

(Stands)

Searle

I’m over here! You’re too busy keeping the world
the way you’d have it – nice and still and safe…
Well bad luck sister – it ain’t – so where are my
strings, eh? Come on, pull me in and make me
dance? What, no strings, ms puppeteer.

Cathy

Prick!
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Searle

Oh you dish it out but take yr own medicine with
difficulty…

Cathy

(She overbalances a bit. She is beginning to
panic and grabs for her headphones)

MUSIC

A BRIEF BURST FROM SOUVENIR

Searle

Nar arrh – leave your headphones off, thankyou!
(He takes them from her) Dancing is such antic
gesture – don’t you find?

Cathy

Give them back, you smug prick!!

Searle

Come on, I’m over here – I haven’t moved – I’ve
been right by you all along, Cathy! Just like the
rest of the world! No need to shut your eyes –
everyone’s right where they should be – all you
have to do is to keep your eyes open and let
yourself fly!

SFX

SWIRLING BECOMING A WHINE
Cathy

(lunges at him with a determined yell before
wrapping her arms around him crying)

Searle

(Catches her…)

SFX

DOVETAIL SWIRLING SFX INTO THE GENTLE
WHIRRING OF LEVEL FLIGHT.

Searle

Its ok… Its ok… relax… relax… Look at me – just
look… See…
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(Long silence during which her tears subside.
Then he reaches over and turns on a CD - cue
Endless)
Some music someone special left behind to help
me appreciate the flight? (Pause – close mic whispered) Lately… (Pause) I’ve come to
appreciate the terrible beauty of keeping your eyes
open as you fall… (Long pause) Hi… I’m Searle…
Pleased to meet you…
Cathy

(Long pause – close mic - whispered) I’m
Cathy… Pleased to meet you… too…

MUSIC

ENDLESS UP TO END PLAY.

282

283

Part 3
The Poetry
Monochords
Secrets of the Driftwood
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Introduction

It is hoped that these monochords will accompany the selected
photographs of Nick Djordjevic’s landscape and lightning
photography, for a book that mutually speaks of poetry and
photography’s ability to creatively reference the inseparability of
unexplained persistent pain and joy. Nick and I are currently
negotiating with a number of publishers to this end and have enlisted
Dr Ben Horgan from the ‘Bone and Joint Decade” to speed this
process up for us.

Aside from the discussion in Chapter 7 of the exegesis, I am intensely
uncomfortable about discussing my poetry in any domain. I agree
with Randolph Stow’s afterword on his own poetry:
I really have nothing to say about poetry in general (except that mine
tries to counterfeit the communication of those who communicate by
silence). And these poems are mostly private letters. (Stow, 1975, p
175).

If anyone has tried to communicate through a kind of enforced
silence, it has been my own deeply flawed attempts to communicate
this thing the English language calls ‘pain’. I wrestle with my pain and
this flawed communication in my day to day existence. It is a deeply
volatile and at times violent struggle that has often led me to sense I
will not survive. It is a violence born within – a kind of corporeal
deconstruction of the self – the self undoing the self. But it is also a
self that does more than we can know and offers me extraordinary
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moments, not despite my pain but because of it. I gather a sense
from Stow’s counterfeit of silence that there is a translation going on
from one volatile body to another not unlike the acts of erotic love –
beautifully flawed in their ambition of a communication of union – a
doomed reclamation of the an ideal sense of self in the other. In this
sense the poem is itself a kind of volatile and self-referential body. I
could not hope to speak of this volatility better than Jacques Derrida
did in his attestation to the body of Paul Celan’s poetry:
There is a hand to hand, bodily struggle “within” every national
language. Each time there is writing. No writing opens a passage
without this bodily violence. How otherwise does one explain the
charge – others would say the investment – the libidinal, even
narcissistic charge that everyone brings to his own texts? It is my
body, this is my body. Every poem says, “This is my body,” and the
rest: drink it, eat it, keep it in memory of me. There is a Last Supper
in every poem which says: This is my body, here and now. And you
know what comes next: passions, crucifixions, executions. Others
would also say resurrections… (Derrida, 2005, p169).
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Secrets of the Driftwood

--white lines of the highway her face in the sky—

--seagulls peel either side of her gait the wake from a boat—

--silence lies behind your eyes closing—

--Cable Station’s beach lands an edge all tides forget—

--my daughter’s overnight bag - the divorce begins—

--this bed breathes without you a torso missing a lung—

--her hair in the plughole the shower’s rain on my face—
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--motifs and chords your voice softens under breath-swells—

--the mornings are worse the moon drowns in the sea—

--that five year old – left – jumps up and down on my fence—

--not a word spoken your sigh turns the sea green—

-tonight there is no moon only the sirens call to your dark hue—

--epiphany is a fashion worn only as you undress—

-locks keep out only the honest – you enter without knocking—

--I was five – she was twenty-five – and both awaited the fall—

--the bullseye men targeted was no reference – that was the fall—
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--a bullseye made her fall and in falling she referred—

--her reference was her eyes forgiving us this fete and my love—

--dragged away from her kicking and screaming—

--riddled as the tides, puzzled as a five year old—

--her death their target, her beauty the bullseye—

--the Fete’s there again in Claremont park but her attraction’s left—

--if they were lucky she waited and waited and waited—

--it’s just that she wanted the end to come soon—
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--when she broke the water their hands flew as gulls over a chip—

--even now a housewife in the sixties prepares her escape—

--even now the five year old waits and waits and waits—

--even now she leaves the horned man each day—

--a rainsquall darkens the sea locusts sweeping a crop—

--fifteen years… its silence spans our time left—

--the metaphor in a poem I never quite make up the difference—

--smoke gyres up your cheekbone, scars the air, dissolves—
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--your head against hers in the parisienne café one cup is full—

--and arm-in-arm under the Eiffel tower heads tilted, just so—

--photos taken in the hope their secret is not safe—

--island blues and whites bleached to salt sprays to fecund sky—

--nationalism is in the air I stay inside & board up my windows—

--Lesbos? Rottnest will do—

--lithe her clothes wild as driftwood on our bed—

--how does this night, its cold, make you whisper?—

-Celan’s Seine my Hampton Road eyes its current: a black truck—
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-droplets fall off her chin her cheek turns sunset red in the rain—

-the earth is lichen the sky is a skeleton dancing with black hair—

-knowing out there something swells rises makes her veil fall—

-I saw you in Vespers café now you’re in every cafe I see—

-the space of poetry mottles its air glimpses visibility—

-marriage felled logs the stochastic colour of tree rings—

-the figure in the tapestry the threads of each in the other—

-the mystery of blood and sunset through her fingertips held to sky—
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-would we trade Celan’s work for the man? one body left the other—

-no-one saw the Seine sweep him under its wheels like a truck—

-Mr Celan – he dead—

-left, left, left, left, (right!) left, left………………….left…—

-the noon-sun freckles her moonless night sky—

-my death, is it possible on this perfect day her hands are cupped—

-my pain cannot be held as pain itself holds what I am—

-hope is to die before my children - not to wake as they burn—
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-selling the house: removal vans, art, beds, couches, that vase—

-she didn’t feel loved but was, I felt loved, but wasn’t—

-Somme – the green silence of their songs the birds won’t sing—

-Passchendaele - impassioned dales the locals leave to fallow—

-Pozierres – my grandfather was nowhere, anywhere, everywhere—

-so I rode all day through Biscay storms south south south—

-Archachon - I fainted & woke wet with her hair raining on my face—

-her hand on my cheek is the snow on Mt Everest—
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-And here she is with fish on the menu—

-Pyla – her husband is in Paris I’m in her medoc—

-even dying on Mt Everest mobile phones keep us close—

-the storm is out to sea insistent so insistentl—

-light aircraft drone in Eb it’s the music of Nelson, Paris, her eyes—

-my fingers type trying to touch your email softly through glass—

-a seahorse dead in my cupped hand still clings to its kelp—

-her death in France comes to me in an email – late late late—

-beach-sand sieves the break leaves her lines of salt on your face—
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-what we all do what we all have done is fall…--

-eyes combing tidal shores for seahorses—

-a poem is not you mapping their kelp in your eyes—

-Good Friday, a black dog is touched by a tipuana everything shines-

-still clouds fray curtains of rain tears Celan’s heartblue to grey—

-moonlight cups a breast your eyelids close like lips in a nocturne—

-you are a boat harbour gulls settle on masts that ache for sails-

-we hear the thunder but doubt the lightning was more than a flash-
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-as for pain as for joy the most we can say is yes—

-doctor on a scale of 1 – 10 how much of an expert are you?--

-you observe me always asking silently “prove it”—

-I learn to think of you the way a farmer thinks of drought—

-the four-wheel-drive that burst my car into this universe was drunk—

-a four-wheel-drive drunk or just the whole universe?—

-the phantom haunting the machine’s ghost is pain—

-intensely I hear silence tonight. Without you is everywhere.
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-I will not sleep in case you end and go on forever—

-taunted by mellifluous signs, symptoms always regret the honey—

-those storms came at us from in us hurled across each ocean—

-why storms form is inexplicable as rain forming prepares only its fall-

-soon a grace will descend a sunset after air-burst heat—

-the bath is running, the meal eaten, the incense burns, touch wafts—

-I dreamt your arm was a violin & played away my pain my joy-

-is there some record of what happened? What happened?—
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-what happened is always always always still happening—

-yes our eyes yes the storm howls, outside holed buckets fill—

-bent over hair wet and flayed to ground your bum is a loveheart-

-braided hair, those beads run like your children by your side-

-and then the spring was here and the storms had passed—

-green poured from yellow canola fields all over us—

-the dawn pitches the land arcing like star trails into the sea—

-you walk head bowed among the ancient headstones—

-but the cold brings back this cry the stones rise up against—

299

300

-the dark a tabula rasa dawn pinnacles will soon clutter like verbs—

-did you get them? Words run everywhere on the dawn’s aperture—

-the moon is in my bed her face is in the sky—

-awake I hunger but asleep her hands come touching—

-how do I mourn something this unfaithful yet persistent?

-you name me one thing we hold without being held—

-I meet you in the same moment you begin your leaving-ness—

-holy water in my palm… it leaks only what clutched would be spilt—

300

301

-earth shadow’s lilac dawn hues seals dismissed as sprites—

-but that moon in blue was there in me still—

-the moment pain is a set of neuronal assemblies it’s all over—

-unless those molecules defy the cipher and just play play play—

-this doctor is a bachelor of medicine wedded to affairs of the state—

-in his rooms he makes us strip before he strips us in court—

-rule 1 - do no harm – rule 2 – be an expert – rule 3 – ignore rule 1—

-Hippocratic oath – h y p o cratic oa…ph – h y p o crite – i – cal oaf—

301

302

-last night again your spooned thighs a cantus are you awake?—

-sleepless we sleep together it ebbs and flows into distance—

-The ogre will come in any case more god-like than they thought—

-Come the Sabbath? A bridge the Seine’s waves nape your neck—

-your cheek pressed against glass curling lip and tongue—

-déjà vu always already does more than we know—

-under the lightning a flash is this pain—

-your eyes Bret Whitely’s bridge and a boat’s wake widens blue-

302

303
-each wave’s a miracle so ordinary our eyes scan the horizon—

-we name things in hope but it’s in how they touch that hopes—

-what’s ultramarine in a view spills colourless from your hair—

-always on the beach this music begins after every wave’s sigh—

-edges let go of always if only to meet who I am already falling—

-a sea glimpsed is of every ocean—

-so much is about timing and the spaces it defers in us here now—


-outside, your eyes eye the morning, a dew-swollen tree-fern—

-when the frond unfurls its music it opens to rain swept like grain—

303

304


-not even these chords sustain the motifs of your hair—

-vines march through the valley fog like swimmers wading into surf—

-the fingers of your right hand slide down the glass like rain—

-I’m dancing with my black dog her tail and eyes smile bark—

-your words flat-stones skip across a calm dusk sea—

-your hand on your breast a tide rises against a shore—

-a dead mother’s silent face. Kelp swaying in the driftwood’s grain—

-remember when we would rub noses with more warmth than a kiss?-

304

305

-each land elsewhere to each hand a distance our touch never joins-

-I sink under fitful sleep, scissor-kick, rollover & float on my back-

-alone in this bed adrift—

-terns fan out from my gait a dawn swim lights the shore—

-a sea-breeze billows a curtain spinnakers dissolve into sunshine—

-my hand tests yours like breath on a window—

-meeting at Claremont jetty the winter river’s still and brown as tea—

-I knew I would love you, a migrating bird knows when to land—

305

306
-your head tilts fifteen degrees as you fold your wings up tight—

-a face as between your hands a whetstone—

-rain hues auburn hair your fingers spread like spilt dye—

-footprints and bits of red seaweed wind-strewn as your hair—

-after storms a still small voice the surge behind breakwater-

-my daughter bursts out of the backdoor water from a faucet—

-spectres return every night, we wake to a dust on every shelf—

-when at last I surrender fog to winter air—

-our joy has its spectre in the entropy of its enjoyment—

306

307

-a photograph never has what it is but always yearns for what it isn’t-

-I have been here digging, digging, Ritsos buries his bottles—

-you lie on the beach, from Tehran, Paris, secrets of the driftwood–
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Appendix 1

The program for A Bell in the Storm, produced by deckchair
theatre.
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